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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law: Walsh-Healey Act: Right to bid on .federal con-
tracts: Judicial control of administrative action.-Disturbed1 because
the Government had been abetting sweatshop and substandard labor condi-
tions by awarding contracts for supplies to the lowest responsible bidder,2
Congress on June 30, 1936, passed the Walsh-Healey Act.3 It empowers
the Secretary of Labor, guided by findings and recommendations made after
investigation by the Public Contracts Board, to include a stipulation in sup-
ply contracts that the contractor pay not less than a fixed minimum wage.
The standard to which the Secretary must adhere in fixing the wage level
is "the prevailing minimum wages . . . in the locality" where the supplies
are manufactured or furnished.4
Whether a prospective bidder can successfully challenge in the courts the
Secretary's wage determinations -under the Act came before the Supreme
Court for the first time in Perkins et al. v. Lukens Steel Company et al.,
60 Sup. Ct. 869 (1940).5 The Secretary had determined the wage standard
for the iron and steel industry, interpreting broadly the meaning of "locality"
and parceling the United States into only six localities with different wage
rates for each. The Lukens Company and two other small steel companies
which had been doing a lucrative business with the Government attacked the
correctness of this broad interpretation. They complained that the inter-
pretation was so capricious and arbitrary that it exceeded the Secretary's
statutory authority and vis-a-vis prospective bidders put her in the position
of a private intermeddler unlawfully interfering with the bidders' right to
bid and negotiate for government contracts. To establish such a right, they
invoked Rev. Stat. § 37097 and the Walsh-Healey Act. The former pro-
vides merely that contracts for supplies and services shall "be made after
advertising a sufficient time previously for proposals respecting the same."
Since this statute establishes conditions under which bidding must be con-
ducted, the steel companies contended that it recognized and created a right
to bid and, therefore, prohibited a government officer, under penalty of court
action, from imposing any other conditions.8 But the Court decided that
lHearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 11554,
74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), 121 et seq., 175, 208; 80 CoNG. REc. 9993 et seq. (1936).2Judicial and executive construction has expanded the statutory requirement that. all
purchases and contracts for supplies must be made by advertising to include the lowest
responsible bidder requirement. REv. STAT. § 3709 (1861), 41 U. S. C. A. § 5 (1934);
Scott v. United States, 44 Ct. Cl. 524 (1909); Schneider v. United States, 19 Ct. t1.
547 (1884).
349 STAT. 2036 (1936), 41 U. S. C. A. §§ 35-45 (Supp. 1939).
449 STAT. 2036 (1936), 41 U. S. C. A. § 35 (b) (Supp. 1939).5The case in the Court of Appeals, 70 App. D. C. 354, 107 F. (2d) 627i (1939), is
noted in (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 548.6The companies did business in the locality consisting of Ohio, Pennsylvania, Dela-
ware, Maryland, Kentucky, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massa-
chusetts, Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, the District of Columbia, and a part of
West Virginia. The minimum standard determined for this locality was 623/2c per hour.
The companies had formerly paid wages ranging from 53c to 563/2 c per hour.7Rv. STAT. § 3709 (1861), 41 U. S. C. A. § 5 (1934).
SThis contention seemed to be supported by a dictum in United States v. Purcell
Envelope Co., 249 U. S. 313, 318, 39 Sup. Ct. 300 (1919).
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the statute conferred no such right, basing its decision on lower court cases
which had held that neither a taxpayer nor a bidder could contest an award
of contracts9 and on a Supreme Court decision that the statutory require-
ments are "for the protection of the United States, not the seller." 10 As to
the Walsh-Healey Act, the Court specifically held that it conferred no "litig-
able rights upon those desirous of selling to the Government.""
Not only is the decision important as definitely establishing that pros-
pective bidders have no statutory right entitling them to complain in the
courts if the contracting officer seeks to impose upon them conditions which
make it economically impossible to bid, but also it reaffirms several recent
cases in which the Court has refused to restrain administrative action when
all that the complainant could show was that such action might cause him
loss of income. In Alabama Power Company v. Ickes,' 2 a power company
distributing electric energy in the TVA zone of activities sought to restrain
Secretary of the Interior Ickes from making loans and grants for the con-
struction of municipally owned power companies, claiming that he was ex-
ceeding the authority conferred on him by a statute which was in itself un-
constitutional. The Court held in effect that even assuming Ickes had ex-
ceeded his authority and granting that as a result the power company would
be subjected to destructive competition, the company was without standing
to challenge the validity of the administrator's acts. This case was followed
in Tennessee Electric Power Company v. Tennessee Valley Authority 3 and
in Duke Power Company v. Greenwood County.'4  Similarly, although for
the steel companies to comply with the Secretary's wage determinations would
force them to increase their wages to such an extent that they would be
unable successfully to bid in competition with companies better able to pay
higher wages,' 5 the Court concluded that "neither damages nor loss of in-
come in consequence of the action of the Government" gave a complainant
standing to maintain a suit.
16
Such a conclusion amplifies ,and furnishes a counterpart to the decision in
Frothingham v. Mellon,17 where it was held that a taxpayer's possible in-
90'Brien v. Carney, 6 F. Supp. 761 (D. Mass. 1934); Champion C. P. Co. v. joint
Comm. on Printing, 47 App. D. C. 141 (1917) ; B. F. Cummins Co. v. Burleson, 40
App. D. C. 500 (1913); cf. Strong v. United States, 6 Ct. Cl. 135 (1870).
'OAmerican Smelting & Refining Co. v. United States, 259 U. S. 75, 78, 4Z Sup. Ct.
420 (1922) ; cf. United States v. N. Y. & Porto Rico S. S. Co., 239 U. S. 88, 36 Sup.
Ct. 41 (1915) ; McGowan v. Parish, 237 U. S. 285, 294, 35 Sup. Ct. 543 (1915).
'lPerkins v. Lukens, 60 Sup. Ct. 869, 877 (1940).
12302 U. S. 464, 58 Sup. Ct. 300 (1938).
'13306 U. S. 118, 59 Sup. Ct. 366 (1939) (corporations generating and distributing
electricity sought to enjoin the directors of the TVA from selling electric energy to
municipally owned distributive systems, non-profit distributing corporations, and industrial
plants. Since the only injury they might sustain was competition which might force
them to reduce their rates, the Court held they had no standing to maintain the suit).
14302 U. S. 485, 58 Sup. Ct. 30 (1938).
l'Because the other companies were large fully integrated companies enjoying more
favorable geographic locations (from the standpoint of proximity to markets, proximity
to raw materials, and freight rate differentials) whose wage rates were not increased
by the determination.
IGPerkins v. Lukens, 60 Sup. Ct. 869, 875 (1940).
17262 U. S. 447, 43 Sup. Ct. 597 (1923).
1941]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
jury in the form of increased taxation from the expenditure of public money
was too minute and indeterminable to justify a suit to test the constitutionality
of the appropriation. From this case the conclusion might seem to follow
that if a party, either as a taxpayer, public utility, or prospective bidder, were
able to show that arn official's acts threatened to inflict immediate, determin-
able damage, the injured party would be entitled to maintain suit either to
test the constitutionality of the statutory authorization or to restrain the
official from exceeding his statutory authority.' s But the Frothingham case
on the one hand, and the principal caselon the other, effectively prevent any
such suit by one who seeks the Court's aid either as a taxpayer, or as a party
who is threatened with disastrous financial consequences.
The reasoning which underlies this line of authority is: That a citizen's
or taxpayer's interest as a representative of the public in the proper adminis-
tration of the law ig not a sufficient interest to give him standing in court to
restrain administrative action alleged to be unconstitutional or unwarranted
by statute; that the official's duty to obey -statutory mandates is owed to the
Government, not to the citizen; that before a complainant is entitled to
judicial protection, therefore, he must be able to show that in addition to
this duty which the official, owes to the Government he also owes a special
duty to the complainant. To establish such a duty, the complainant must
show either that a statute has conferred upon him a right to judicial pro-'
tection or that the official has assailed one of his common law rights. The
Court, to protect the right, will enforce the duty which the official owes not
to the Government nor to the public but to the complainant.
That a person may owe a duty to A but may owe no duty to B, the in-
jured party, and is, therefore, not liable to B, is of course a legal concept
common to other fields of the law,19 and, in the field of administrative law is
a narrow statement of the reasoning which impels a court to deny relief.
In deciding whether or not to restrain administrative activity, the Court is
influenced by considerations which are much broader and much more diffi-
cult to reduce to succinct statement than this comparatively simple right-duty
concept. The Ickes and Perkins cases, however, bring to light a broad dis-
tinction which guides the Court. These cases indicate that the Court is more
apt to enjoin administrative activity which is ministerial or governmental
than it is to enjoin activity which is proprietary.
When ai complainant seeks judicial restraint of proprietary activities, he is
asking the Court to restrain' activity similar to that carried on by a private
corporation. In the Ickes and Perkins cases, the complainants sought to
establish that the Government, acting through its agents in a proprietary
capacity, threatened to assail common law rights in a manner analogous to a
private corporation. They contended that Ickes by unlawfully loaning money
threatened to subject them to unlawful competition and that the Secretary
by exceeding her authority had unlawfully impeded their right to contract
without interference. But once a complainant shifts the basis of his com-
plaint from an attempt to secure judicial protection of a statutory right to
'
8See Greenwood County v. Duke Power Co., 81 F. (2d) 986, 1001-2 (C. C. A. 4th
1936) ; Note (1924) 37 HARV. L. REV. 750, 751.
'19Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928).
[Vol. 26
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an attempt to secure protection of a common law right, the Court is justified
in resorting to a common law agency analogy. The Court used such an
analogy in the Ickes and Perkins cases: If A, an agent of P, exceeds the
authority conferred on him by P, and because of A's misuse of his authority
T is subjected to heightened competition or is unable to contract with P, T
cannot challenge the legal validity of the orders, since A is responsible only
to P. A fortiori, although an administrative official may inflict damage by
exceeding the orders of his principal, the Government, he is responsible only
to superior executive and legislative authority.20 Now, the applicability of
this analogy as a basis for judicial non-interference with administrative ac-
tivities is limited to activities which are proprietary. If the officials are
engaged in activities which are solely within the province of the Government
and which cannot be, or are not, carried on by private corporations, it ob-
viously is not applicable; and where the activities complained of are govern-
mental, as distinguished from proprietary, the Court frequently grants relief.
For example, an official charged with the duty of enforcing the law may be
enjoined from bringing proceedings to enforce an unconstitutional statute,2 '
and an official may be enjoined if he exceeds his authority to regulate im-
ports22 or the postal service.23  An official entrusted with such governmental
activities is given powers with respect to the interests of the public that are
never placed in the hands of a private agent. To protect the citizen, the
Court will enjoin such activity when it is oppressive or arbitrary. But where
enjoining administrative activity would interfere "with the manner in which
the Government may dispatch its own internal affairs, ' 24 the Court, "perhaps
from a desire to give the Government the freedom of a private corporation
in conducting its business, will not interfere. The line of distinction, there-
fore, seems to be between activity which is proprietary and that which is
governmental. With regard to the former, where the Court's reasoning is
based on a private agency analogy, relief is denied; with regard to the latter,
where such an analogy is inapplicable, relief is granted.
20Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U. S. 464, 481, 58 Sup. Ct. 300 (1938) ; Perkins
v. Lukens, 60 Sup. Ct. 869, 877 (1940) ; see also Tennessee Electric Power Co. v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 306 U. S. 118, 139-140, 59 Sup. Ct. 36d (1939) ; R. R.
Co. v. Ellermann, 105 U. S. 166, 26 L. ed. 1015 (1891). This last case seems to be
the basis for the Court's use of this analogy, since there although the complainant was
threatened with loss from the udtra vires acts of a corporation the Court could find no
right which gave the complainant standing to sue. Cf. Frost v. Corp. Comm'n, 278
U. S. 515, 49 Sup. Ct. 235 (1929); The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258, 266
et seq., 44 Sup. Ct. 317 (1926).
Quaere as to the Court's statement of the law in so far as it applies to a private
agent. Cf. Sidney Blumenthal & Co. v. United States, 30 F. (2d) 247 (C. C. A. 2d
1929), cert. denied, 279 U. S. 847, 49 Sup. Ct. 345 (1929); Carpenter v. Williams,
41 Ga. App. 685, 154 S. E. 298 (1930); McGurk v. Cronenwatt, 199 Mass. 457, 85
N. E. 576 (1908) ; Eastin & Knox v. T. & P. Ry., 99 Tex. 654, 92 S. W. 838 (1906) ;
RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 353; RESTATEmENT, AGENCY (Tent. Draft No. 6,
1931) §§ 574-580; RESTATEmENT, ToRTs (1939) § 766.2 1Santa Fe R. R. v. Lane, 244 U. S. 492, 37 Sup. Ct. 714 (1917) (civil proceedings);
Philadelphia Co. v. Stimsoi, 223 U. S. 605, 32 Sup. Ct. 340 (1912) (criminal proceed-
ings) ; Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 28! Sup. Ct. 441 (1908).22 Waite v. Macy, 246 U. S. 606, 38 Sup. Ct. 395 (1918).23 School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94, 23 Sup. Ct. 33 (1902).24 Perkins v. Lukens, 60 Sup. Ct. 869, 878 (1940).
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By adhering to this analogy the Court of course' blocks off a large area of
administrative activity over which it will exercise no control, even though
the complainant can show a substantial injury to himself in a vital matter
and even though the official is exceeding his authority. For example, sup-
pose the Secretary in administering the Walsh-Healey Act should say that
the entire United States constituted only two localities and that the prevail-
ing wages for the localities were fifty cents per hour and one dollar per hour
respectively. Could the Court at the behest of a bidder in the higher wage
locality do anything about it? The Ickes case suggests that if such a deter-
mination were tainted with "conspiracy or fraud or malice or coercion" 25
the Court could grant relief; and in the principal case the Court implies that
if there had been a tortious invasion of the bidders' rights an injunction
might be granted.2 6 Without such elements or other elements which would
make the Secretary's actions analogous to a wrong for which a private agent
would be liable, however, such arbitrary determinations could not be re-
strained, unless by acting so flagrantly in the teeth of the statute the Secre-
tary were stripped of her statutory privilege and could be attacked on the
ground that she was interfering with reasonable business expectancies. But
the firm stand which the Court has taken appears to give the Secretary com-
plete freedom of action unchecked by judicial restraints.
With this avenue of attack closed, the prospective.bidder's only protection
is in the sense of public duty of the Secretary or in the restraints imposed by
Congress or the executive department. If a bidder included in his proposal
the required stipulations and received a contract, he would seem to be estopped
as a recipient of benefits from challenging the validity of the determinations.
27
A bid submitted without all required stipulations would be rejected, 28 and
in this event the contracting officer could not be mandamused to award the
contract to the bidder nor could he be restrained from awarding it to a third
party.29 While a tolerance section in the Act permits certain exemptions
before a contract is made, such permission is granted only when public neces-
sity so requires and only upon a motion by the Government.8
Since a prospective bidder is unable to obtain relief in any other way, it
seems questionable whether the Court should refuse to review the Secre-
tary's determinations. While a disgruntled bidder should not be able to tie
up the purchasing activities of the Government by an appeal to the courts,
yet the principal case opens up vistas of administration run riot. 1 But, to
25Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U. S. 464, 479, 58 Sup. Ct. 300 (1938) ; see also
Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 306 U. S. 118, 145, 59
Sup. Ct. 366 (1939).2 6Perkins v. Lukens, 60 Sup. Ct. 869, 877 (1940).27St. Louis Malleable Casting Co. v. Prendergast Const. Co., 260 U. S. 469, 43 Sup.
Ct. 178 (1923) ; Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U. S. 415, 26 L. ed. 187 (1880) ; cf. United
Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm. of Kentucky, 278 U. S. 300, 308, 49 Sup. Ct. 97 (1929).
2849 STAT. 2036 (1936), 41 U4 S. C. A. § 35 (b) (Supp. 1939).29United States Wood Preserving Co. v. Sundmaker, 186 Fed. 678 (C. C. A. 6th 1911);
O'Brien v. Carney, 6 F. Supp. 761 (D. Mass. 1934); Talbot Paving Co. v. Detroit,
109 Mich. 657, 67 N. W. 979 (1896) ; cf. American Smelting & Refining Co. v. United
States, 259 U. S. 75, 78, 42 Sup. Ct. 420 (1922).
3049 STAT. 2038 (1936), 41 U. S. C. A. § 40 (Supp. 1939).
31From the decision in the principal case it would seem to follow that the Secretary
[Vol. 26
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paraphrase Justice Holmes, perhaps in these day§ administrative officials "are
ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as
great a degree as the courts.1 32
Rex Rowland
Admiralty: Contract exempting tug from liability for negligence: Inland
Waterways Corporation.-Mengel Co. v. Ivland Waterways Corporation,
34 F. Supp. 685, 1940 A. M. C. 1339 (E. D. La. 1940), reopens the question
of the validity of a towage contract clause purporting to release the towing
vessel from liability to its tow for consequences of negligence. Libellant,
charterer of a barge, entered into a contract of towage with the Inland Water-
ways Corporation,' the contract providing that no common carrier status
was entailed,2 that towing was to be done solely at the risk of libellant, and
that defendant was not to be liable for any damage sustained in tow by libel-
lant's barge.3 The court4 held valid the provisions of the contract.
There has been a distinct split among the federal courts as to the inter-
pretation given such contracts.5  The western circuits followed the dictum
in The Syracuse0 to the effect that a tug is liable where through negligence
of those in charge of her the tow suffers loss, ever though the towage is at
the risk of the towed vessel.7 Contemporaneous cases in the eastern courts
reached a result diametrically opposed.8  In 1928, however, the Supreme
without any statutory authority at all could put conditions in contracts and still not be
subject to judicial restraint.32 Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. v. May, 194 U. S, 267, 270, 24 Sup. Ct. 638 (1903).
'See infrca notes 23 to 35 and text thereto.2This provision is in the abundance of precaution, for a towing vessel is neither a bailee
nor an insurer of the tow, nor is it liable as a common carrier. This the court in the
main case stated at page 690, and the proposition is well supported by authority. Sun
Oil Co. v. Dalzell, 287 U. S. 291, 53 Sup. Ct. 135 (1932); Stevens v. The White
City, 285 U. S. 195, 52 Sup. Ct. 347 (1932); Simkins v. Morrison, 107 F. (2d).
121 (C. C. A. 5th 1939) ; The Anita D., 28 F. Supp. 361 (E. D. La. 1939) ; RoBINsoN,
ADmRALTY (1939)f § 91. Affording an analogy are the circus train cases, in which the
railroad is held not to be a common carrier and is consequently permitted to stipulate
in the contract of haulage against liability for negligence. Sasinowski v. Boston & M. R. R.,
74 F. (2d) 628 (C. C. A. 1st 1935) ; Sager v. Northern Pac. Ry., 166 Fed. 526 (C. C.
Minn. 1908); Cleveland Ry. v. Henry, 170 Ind. 94, 83 N. E. 710 (1908); Bernardi
Greater Shows v. Boston & M. R. R., 89 N. H. 490, 1 A. (2d) 360 (1938), cert. denied,
306 U. S. 662, 59 Sup. Ct. 787 (1939); 4 WILLISTON, CONT AcTsi (Rev. ed. Willis-
ton and Thompson 1936) § 1089.3The liability of tug to tow is conceived to be delictual, upon the analogy to collision
between two ships, rather than contractual. The Pacific. Maru, 8 F. (Zd) 166 (S. D.
Ga. 1925); ROBINsoN, ADmirLLTY (1939) § 91.4 Caillouet, D. J.
5 For a comprehensive collation of cases in point, see Note (1927) 54 A. L. R. 104,
243-257.
612 Wall. 167, 20 L. ed. 382 (U. S. 1871).7 Sacramento Navigation Co. v. Salz, 3 F. (2d) 759 (C. C. A. 9th 1925), re'd om
other grounds, 273 U. S. 326, 47 Sup. Ct. 368 (1927); Mylroie v. British Columbia
Co., 268 Fed. 449 (C. C. A. 9th 1920), aff'd, 259 U. S. 1, 42 Sup. Ct. 430 (1922);
Alaska Commercial Co. v. Williams, 128 Fed. 362 (C. C. A. 9th 1904); see The Sea
Lion, 12 F. (2d) 124 (N. D. Cal. 1926).
STen Eyck v. Director General, 267 Fed. 974 (C. C. A. 2d 1920), cert. denied sub
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Court, in Compaiia, de Navegacion v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.,9 a
case which involved only an insured tow and its insurer, inferentially resolved
the controversy in favor of the view taken by the western circuits.10  In fhe
Navegacion case, the towing contract read: "[The tug] is not responsible
in any way for loss or damage to the [tow]." This, the Court considered, did
not release the towing vessel from liability for damage to the tow due to
negligence of the master or crew of the towing vessel and was not an agree-
ment cutting off the right of subrogation. Consequently its non-disclosure
to the insurer was immaterial and no defense to the insured's claim. Taft,
C.J., for the Court, said: "The rule laid down by this Court in The Steamer
Syracuse, 12 Wall. 167, 171 covers the point.""1  The opinion in Mengel
Co. v. I. W. C. unaccountably ignores the Navegacion decision. The present
case is not likely to be appealed because the court found that there was no
negligence.12 The resulting discrepancy is not novel, for the Supreme Court
itself has made insurance law different from transportation law.' 3
The court in the instant case stressed, as support for the validity of liability-
exempting contracts, the "paramount public policy" in favor of freedom of
contract.' 4  It relied principally upon the well known opinion of Sir George
Jessel, M. R., in Printing Co. v. Sampson:15 "[I] f there is one thing which
more than another public policy requires, it is that men of full age and com-
petent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting." This
general philosophy, however, has less standing today than it had in Jessel's
time. 3 Moreover, it is not to be denied that one will be more careful and
diligent when he stands beneath the Damoclean sword of liability for his
negligence. This, in essence, was the theory upon which The Syracuse'7
and the cases following it's were based. Indeed, it has been the principal
nom. Hartman-Blanchard Co. v. Ten Eyck, 254 U. S. 646, 41 Sup. Ct. 14 (1920) ; The
Oceanica, 170 Fed. 893 (C. C. A. 2d 1909), cert. denied sub nom. Boland v. The Ocean-
ica, 215 U. S. 599, 30 Sup. Ct. 400 (1909); The Pacific Maru, 8 F. (2d) 166 (S. D.
Ga. 1925).
9277 U. S. 66, 48 Sup. Ct. 459 (1928).
10 RoBINsoN, ADMIRALTY (1939) 672.
11277 U. S. at 73.
12The finding of no negligence does not render the decision mere obiter, because
Judge Caillouet expressly dealt with the validity of the contract prior to his incidental
finding of fact.
13See Aschenbrenner v. U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 292 U. S. 80, 54 Sup. Ct. 590 (1934),
in which double indemnity was allowed for death of the insured as a "passenger" even
though the victim was not a "passenger" for- purposes of a suit against the railroad.
1434 F. Supp. at 691. The analogy of the circus cases, supra note 2, supports the opinion
of the court. See also 4 WILISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson
1936) § 1089A.
15L. R. 19 Eq. 462, 465 (1875).
16The present trend away from the freedom of contract and toward status is evidenced
by the geometrically accelerated return to thrust-law, relational obligations in the form
of standardized contracts, administrative board regulations, et cetera. Thompson, Some
Current Economic and Political Impacts in the Law of Contract (1940) 26 CORNELL
L. Q. 4, 13.
'VSupra note 6.
18Supra notes 7 and 9. And see Judge Coxe, dissenting in The Oceanica, 170 Fed.
893, 896 (C. C. A. 2d 1909).
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argument against such contracts in all fields, 1 except perhaps in that of in-
surance. Automobile liability insurance-both property and personal-may
be conducive to negligence and recklessness.. Yet it is today universally
sanctioned ;20 it is even compulsory in certain states, notably Massachusetts. 2'
The countervailing interest is, of course, that of the accident victim.22
The Inland Waterways Corporation
Having but slightly penetrated the hinterland heretofore, the law of ad-
miralty is becoming of greater interest to the inland lawyer as the Inland
Waterways Corporation plays its role in our internal commerce. Shortly
after World War I, the government-owned facilities for river transportation
operated by the Railroad Administration were transferred to the Secretary
of War,23 to be continued as a national defense measure and as an experi-
ment in commercial barge line operation.24 Congress, in 1924, created the
Inland Waterways Corporation and transferred the enterprise to it.25 The
Secretary of Commerce26 governs the corporation27 through an advisory
board, which he appoints ;28 and he is authorized to lease or sell to private
persons or corporations 29 the transportation facilities belonging to the cor-
poration.30 By the terms of the act,31 all vessels employed by the corpora-
tion solely as merchant vessels are subject to all other laws, regulations, and
liabilities governing merchant vessels. Consequently, in Sevin v. Inland
10 Note, Contracting Against Liability for Negligent Conduct (1939) 4 Mo. L. Rv.
55; 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson 1938) §§1751-1751B.20Barmann v. McConachie, 289 Ill. App. 196, 6 N. E. (2d) 918 (1927), noted (1937)
22 CORNELL L. Q. 590; VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) § 275; 6 WILLISTON, CoN-
TRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson 1938) § 1751.2 1MAss. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 90, §§ 34A-34J, In re Opinion of the Justices, 251
Mass. 569, 147 N. E. 681 (1925); Stone, Compulsory Automobile Insurance (1927)
13 A. B. A. J. 151. Liability insurance compulsory as to certain classes of automobile
owners exists in New York. N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 94.22N. Y. INSURANCE LAW § 167; Laube, The Social Vice of Accident Indemnity
(1931) 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 189; Note (1937) 22 CORNELL L. Q. 400.
2349 U. S. C. A. § 141.
24 BULLETIN OF INFORMATION, INLAND WATERWAYS CORPORATION (Oct. 1, 1940).
2549 U. S. C. A. § 151 et seq. A corporation of the District of Columbia, its entire
stock of $12,000,000 (reduced from $15,000,000 upon recommendation by the corporation)
is owned by the United States. 49 U. S. C. A. § 155 defines the powers of the cor-
poration. It may, inter alia, sue and be sued in its corporate name, adopt a corporate
seal, make contracts, acquire, hold, and dispose of property, appoint and remove neces-
sary employees, attorneys and agents, borrow money for temporary purposes, conduct
the business of a common carrier by water, and exercise other powers, though not
specifically granted, as may be necessary or incidental to the fulfillment of the purposes
of its creation.26The original incorporator and governor was the Secretary of War. 49 U. S. C. A.
§ 151. But under the President's Reorganization Plan No. II, effective July 1, 1939,
the War Secretary's rights and duties devolve upon the Secretary of Commerce. 5 U.
S. C. A. § 133 (t).27Subject to the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act [49 U. S. C. A., c. 1]
and the Shipping Act [46 U. S. C. A., c. 23]. 49 U. S. C. A. § 153 (f).
2849 U. S1 C. A. § 154.29He may not lease or sell to a party directly or indirectly connected with any carrier
by rail.
3049 U. S. C. A. § 153 (d).
3149 U. S. C. A. § 153 (f).
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Waterways Corporation,3 2 it was decided that the Suits in Admiralty Act83
applies in suits against this corporation as in the case of suits against the
present Maritime Commission.34
That the Inland Waterways Corporation is having the desired effect of
stimulating barge line operations is indicated by its reports; and the mari-
time law is finding its way into the law offices of Kansas City, Dallas, Saint
Paul, and, Peoria.85
John Wesley Reed
Bankruptcy: Effect of Section 60a of the Chandler Act on transactions
under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act.-The enactment of the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act in ten states1 evidences a legislative recognition of the
value of the trust receipt in the short term financing of transient loans and
a realization of the confusion inhering in the common law treatment of trust
receipts.2  The Act provides a thirty day period of validity for the entruster's
security interest without filing,3 but, irrespective of filing, full protection is
accorded a "buyer in the ordinary course of trade."4
Trust receipts were first used to finance import transactions, but they
are now commonly used in connection with the sale of automobiles and
electrical appliances. 5 In the typical case of the automobile dealer, cars are
ordered directly from the manufacturer. The manufacturer ships the cars
and sends the bill of lading to a local bank which has agreed to finance the
purchase. Then the dealer executes his note for the purchase price and a
trust receipt in consideration of the bank indorsing over to him the bill of
lading." The trust receipt acknowledges that the cars are the property of
the bank and that the dealer holds the cars in trust for the bank. When the
3288 F. (24) 988 (C. C. A. 5th 1937).
3346 U, S. C. A. § 741.34ROBISoN, ADMIRALTY (1939) § 34.3 5 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INLAND WATERWAYS CORPORATION, CALENDAR YEAR 1939.
The Executive Department is located in St. Louis, Mo. A list of cities in which there
are agents of the corporation is found in the BULLET N OF INFORMATION, supra note 24.
'California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jer-
sey, New York, Oregon and Tennessee. The Uniform Trust Receipts Act was approved
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1933. For
an excellent discussion of the purposes of the Act, see Commissioners' Prefatory Note
by Professor Llewellyn in 9 UN. LAws ANN. (Supp. 1939) 240. See Bogert, The
Effect of the Trust Receipts Act (1935) 3 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 26; Legis. (1935)
12 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 468.20n the common law treatment and early history of trust receipts, Taylor, Trust Re-
ceipts (1921) 6 CORNELL L. Q. 168; Vold, Trust Receipt Security in Financing of Sales
(1930) 15 CORNELL L. Q. 543.
sUNrFoRm TRUST REcEiPTs Acr § 8 (1).4UNIFORm TRUST REcErPTs Acr § 9 (2) (a).5See Notes (1933) 3 MicH. L. Rxv. 558; (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. REv. 742.
6The transaction here outlined is perhaps over-simplified in that the role of the sub-
sidiary )finance company of the automobile manufacturer is ignored. For a fuller state-
ment see the discussion of Judge Gibson in Houck v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,
44 F. (2d) 410 (W. D. Pa. 1930).
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prospective purchaser is identified to the bank, the dealer is given the right
to release the car. The value of this type of security transaction can readily
be seen. It enables the dealer without large capital resources to compete
on an equal footing with larger dealers, accords to the bank a satisfactory
measure of protection, and in general facilitates the sale of motor vehicles.
Prior to the Chandler Act of .1938, there was no difficulty in the event of
the bankruptcy of the automobile dealer. The holder of the trust receipt
was uniformly allowed to repossess the cars on the showroom floor as against
the trustee in bankruptcy of the automobile dealer.7 There was clearly no
preference involved in the transaction outlined above, since there was no
transfer of the property of a debtor to a creditor "for or on account of an
antecedent debt."' 8 The trust receipt was merely exchanged for merchandise
of equal value. However, in 1938 Section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act, deal-
ing with preferences, was amended so as to read: ". . . transfer shall be
deemed to have been made at the time when it became so far perfected that
no bona fide purchaser from the debtor and no creditor could thereafter have
acquired any rights in the property so transferred superior to the rights of
the transferee therein, and, if such transfer is not so perfected prior to the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy... it shall bet deemed to have beent made
immediately before bankruptcy."
Since under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act a transfer can never become
"perfected" against a bona fide purchaser, it can very well be argued that
the portion of Section 60a italicized above would apply to the typical trust
receipt transaction. Thus thd transfer of the trust receipt would be deemed
to have been made immediately before bankruptcy, and not at the time when
the trust receipt was issued to secure a contemporaneous loan. Then the
exchange would amount to a transfer of the property of the dealer to the
bank "for or on account of an antecedent debt." Whether or not the courts
will accept this argument is a matter of speculation,'0 but certainly some doubt
has been injected into the validity of innumerable trust receipt transactions"l
7Houck v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 44 F. (2d) 410 (W. D. Pa. 1930);
White v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 2 F. Supp. 406 (E. D. Ky. 1932).
SFirst sentence of Section 60a of the Chandler Act: "A preference is a transfer, as
defined in this Act, of any of the property of the debtor to or for the benefit of a
creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made or suffered by such debtor while
insolvent and within 4 months before the filing by or against him of the petition in
bankruptcy . . . the effect of which transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain
a greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the same class."
9 1talics added.
'OTwo recent cases cast some doubt on the effectiveness of this argument. Adams
v. City Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Macon, 115 F. (2d) 453 (C. C. A. 5th 1940),
held that a bill of sale conveying personal property to secure an indebtedness
simultaneously created does not constitute a voidable preference even when subsequently
recorded when the debtor is insolvent and within four months of bankruptcy. The court
construed the first sentence of Section 60a, providing that a preference is on account
of an antecedent debt, as referring to the whole transaction and not simply to the steps
to bet taken to make it binding as to subsequent creditors and purchasers for a valuable
consideration. Note also In re Talbot Canning Corp., 35 F. Supp. 680 (D. Md. 1940).
See also Chichester v. Commercial Credit Co., 37 Cal. App. (2d) 439 (1940) where the
court ignored the argument which was apparently raised by counsel.
"lThe same argument might apply to cases of assignments of accounts receivable, in
jurisdictions which adhere to the so-called "English rule"-the first bona fide assignee
1941]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
by this apparent oversight on the part of the draftsmen of Section 60a of
the Chandler Act.' 2
Ralph H. German
Bankruptcy: What section governs eligibility to farmers' composi-
tions?-Since the passage of the National Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
farmers have been subject to voluntary bankruptcy under Section 4 (a)'
of the Act, but have been exempt from involuntary bankruptcy by Section
4 (b) .2 Section 75, 3 popularly known as the Frazier-Lemke Act, enacted
as a temporary measure in 1933, but recently extended until March 4, 1944,4
provides a procedure whereby farmers may arrange a composition with their
creditors and, if that fails, be granted a three year period within which to
pay their debts,5 with a consequence of liquidating bankruptcy if they do not
do so.
Prior to 1933, there was no definition of the term "farmer" in the Bank-
ruptcy Act, but Section 4 (b) provided that involuntary bankruptcy proceed-
ings could not be instituted against "a wage earner or a person engaged
chiefly in farming or tillage of the soil."6  Under this phraseology, one had
to be a tiller of the soil to be a farmer,7 and a ranchman who raised live-
stock for market, was held not to be a farmer.8 When Section 75 was
enacted in 1933, Section 75 (r) was added, providing that "for the pur-
pose of this section and Section 74, the term farmer means an individual
who is primarily bona fide personally engaged in farming operations, or
the principal part of whose income is derived from farming operations,
and includes the personal representative of a deceased farmer; and a farmer
shall be deemed a resident of any county in which such farming operations
occur."
9
to notify the debtor prevails, even as against an assignee prior in time. Since the assign-
ment does not become "perfected" until the debtor is notified, and since the creditor does
not wish the debtor to know that the assignor is in financial difficulties, with the result
that frequently the debtor is never notified, it could be similarly argued that the assign-
ment is made immediately before bankruptcy and thus constitutes a voidable preference.
See Hamilton, The Effect of Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act Upon Assignments of
Accounts Receivable (1939) 26 VA. L. REv. 168; Neuhoff, Assignment of Accounts Re-
ceivable as Affected by the ChandletA Act (1940) 34 ILL. L. REv. 538.
12 The problem has been brought to the attention of the National Bankruptcy Confer-
ence, and it has been learned that an amendment to resolve this problem will probably
be proposed to the next Congress.
1BANxRupTcY Act § 4 (a), 30 STAT. 547 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 22 (a) (1927).2 BAxNKRUPTCy AcT § 4 (b), 30 STAT. 547 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 22 (b) (1927).
3BANiRUPTCY AcT § 75, 47 STAT. 1467 (1933), 11 U. S. C. A. § 203 (1939).
454 STAT. 40 (March 4, 1940).
5Land of farmer-debtor is not subject, under Section 75 (s) (3) to order for sale
within the statutory three year period until after the debtor has been awarded oppor-
tunity, on his request, to redeem property at reappraised value or at value fixed by
court. Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 9 U. S. L. WEEK 4039 (Dec. 9, 1940).6BANKRupcY AcT § 4 (b), supra note 2.
7 Hart-Parr Co. v. Barkley, 231 Fed. 913 (C. C. A. 8th 1916). One chiefly engaged
in threshing grain raised by others held not exempt from involuntary bankruptcy.81n re Stubbs, 281 Fed. 568 (D. Wyo. 1922).
9 BAXxRuI-rcv Act § 75 (r), 47 STAT. 1473 (1933), 11 U. S. C. A. § 203 (r) (1939).
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Section 75 (r) was not made applicable to Section 4 (b), but the
phraseology of Section 4 (b) so affected the interpretation of the term
"farming operations" of Section 75 (r) that persons engaged primarily
in raising livestock were held not to be "farmers."' °  To broaden the
definition of the term "farmer" for purposes of voluntary composition pro-
ceedings, Congress, in 1935, amended Section 75 (r) to include "any
individual who is primarily bona fide personally engaged in dairy farming,
the production of poultry or livestock, or the production of poultry products
or livestock products in their unmanufactured state, or the principal part of
whose income is derived from one or more of the foregoing operations.""1
At the same time, this definition was specifically made applicable to Section
74 and Section 4 (b), and Section 4 (b) was amended to read: "except a
wage earner or a farmer.'
1 2
By the Chandler Act, enacted in 1938, a definition of the term "farmer"
was placed in Section 1 of the Bankruptcy Act. The new section [§ 1 (17)]
provides that, unless inconsistent with the context, "'farmer' shall mean an
individual personally engaged in farming or tillage of the soil, and shall in-
clude an individual personally engaged in dairy farming or in the production
of poultry, livestock, or poultry or livestock products in their unmanufactured
state if the principal part of his income is derived from any one or more of
such operations."'13 On March 4, 1940, by an "as follows" amendment, Con-
gress so amended Section 75 (r) as to apparently leave it as it was in 1935,
except for reference to Section 74.14
1oI; re Palma Bros., 8 F. Supp. 920 (D. Neb. 1934), appeal dismissed, Palma! v.
Tobin, 77 F. (2d) 1009 (C. C. A. 9th 1935). One primarily engaged in raising sheep
held not to be a farmer entitled to voluntary composition.
lAs amended in 1935, Section 75 (r) reads: "For the purposes of this section, § 4
(b), and § 74, the term farmer includes not only an individual who is primarily bona
fide personally engaged in producing products of the soil, but also any individual who is
primarily bona fide personally engaged in dairy farming, the production of poultry or
livestock, or the production of poultry products or livestock products in their unmanu-
factured state, or the principal part of whose income is derived from one or more of
the foregoing operations, and includes the personal representative of a deceased farmer
and a farmer shall be deemed a resident of any county in which such operations occur."
BANkRUPtCY Acr § 75 (r), 49 STAT. 246 (1935), 11 U. S. C. A. § 203 (r) (1939).12BAyRupTcy Acr § 4 (b), 49 STAT. 246 (1935), 11 U. S. C. A. § 2Z (b) (Supp.
1939).
13BNKRaupTcy AcT § 1 (17), 52 STAT. 840 (1938), 11 U. S. C. A. § 1 (17) (Supp.
1939).
'
4As amended March 4, 1940, Section 75 (r) now reads: "For the purposes of this sec-
tion and § 4 (b) the term 'farmer' includes not only any individual who is primarily
bona fide personally engaged in producing products of the soil, but also any individual
who is primarily bona fide personally engaged in dairy farming, the production of
poultry products or livestock products in their unmanufactured state or the principal
part of whose income is derived from any one or more of the foregoing operations, and
includes the personal representative of a deceased farmer, and a farmer shall be deemed
a resident of any county in which such operations occur." BAKRupTC y ACT § 75 (r),
54 STAT. 40 (1940), 11 U. S. C. A. § 203 (r) (Supp. 1940).
This amendment is termed an "as follows" amendment because the amendment states
the amended version of the section exclusively and requires a comparison with the
original section to determine what portion of the amended section is new and what
portion is merely a continuance of the old statute.
Section 74 of the Bankruptcy Act, 47 STAT. 1467 (1933), 11 U. S. C. A. § 202 (1935),
was repealed June 22, 1938. 52 STAT. 840.
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The enactment of Section 1 (17) has created the question Whether Section
1 (17) or Section 75 (r) now governs eligibility to Section 75 proceedings.
In Benitez v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 109 F. (2d) 943 (C. C. A. 1st 1940),'r
decided prior to the amendment of March 4, 1940, Circuit Judge Magruder
ruled that Section 1 (17) repealed Section 75 (r) so far as the old defini-
tion of the term "farmer" is inconsistent with the new, and that Section 1
(17) now governs eligibility to Section 75 proceedings. In this case, a city
housewife who derived $50 a month from raising poultry in the backyard,
and $20,000 as a shareholder in a large sugar enterprise in which her only
'participation was the receipt of profits, was held not to be personally engaged
in farming and not to be entitled to relief as a farmer. Judge Magruder did
not state whether the housewife was so primarily bona fide personally engaged
in the raising of chickens that the decision would have been otherwise had
Section 75 (r) been used as the controlling definition.
Section 1 (17) is more restrictive than Section 75 (r). It reintroduces
the phrase "engaged in farming or tillage of the soil," which was the original
phraseology of Section 4 (b), the section which prohibits the institution of
involuntary bankruptcy proceedings against farmers,' 6 and apparently in-
cludes an individual engaged in dairy farming, the production of poultry,
livestock, or poultry or livestock products in their unmanufactured state,
only if he is personally so engaged and if the principal part of the income
is derived from one or more of such operations. Also Section 1 (17) does
not specifically include the personal representative of a deceased farmer.
Section 75 (r) defines one as a farmer who is primarily bona fide personally
engaged in producing products of the soil, or who is primarily personally
engaged in one of the four specified operations, or "the principal part of
whose income" is derived from one or more of the four operations. In the
"principal part of the income" test, however, the courts seem to require
some personal operations.17 Section 75 (r) also includes the personal rep-
resentative of a deceased farmer and provides that a farmer shall be deemed
a resident of any county in which he has farming operations.
With the exception of Benitez v. Bank of Nova Scotia, the courts seem to
have assumed that Section 75 (r) is still the governing definition of "farmer"
for purposes of farmers' composition proceedings.'5 Although it seems clear
that Section 1 (17) was intended to govern Section 4 (b),'" the section
15Cert. granted, 61 Sup. Ct. 10 (1940).1 6 BANKRUpTCy Acr'§ 4 (b), 30 STAT. 547 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 22 (b) (1927).
'
7 Shryvers v. Security-First Nat. Bank of Los Angeles, 108 F. (2d) 611, 126 A. L. R.
674 (C. C. A. 9th 1939), cert denied, 305 U. S. 624, 60 Sup. Ct. 608 (1940) ; It re
Moser, 95 F. (2d) 944 (C. C. A. 9th 1938) ; In re, Davis, 22 F. Supp. 12 (D. Iowa 1938).
Contra: In re Shonkwiler, 17 F. Supp. 697 (D. Ill. 1935).
18Since the enactment of Section 1 (17), Section 75 (r) has been used specifically
as the test of eligibility under Section 75 in the following cases: Shryvers v. First
National Bank of Los Angeles, 108 F. (2d) 611, 126 A. L. R. 674 (C. C. A. 9th
1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 624, 60 Sup. Ct. 608 (1940) ; In re Homer, 104 F. (2d)
600 (C. C. A. 7th 1930) ; In re Byrenius, 30 F. Supp. 241 (D. N. H. 1939). The instant
case, Benitez v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 109 F. (2d) 743 (C. C. A. lst 1940), cert.
granted, 61 Sup. Ct. 10 (1940), is the only case which specifically applied Section 1 (17)
as the definition controlling Section 75 proceedings.
19A note to Section 4 (b) in Committee Print Analysis of H. R. 12889, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1936) states: "The newly defined term 'farmer' is here employed, § 1 (17)." The
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which prohibits the institution of involuntary bankruptcy proceedings against
farmers, it does not seem necessary to rule that Section 1 (17) governs eligi-
bility under the newer voluntary rehabilitation proceedings of Section 75
which permits farmers to file voluntary compositions. In fact, it appears that
in submitting Section 1 (17), the National Bankruptcy Conference intended
that Section 75 (r) should continue to control Section 75, as, in its reports,
the Conference specifically made no recommendation with reference to Sec-
tion 75, inasmuch as this section is but temporary.20
It is true that if a later act is so repugnant to a prior act that the two
acts cannot be harmonized, the later act repeals the prior act to the extent
that the acts are irreconcilable. 21 Repeal by implication, however, is not
favored,2 2 and the courts rule that an act has been repealed by implication
only where it appears that the legislature so intended. 23
It seems probable that the "as follows" March 4, 1940 amendment to Sec-
tion 75 (r) is not important because, except as to new material introduced
by the amendment, such an amendment relates back to the original statute,
and is itself modified by an intervening statute which modifies the original
statute.2 4 Inasmuch as the amendment of March 4, 1940 introduces no new
material, the amended statute would seem to be modified by Section 1 (17)
to whatever extent the original Section 75 (r) is modified by Section 1 (17).
It would seem expedient to make the conditions which permit farmers to
ile voluntary compositions with creditors more lenient than the conditions
under which creditors are permitted to institute involuntary bankruptcy pro-
ceedings against farmers. It may be wise to prevent creditors from bringing
involuntary proceedings against certain individuals who are on the borderline
of farming, while also permitting those same debtors to file voluntary compo-
sitions as farmers under Section 75 if they so choose. It seems, therefore,
that the courts might logically rule that Section 1 (17) controls Section 4
(b), but that Section 75 (r) still controls eligibility under Section 75 pro-
ceedings.
William G. DeLanmater
note was appended by Walton B. Adair, past president and chairman of the conference
committee, National Association of Referees in Bankruptcy, and Jacob Weinstein, mem-
ber of the bankruptcy committee, Commercial Law League of America.
For effect of Section 1 (17) on Section 4 (b), see Note (1938) 18 ORa. L. REV. 108.20Note to Section 75 in Committee Print Analysis of H. R. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1936) 234.2ILewis v. United States, 244 U. S. 134, 37 Sup. Ct. 570 (1917); Barney v. Dolph,
97 U. S. 652, 24 L. ed. 1063 (1878) ; Merchants Ins. Co. v. Ritchie, 5 Wall. 541, 18
L. ed. 540 (U. S. 1867).22United States v. Burroughs, 289 U. S. 159, 53 Sup. Ct. 574 (1933) ; United States v.
Noce, 268 U. S. 613, 45 Sup. Ct. 610 (1925); H. Rouw Co. v. Crivella, 105 F. (2d)
434 (C. C. A. 8th 1939), cert. granted, 308 U. S. 544, 60 Sup. Ct. 176 (1940).23Waterworks Co. v. Burkhart, 41 Ind. 364 (1908) ; Pacific R. R. v. Cass County, 53
Mo. 17 (1873).2 4Goodrich v. Hackley-Phelps-Bonnell Co., 141 Mich. 343, 104 N. W. 669 (1905);
Powell v. King, 78 Minn. 83, 80 N. W. 850 (1899); Allison v. Holton, 46 Ore. 370,
372, 80 Pac. 101 (1905).
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Chattel Mortgages: Validity of after-acquired personal property clause.-
Is an after-acquired personal property clause in a mortgage valid? "Yes,"
would be the categorical answer in some jurisdictions, but in New York
the question assumes the complexity of a riddle. Twenty years ago Mr.
Justice Stone deplored the inconsistency of the New York decisions. "That
the purchaser who has bought in good faith should be chargeable with
notice of the record of the mortgage of future chattels and should be sub-
ject to the mortgage, but that such a mortgage should not be valid and en-
forceable against an attaching creditor is a curious legal incongruity."1
This incongruous condition of the law dates from 1894.2 Prior to that
time, New York apparently was well on its way to a complete adoption of
the doctrine expounded in the English case of Hoiroyd v. Marshall3 that,
on equitable principles, a mortgage of after-acquired .personalty is valid
as against the mortgagor and subsequent creditors or purchasers with notice.
Successive decisions in New York had held the after-acquired property
clause valid as between the parties to the agreement 4 and as against a pur-
chaser with actual notice.5 This sequence attained its logical development
in Kribbs v. Alford,6 where the after-acquired clause was held valid as against
bona fide purchasers with only constructive notice. However, the order-
liness of this progression was soon shattered by Rochester Distilling Co. v.
Rasey,7 which held this clause invalid as against attaching or execution
creditors.
In the Kribbs case the court held that the trial court correctly enforced
by its judgment the equitable lien, which resulted from the after-acquired prop-
erty clause. Some jurisdictions deny any validity to a contract containing
this clause, upon the ancient doctrine that "a man cannot grant or charge
that which he hath not." In referring to other jurisdictions which held
the clause invalid in law yet operative in equity, Parker, J., declared, "Un-
explained, this seems to be a solecism, and results from a use of language
which fails to accurately convey the idea intended." In the Rasey case, the
chattel mortgage covered unplanted crops, which were "non-existent things."
Gray, J., declared that a chattel mortgage on future property could not operate
to defeat the lien of an attaching creditor, since a chattel mortgage imports
a conveyance of personal property and the statute provides for filing as a
substitute for "an immediate delivery" or "an actual ... change of possession
of the things mortgaged."
'Stone, The "Equitable Mortgage" in New York (1920) 20 COL. L. Ruv., 519, 528.
Mr. Justice Stone then suggested that the curious inconsistencies and complications of
the law relating to such security called for comprehensive reform and unification, but
no such improvement has been forthcoming.2Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey, 142 N. Y. 570, 37 N. E. 632 (1894). Stone, supra
note 1, and Note (1928) 3 ST. Jo N's L. REv. 139 severely criticize this case. Cohen
and Gerber, The After-Acquired Property Clause (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. REv. 635,
distinguish the decision as a crop case, declaring thae a decision with reference to crops
does not create a rule applicable to land or capital goods.
310 H. L. Cas. 191, 11 Eng. Rep. 999k (1862).4McCaffrey v. Woodin, 65 N. Y. 459, 22 Am. Rep. 644 (1875).5Wisner v. Ocumpaugh, 71 N. Y. 113 (1877).
6120 N. Y. 519, 24 N. E. 811 (1890).
7Satpra note 2.
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The refusal of the Rasey case to accept and apply the Kribbs doctrine
in a situation involving attaching or execution creditors raised the question
whether subsequent cases would overrule the Rasey decision as incompatible
with the modem trend.
Only three years later, in Platt v. New York & Sea Beach, Ry.,8 the Court
of Appeals refused to follow the Rasey holding. This case involved a mort-
gage on railroad property, and the after-acquired clause was held valid against
a judgment creditor who sought to have the judgment of foreclosure and
sale modified so as to affect only such property as the mortgagor had when
the mortgage was executed. Soon afterward, in New York Security Co. v.
Saratoga Gas Company,9 gas companies were classed with railroads. Neither
of these decisions expressly confined the exceptions to the Rasey rule to
public utilities. "In the interest of commerce and manufactures, a liberal
rule as to bondholders and mortgagees should be adopted as to after-acquired
personalty that becomes a necessary or proper part of the mortgaged plant,"
was the observation made by the court in the Saratoga Gas Company case.10
While this attitude persisted there was the possibility that such a clause
might be held valid in a mortgage on the equipment of any large business
enterprise, even against attaching or execution creditors, where the property
was acquired for the purpose of renewing or replacing machinery worn out
or superseded in the course of business. Unfortunately, however, the fed-
eral courts interpreting New York law appeared to be under the impression
that public utilities were the sole exception to the Rasey rule.n The Court
of Appeals seems now to have adopted this view,' 2 and consequently only
the field of public utilities is sheltered from the pernicious operation of the
Rasey rule.
The validity of the after-acquired clause as against a subsequent chattel
mortgagee was yet to be determined. In Diana Paper Company v. Wheeler-
Green Electric Company13 the after-acquired clause was held valid as against
a subsequent chattel mortgagee who had actual notice of the prior mortgage.
The same result was reached in Shelton Holding Corporation v. 150 E. 48th
St. Corporation,14 where the mortgagor and the subsequent mortgagee of
the chattels were corporations headed by the same individual, the same
knowledge and intent being ascribed to both. A recent case, Herold v. Coh-
rone Boat Company, Inc.,' 5 where only constructive notice was present,
squarely held that the subsequent mortgagee was subject to the after-acquired
89 App. Div. 87, 41 N. Y. Supp. 42 (2d Dep't 1896), aff'd on opinion below, 153 N. Y.
670, 48 N. E. 1106 (1897).
988 Hun. 569, 34 N. Y. Supp. 890 (3d Dep't 1895), aff'd on opinion below, 157 N. Y.
689, 51 N. E. 1092 (1898).
1088 Hun 569, 589, 34 N. Y. Supp. 890 (3d Dep't 1895).
21In re Niagara Lead & Battery Co., 202 Fed. 298 (W. D. N. Y. 1913), and Ameri-
can Brake Shoe & F. Co. v. New York Rys. Co., 277 Fed. 261 (S. D. N. Y. 1921)
(mention railroads as the exception) ; Pintsch Compressing Co. v. Buffalo Gas Co.,
280 Fed. 830 (C. C. A. 2d 1922) (states public utility corporations to be the exception).
12Judging from dictum in Ithaca Trust Co. v. Ithaca Traction Corp., 248 N. Y. 322,
162 N. E. 93 (1928).
13228 App. Div. 577, 240 N. Y. Supp. 108 (4th Dep't 1930).
14264 N. Y. 339, 191 N. E. 8 (1934).
15249 App. Div. 318, 292 N. Y. Supp. 81 (2d Dep't 1936).
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clause of the previous mortgage. This result was not only desirable from
the viewpoint of extending the validity of the after-acquired clause but it
also accentuates the incongruity of the New York law. A' diligent creditor
who has attempted to make himself secure through a chattel mortgage is
given less consideration than a casual creditor! Ordinarily, the casual creditor
is bound by a chattel mortgage on existing goods, properly filed. When the
conflicting interests of an attaching creditor and a subsequent chattel mort-
gagee are simultaneously arrayed against the interests of a mortgagee with
an after-acquired clause, how will New York solve the dilemma in which
the Rasey case has put it?
That New York still adheres to the position taken in the Rasey case,
which extends protection to the attaching or execution creditor, as opposed
to the more consistent doctrine, is evidenced by dictum in the recent case of
Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Peck-Schwartz Realty Corp.Y6  In a brief
resume of cases involving after-acquired clauses, the court says, "Such a
clause will not include personal property not in existence at time the mort-
gage is made and recorded .. .unless .. . there is an express agreement
that the personalty, although not a fixture, shall become part and parcel of
the mortgaged realty .. . or . ..it shall clearly and unequivocally appear
from all the facts and circumstances that the intent was to make them a
part of the security for the loan . .. and then only . ..in the absence of
superior enforceable rights of third parties thereto, ' 'l 7 which is to say, in
the absence of intervening equities of creditors. John W. Glendening, Jr.
Constitutional Law: Municipal Corporations: Validity of federal grants
and loans for municipal power plants.-In the last few years there has
been much comment and some concern regarding federal grants and loans
to the states and their political subdivisions. The problem has arisen especi-
ally in regard to federal aid for the construction and maintenance of muni-
cipal power plants.2  Decisions in the last few years have generally settled
the constitutionality of such federal grants for local improvements.3 A typical
16277 N. Y. 283, 14 N. E. (2d) 70 (1938).
171d. at 286.
'Foley, Recent Developments in Federal-Municipal Relatiowships (1938) 86 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 485; Corwin, National-State Coperationz-Its Present Possibilities (1937)
46 YALE L. J. 599, 615 et seq.; Kilpatrick, Federal Assistance to Municipal Recovery
(1937) 26 NAT. MuNic. REv. 337.2 See Welch, The Validity of Federal Loans and Grants to Municipalities for Conl-
struction of Power Plants (1937) 25 GEo. L. J. 607.
3Tennessee Electric Power Co. eP al. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 306 U. S. 118,
59 Sup. Ct. 366 (1939) (PWA loans and grants for erection of municipal power plant
obtaining power from TVA, held valid) ; Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U. S. 464,
58 Sup. Ct. 300 (1938) ; School District No. 37, Clark County, Wash. v. Isackson, 92 F.
(2d) 768 (C. C. A. 9th 1937) (federal grant for erection of school building, held valid) ;
Johnson v. Russell, 198 Ark. 49, 127 S. W. (2d) 260 (1939) (PWA grants to city for
construction of sewage disposal plant, held valid) ; Mann v. Board of Education of City
of Artesia, 43 N. M. 78, 85 P. (2d) 595 (1938). In all these cases, the state govern-
ments had passed statutes enabling municipalities to receive federal grants and loans.
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case raising this problem is Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. City of
Bushnell, Ill., 109 F. (2d) 26 (C. C. A. 7th 1940). In that case, plaintiff,
possessing a non-exclusive franchise to operate an electric power plant in
defendant city, brought suit to enjoin the city from erecting a rival muni-
cipal power plant, part of the proceeds for which were to be obtained from
a Public Works Administration grant. By state statute, a municipal cor-
poration in Illinois can erect and operate an electric power plant. The court
dismissed plaintiff's complaint, holding that defendant city had fully com-
plied with the terms of the state statute, and that the plaintiff could not
question the right of the federal government to grant the funds.
In recent years the number of municipal power plants has remained fairly
stable. Even PWA grants have not greatly augmented their spread in detri-
ment to private power utilities.4 Passing over the question of whether the
federal government is promoting governmental ownership of public utilities,
this note shall consider only the constitutionality of grants and loans for such
projects.
The question usually raised relates to the rights of the private utility
company against the federal government concerning the giving of grants and
loans to municipalities upon certain conditions. In the lower courts, there
have been decisions both for and against the federal government,5 but the
Supreme Court definitely disposed of the matter in favor of the constitu-
tionality of such grants-in-aid in Alaban Power-Co. v. Ickes6 and Duke
Power Co. et al. v. Greenwood County.7 The Court said that the munici-
4
"Compared with the total investment of approximately thirteen billion for the elec-
tric industry in the United States, this federal contribution and financing of a mere
$55,379,170 for publicly owned plants seems scarcely a major threat to private industry.
When it is further considered that the private industry furnishes well over 90% of all
electric utility service consumed in the United States, the PWA disbursement seems
unlikely to alter drastically the ratio of public to privately owned distribution plants."
Welch, supra note 2, at 609. See also DoRAu, THE CHANGING CHARAcTER AND EXTENT
OF MUNICIPAL OWNERSHIP IN THE ELEcTRIc LIGHT AND POWER INDUSTRY (1930) 11;
1 POND, LAW OF PUBLIC UTILITIES (4th ed. 1932) § 30; 3 id. § 866.
5 Carolina Power & Light Co. et al. v. South Carolina Public Service Authority
et al., 20 F. Supp. 854 (E. D. S. C. 1937), aff'd, 94 F. (2d) 520 (C. C. A. 4th 1938)
(national unemployment held to bring grants and loans within "General Welfare" clause
of Constitution) ; Kansas Gas & Electric Co. v. City of Independence, 79 F. (2d) 32
(C. C. A. 10th 1935), 100 A. L. R. 1479, 1499 (1936); City of Allegan, Mich. v. Con-
sumer's Power Co., 71 F. (2d) 477 (C. C. A. 6th 1934), noted (1934) 48 HARv. L,
RpV. 89 (plaintiff, suing as municipal taxpayer only, held to show no substantial threat
of injury) ; Washington Water Power Co. v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 9 F. Supp. 263
(N. D. Idaho 1934), noted (1935) 20 CORNELL L. Q. 513 (held, federal expenses not
justified under "General Welfare" clause of the Constitution), reopened and mod.,
25 F. Supp. 795 (N. D. Idaho 1938) ; Mo. Pub. Serv. Co. v. City of Concordia, 8 F.
Supp. 1 (W. D. Mo. 1934), noted (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. t~v. 379 (held, federal grant
or loan was invalid as federal interference with intrastate commerce, viz., the local
generating and distributing of electricity); Kansas Utilities Co. v. City of Burlington,
141 Kan. 926, 44 P. (2d) 223 (1935).
6302 U. S. 464, 58 Sup. Ct. 300 (1938), aff'g 91 F. (2d) 303 (App. D. C. 1937) (any
injury plaintiff might suffer held to be danmum absque injuria, since plaintiff could not
attack federal loans [quoting the well-known case of Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.
S. 447, 43 ,Sup. Ct. 597 (1923)] and since municipality's application of the money was
lawful, invading no legal right of plaintiff's). This case is noted in (1938) 51 HARv.
L. Rxv. 897.
7302 U. S. 485, 58 Sup. Ct. 306 (1938). This case has a long history, for a brief
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pality was left entirely free from federal control or direction in respect of
the management and control of its plant and business, and that the mere con-
summation and subsequent application of the federal loans and grants would
not constitute an actionable wrong. So, at present, certain propositions are
established, viz., that a private utility has no standing to test the constitu-
tionality of such grants and loans as against the federal or municipal govern-
ment,8 and that such grants are valid under the "General Welfare" clause
of the Federal Constitution.0
The other aspect of this problem is whether it is constitutional for the
municipal corporation to accept federal grants and loans made upon stated
conditions. By statute nearly all states allow municipal power plants to be
built and operated. 10 Generally, such plants are considered to come within
the proprietary functions of municipal government, as opposed to gove-n-
mental functions."' Governmental powers, of course, can not be delegated,
but proprietary powers may be reasonably delegated. 12  Usually, for the
municipal corporation to obtain loans and grants the labor and materials
used on the local project must be approved by the federal authorities. If
the conditions attached to the loan or grant are reasonable, the courts gen-
erally hold there is no delegation of municipal powers to the federal govern-
ment.'8 There is also the limitation in most state constitutions or statutes
summary of which see Note (1938) 6 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 375, 376. Two of the lower
courts' decisions will be found in 81 F. (2d) 986 (C. C. A. 4th 1936) and 91 F. (2d)
665 (C. C. A. 4th 1937). And see Notes (1938) 5 U. OF CmI. L. REv. 639; (1937) 16
N. C. L. Rmv. 162.
Sit is true that plaintiff may sue as franchise holder to restrain threatened competi-
tion of an illegal nature [Frost v. Corporation Commission, 278 U. S. 515, 49 Sup. Ct.
235 (1928)], but here we have no illegal competition. "The law is settled that the
local utility, as a federal taxpayer or as a franchise holder, may not question the right
of the United States to grant funds to the city as proposed; the source of the funds
can not affect the question of invasion of rights, where plaintiff has no interest in the
funds that it could protect by injunction." Central Ill. Public Service Co. v. City of
Bushnell, Ill., 109 F. (2d) 26, 30 (C. C. A. 7th 1940).9 For an excellent consideration of this point, see Note (1935) 20 CORNELL L. Q. 513.
See also, Welch, supra note 2, at 617 et seq.; Note (1937) 50 HAxv. L. REv. 802. It
is to be noted that the main purpose to be obtained is relief of national unemployment;
this purpose is covered by the "General Welfare" clause in the Constitution, according
to the dictum in United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 65, 56 Sup. Ct. 312 (1936).
105 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPALA CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1928) §§ 1923, 1925. N. Y. GEN-
ERAL MUNICIPAL LAW art. 14-A provides the means whereby municipalities in New
York can own and operate gas and electric utilities.
"1Public Service Co. of Indiana v. City of New Castle, 212 Ind. 229, 8 N. E. (2d)
821 (1937) ; Memphis Power and Light Co. v. City of Memphis, 172 Tenn. 346, 112
S. W. (2d) 817 (1937) : 5 McQumLIN, op. cit. supra note 10, at 1946.
121 MCQUILLIN, op. cit. supra note 10, § 390 (public or governmental powers cannot
be surrendered or delegated) ; 5 id. §§ 1980-1987 (there may be municipal discretion as
to improvements made, especially in selecting materials and in contracting for the work).
'
8 Southwestern Gas & Electric Co. v. City of Texarkana, Tex. et al., 104 F. (2d) 847
(C. C. A. 5th 1939) ; Mississippi Power Co. v. City of Aberdeen et al., 95 F. (2d) 990
(C. C. A. 5th 1938); Iowa Southern Utilities Co. v. Town of Lamoni, 11 F. Supp. 581
(S. D. Iowa 1935) ; Lake Superior District Power Co. v. City of Bessemer, 288 Mich.
455, 285 N. W. 20 (1939); Warm v. City of Cincinnati, 57 Ohio App. 43, 11 N. E.
(2d) 281 (1937). Contra: Ark.-Mo. Power Co. v. City of Kennett, Mo., 78 F. (2d)
911 (C. C. A. 8th 1935), criticized (1936) 13 N. Y. U. L. Q. REy. 303.
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as to the indebtedness a municipality may incur for the future.' 4 Since a
municipal corporation has only those powers which are expressly granted to
it by the state and those which may be implied as absolutely necessary to
execute the express powers,' 5 most states have passed legislation authorizing
municipal corporations to borrow from federal funds.16 However, the loans
obtained in accordance with the state enabling acts must substantially comply
with the debt limit provisions in the state statutes or state constitutions.' 7
Observations from a survey of this particular field show that the states
are being eliminated as "middle-men" between the federal government and
municipal government, and that this method of loan and grant affords the
federal government opportunity to invade local autonomy. These federal loans
were to extend only during an emergency period,' 8 but it seems that the
emergency will last. As the concept of the "General Welfare" clause is ex-
panded and municipal restrictions lessened, the question whether the federal
government by indirect subsidization is actively promoting widespread govern-
ment ownership of public utilities may become increasingly important.
Frederick L. Turner
Constitutional Law: Procedural due process: Application to class suits.--
The recent case of Hansberry v. Lee, 61 Sup. Ct. 115 (1940), illustrates
the intricacies of the problems of class suits. Land owners of a certain neigh-
borhood had entered into an agreement not to sell or lease their property
in this section to negroes for a certain period, which was to be binding if
ninety-five per cent of the frontage owners signed the agreement. In a pre-
vious action by one signer in behalf of herself and other signers, against
another signer, the court enjoined the breach of the covenant upon the stip-
U4See N. Y. CONST. Art. 8, § 4; 6 McQuILLIn, op cit. supra note 10, § 2364.
151 McQUILLIN, op. cit. Fupra note 10, § 373.
'
6 See, e.g., N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 782, which reads: "An Act declaring a public emer-
gency, and enabling municipalities and public bodies to secure the benefits of and aid
in carrying out the provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act." N. Y. UNcoNs.
LA,ws, PUBLic RELIMEF. Note that this refers to the Federal Emergency Relief Act, and
not to the provisions of the Industrial Recovery Act, 48 STAT. 195 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A.
§ 701 et seq. (1939), declared unconstitutional in A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp v.
United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55 Sup. Ct. 837 (1935). Consult respective state statutes
for corresponding acts. The federal law provides that "The President, in his discretion,
and under such terms as he may prescribe, may extend any of the benefits of this
chapter to any state, county, or municipality notwithstanding any constitutional or legal
restriction or limitation of the right or power of such state, county, or municipality to
borrow money or incur indebtedness." 48 STAT. 202 (1933), 40 U. S. C. A. § 403 (d)
(Supp. 1940). This section has been declared constitutional when the loan or grant is
made to the municipality in a state which authorizes the project and the procuring of
the loan and grant. Duke Power Co. et al. v. Greenwood County, supra note 7.
17 1owa Electric Co. v. Town of Cascade et al., 288 N. W. 633 (Iowa 1939) ; Kansas
Utilities Co. v. City of Burlington, 141 Kan. 926, 44 P. (2d) 223 (1935) ; New York
State Electric and Gas Corp. v. City of Plattsburg et al., 168 Misc. 597, 6 N. Y. S. (2d)
419 (Sup. Ct. 1938), rood., 281 N. Y. 450, 24 N. E. (2d) 122 (1939).
'SThis declaration of emergency is found both in the federal and state acts, cited
mspra note 16.
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ulation that the requisite per cent had signed.' In the present suit to enforce
the covenant defendants, who had not been parties to the previous suit nor
formally served with notice thereof,2 proved that only fifty-four per cent' had
signed, but the trial court held that the prior adjudication was res judicata
and the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed, holding that the previous action
was a proper class suit and the judgment binding on the class.3 The United
States Supreme Court held that this was a denial of due process.
A recent attempt to classify class suits was made in Rule 23 (a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure4 which states: "If persons constituting a
class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before
the court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate
representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the character
of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is, (1) joint, or
common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary right refuses
to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes entitled
to enforce it; (2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication
of claims which do or may affect specific property involved in the action;
or (3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the
several rights and a common relief is sought." The Rule does not state the
effect of the judgment rendered under the different classifications. They
have been labelled respectively the true, hybrid, and spurious class suits with
the judgment rendered in the true type binding on all the class, that in the
hybrid type binding on all the class if in ren but not if in personam, and
the judgment rendered in the spurious type binding only on the parties to
the action and their privies. 5
Despite the careful wording of the Rule much difficulty arises in deter-
mining within which type a case falls when it apparently could be placed
under any one. In the case of a restrictive covenant, such as exists in the
Hansberry case, is not the purpose and common interest of the covenant an
economic one-to safeguard the value of the land within the restricted
area? The writer has only found one other case of a class suit on restrictive
covenants concerning land but the court merely states that such was a proper
case for a class suit.6
From the standpoint of due process should any distinction be made re-
'Burke v. Kleiman, 277 Ill. App. 519 (1934).2Defendant in the Hawsberry case had actual knowledge of the previous suit since
his wife had been a party to it, but it appears that more than actual knowledge was
required to bind him. There must be notice and an invitation to join before the judg-
ment rendered will be binding on a person not a party to the suit [Richards v. McNair,
121 Fla. 733, 164 So. 836 (1935); State v. Woodruff, 170 Miss. 744, 150 So. 760
(1933) ; Producers Inv. Co. v. Calvert, 100 P. (2d) 1005 (Ok1a. 1940) ; 1 FREEMAN ON
JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 410] unless such person, or persons, actively participates
in the defense by contribution, etc. Bryant El. Co. v. Marshall, 169 Fed. 426 (C. C. A.
1st 1909); Confectioners' Mach. Co. v. Racine Engine & Mach. Co., 163 Fed. 914
(C. C. A. 7th 1908).3Lee v. Hansberry, 372 Ill. 369, 24 N. E. (2d) 37 (1939), noted (1940) 7 U. OF CuI.
L. REv. 563, 49 YALE L. J. 1125.
428 U. S. C. A. following § 723c (Supp. 1940).
52 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 2219-2303. For a general discussion of persons
affected by judgments see 1 FREEMAN ON JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) §§ 401-518.6Allen v. Avondale Co., 135 Fla. 6, 185 So. 137 (1938).
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garding the effect of judgments rendered in the three different types of class
suits? Due process signifies that a person should not be deprived of his
property or rights without notice and an opportunity to present his defense.
It does not guarantee to the citizen of a state any particular method of state
procedure and the clause is satisfied if the citizen has reasonable notice and
opportunity to be heard and present his claim or defense.7 In the Hansberry
case Mr. Justice Stone states: "It is evident that the considerations which
may induce a court to thus proceed, despite a technical defect of parties, may
differ from those which must be taken into account in determining whether
the absent parties are bound by the decree or, if it is adjudged they are, in
ascertaining whether such an adjudication satisfies the requirements of due
process and of full faith and credit. Nevertheless there is scope within the
framework of the Constitution for holding in appropriate cases that a judg-
ment rendered in a class suit is res judicata as to members of the class who
are not formal parties .. . this Court is justified in saying that there has
been a failure of due process only in those cases where it cannot be said
that the procedure adopted, fairly insures the protection of the interests of
absent parties who are to be bound by it. . ...s
The cases of actions by or against a class in which the judgments rendered
were held to be binding on the entire class can be divided into two general
categories: (1) Those involving disputes between the class and outsiders;9
(2) Those involving disputes among the members of the class.10 The Hans-
7Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U. S. 362, 50 Sup. Ct. 299 (1930) ; Owens v. Battenfield, 33
F. (2d) Th3 (C. C. A. 8th 1929), aff'd w. o. op., 280 U. S. 605, 50 Sup. Ct. 88 (1929).
861 Sup. Ct. 115, 118 (1940).
9 .g., a receivers suit against subscribers to establish their assessment liability[Southern Ornamental Iron Works v. Morrow, 101 S. W. (2d) 336 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937)] ; a suit to enforce a mortgage or other debt against trust property with the
trustee representing the beneficiaries [Rejall v. Greenhood, 92 Fed. 945 (C. C. A. 9th
1899), followed in .I re Hillebrand, 49 F. (2d) 459 (N. D. Ohio, 1930)]; proceedings
by creditors against an insolvent corporation, where the stockholders, etc., are held
to be represented by the corporation [Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U. S. 413,
35 Sup. Ct. 625 (1915)]_; actions by an administrator or executor to collect claims
due the decedent, where the administrator or executor is held to represent the persons
interested in the estate [O'Hara v. O'Hara's Adm'r, 182 Ky. 260, 206 S. W. 462
(1918)]; suits against a municipality regarding a matter of public and general interest,
where the municipality represents its taxpayers and citizens [Humble Oil & Refining Co.
v. State Tax Commission, 78 F. (2d) 108 (C. C. A. 10th 1935) ; Pear v. City of East
St. Louis, 273 Ill. 501, 113 N. E. 60 (1916)].
1oE.g., a member's suit against a fraternal benefit association contesting the validity
of assessments [Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Barber, 245 U. S. 146, 38 Sup. Ct. 54 (1917) ;
Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U. S. 531, 35 Sup. Ct. 724 (1914); Waybright v. Colum-
bian Mut. Life Ins. Co., 30 F. Supp. 885 (W. D. Tenn. 1939)], whether certain acts
are ultra vires [Sovereign Camp v. Bolin, 305 U. S. 66, 59 Sup. Ct. 35 (1938)31, and
rights and interests in the association's funds [Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble,
255 U. S. 356, 41 Sup. Ct. 338 (1920)]; a taxpayer suing the municipality in a matter
of public and general interest, as, for example, to enjoin the issuance of bonds [Gallaher
v; City of Moundsville, 34 W. Va. 730, 12 S. E. 859 (1891)], expenditure of muni-
cipal funds [Lavin v. Board of Com'rs, 245 Ill. 496, 92 N. E. 291 (1910)], and col-
lection of certain taxes [Taxpayers v. O'Kelley, 49 La. App. 1039, 22 So. 311 (1897)] ;
suits by classes of remaindermenand beneficiaries under a will against the executor,
administrator or trustee to determine their rights, etc. [Montgomery v. Equitable Life
Assur. Soc., 83 F. (Zd) 758 (C. C. A. 7th 1936); Stewart v. Oneal, 237 Fed. 897
(C. C. A. 6th 1917)]; and a suit by cemetery lot owners to enjoin the trustee church
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berry case logically comes within the second category, representing a suit
among the members of the class.
The case follows the doctrine that a person may not represent a class
where there is a possibility of adverse interests between him and the class
intended to be represented-his interests must not, be antagonistic to those
whom he would represent.'1 But is it not apparent that in the type of cases
in which the judgment rendered has been held binding on the class, there
exists the possibility of differences of opinion and resulting adverse interests
between the representative party and the represented class? Does not the
application of this doctrine, therefore, lead to the conclusion that there has
been likewise a denial of due process in these cases? An interesting contrasf
may be found in the case of Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co. 1 2 An Ohio
statute' 3 provides that the value placed upon his stock by .a dissenting share-
holder when the majority have voted to sell the corporate assets, should,
after six months' and under certain circumstances, conclusively be deemed
to be equal to the fair cash value. In construing this statute, the Court held
that such declaration of value constituted notice to the corporation by the
dissenting minority and was the equivalent of notice to the majority itself.
The Supreme Court held this no denial of due process; the formalism of
its reasoning is in strange contrast with the realism of Hansberry v. Lee.
The majority, said the Court, have indicated by their vote their desire to
remain part and parcel of the corporation; the minority, their desire to sever
relationships. As to the majority, therefore, the failure of the corporate
management to reject the proposal of the minority must be treated as an
ordinary act of management binding on them as shareholders in their col-
lective capacity. But the majority have in reality voted to part company
with the corporate enterprise and the minority have expressed, however in-
effectively, their desire to remain a part of it; indeed, it is because the
interests of the minority are identical with those of the corporation that
unanimous conseiit for such action would have been required at common law.
If the corporation is regarded as the representative of the majority, therefore,
there is much to be said against forcing upon them a representative for whose
summary execution they have just voted. Realistically, however, it is not the
corporation but the management which will be called on to represent the
majority's interests. And as between majority and management, there will be,
in most instances, not conflict but community of interest; indeed, it is commonly
the management, not the stockholders, that proposes a sale of corporate assets.
A possible line of distinction lies in the nature of the issue involved and
its effect on the ability of the court to safeguard the interests of the absent
parties, but no case seems to have turned on this distinction.
Again, in many cases, a representative of the class as a whole is a party
to the suit, either as plaintiff or defendant, and can perhaps be regarded as
from destroying the cemetery, etc. [Chew v. First Presbyterian Church, 237 Fed. 219
(W. D. Del. 1916)].
"'Lightle v. Kirby, 194 Ark. 535, 108 S. W. (2d) 896 (1937) ; Langson v. Goldberg,
373 Ill. 297, 26 N. E. (2d) 111 (1940); Sartor v. Newberry Land & Security Co.,
104 S. C. 184, 88 S. E. 467 (1916) ; 1 FREEMAN ON JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 422.
1261 Sup. Ct. 376 (1941).
130mo GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1938) § 8623-72, par. 7.
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looking out for the interests of all members. Thus, in fraternal benefit intra-
class suits contesting the validity of certain acts the association, a quasi-
entity, represents its members. 14 However, in a proceeding for instructions
by a trustee, he is not permitted to represent the beneficiaries but must make
those persons having a present interest in the trust parties to the suit.15 Is
not the trustee a more disinterested and impartial fiduciary than such cor-
porate entity? Would not the trustee be more apt to represent the reason-
able interests of his cestuis? Would not the court safeguard more strictly
the interests of such absent cestuis if they were permitted to be represented?
There remains the problem of how to meet the requirements of due process
established by the narrow doctrine of the HIansberry case. Could the court
in its discretion require formal notice to be served to all the members of
the class? What type of notice would be sufficient-notice by publication
or by mail? Could the rule be established that the judgment rendered will
be conclusive on the class but the represented members may attack the
judgment within a reasonable time-perhaps within the traditional year
and a day-directly but not collaterally? The writer is of the opinion that
there is a necessity for class suits with conclusive judgments and suggests
that some amendment should be made to Federal Rule 23 (a).
The Law Revision Commission of the State of New York is at present
investigating the problems of class suits and it will be interesting to note
what recommendations, if any, they will suggest.
Edward R. Moran
Contracts: Prevention of performance as breach: Diversion of percolat-
ing water.-This note is a sequel to one published in the December,
1940 issue of the QUARTERLY' wherein the recent case of Rothrauff et ux.
v. Sinking Springs Water Co., 339 Pa. 129, 14 A. (2d) 187 (1940), was
discussed purely from the property viewpoint. In addition, however, the
case presents an unusual contract situation involving the doctrine of breach
by hinderance or prevention of performance, which it is the purpose of this
note to discuss.
The Pennsylvania court, unfortunately, resolved all contract difficulties
by choosing to regard the case as a tortious violation of property rights,
constituting a breach of the contract between the parties. It is settled law
that if one party to a contract commits a tortious act whereby performance
by the other party is effectively hindered or prevented, such act may be
regarded as a breach of contract for which the adverse party may recover
his damages.2  If, on the other hand, the act which hinders or prevents
performance would be entirely lawful were it not for the existence of the
14 Sovereign Camp v. Bolin, 305 U. S. 66, 59 Sup. Ct. 35 (1938).15Northern Trust Co. v. Thompson, 336 Ill. 137, 168 N. E. 116 (1929); Appeal of
Chaplin, 131 Me. 446, 163 Atl. 774 (1933).
'(1940) 26 CORNELL L. Q. 154.2REsTATEmENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 315. See also Corbin, Conditions in the Law of
Contracts (1919) 28 YALE L. J. 739, 757, 758 [SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS (1931) 871, 887, 888].
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contract, there is raised a more complex problem, and one which has been
subject to varied judicial interpretation. Courts have sought to evade this
contract difficulty by finding, wherever possible, that the act preventing per-
formance was tortious per se.8 In the Rothrauff case, the Pennsylvania
court seems to have adopted this technique.
Plaintiffs were the owners of a farm upon which there was a deep-seated
spring producing a substantial quantity of water. Defendant, a corporation
engaged in the business of supplying water to the public, entered into a
contract whereby it agreed to purchase the total effluent of plaintiff's spring
for a period of two years at a stated price per gallon. Having difficulty with
its other sources of supply, and finding that the amount of water received
from the spring was inadequate for its needs, defendant obtained permission
to sink a well on plaintiff's land and to pump water therefrom. Although
the flow from the spring was measurably reduced by the digging of the
well, the combined flow greatly increased the supply of water obtained.
When this increased supply proved inadequate, defendant took options on
adjoining land and sank several more wells, the last of which produced
water in the desired quantity but caused plaintiff's spring to run dry. The
court held that the sinking of the productive well on the adjacent property
"was, as against plaintiffs, a tortious act for which at common law they
might have recovered resulting damages." 4  Recovery was permitted in the
action on the contract because "such illegal act constituted a breach by pre-
venting performance on the part of plaintiffs." 5 Clearly, therefore, the court
indicated that it regarded defendant's conduct as a wrongful infringement on
plaintiff's property rights irrespective of the contract. In the previous note,
it was pointed out that with respect to the law of percolating waters, the
court's decision was based on extremely tenuous grounds.6
If. defendant's diversion and appropriation of the water may be deemed
to have been entirely within its rights as a landowner, there remains the
other question raised but not discussed by the court, to wit, whether such
conduct might still have constituted an actionable breach of the contract.
It has frequently been stated that "where a party stipulates that another
shall do a certain thing, he thereby impliedly promises that he will himself
do nothing that will hinder or obstruct that other in doing that thing.' 7 And
further, in a situation where the cooperation of one party is an essential pre-
requisite to performance by the other party, a promise to give the necessary
co6peration has been inferred.8 From these implied in fact promises has
3See Note, Prevention of Perforinaiwe as Breach (1928) 41 HARv. L. REV. 398.4Rothrauff et ux. v. Sinking Springs Water Co., 339 Pa. 129, 14 A. (2d) 87, 90 (1940).5Ibid.6See (1940) 26 CORNELL L. Q. 154 et seq.
7Gay v. Blanchard, 32 La. Ann. 497, 504 (1880), quoted with approval in Patterson
v. Meyerhofer, 204 N. Y. 96, 97 N. E. 472 (1912). See also United States v. Peck,
102 U. S. 64, 26 L. ed. 46 (1880); Kress House Moving Co. v. Hogg, 263 Pa. 191,
106 Atl. 351 (1919).
8Murphy v. North American Co., 106 F. (2d) 24 (C. C. A. 2d 1939) ; O'Neil Supply
Co. v. Petroleum Heat & Power Co., 280 N. Y. 50, 19 N. E. (2d) 676 (1939) ; Gessler
v. Erwin Co., 182 Wis. 315, 193 N. W. 363 (1924) ; 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed.
Williston and Thompson 1937) §§ 677, 887A; 5 id. §§ 1293, 1293A, 1318; RESTATEMENT,
CoNRcrs (1932) § 395, comment (e).
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been derived the doctrine of breach by hinderance or prevention of perfor-
mance. Conduct constituting a breach of these promises may be set up as
a complete defense in suits for non-performance,9 or may itself be treated
as a breach of contract and damages recovered.10 Such wrongful conduct
has been held to include actual violence to the person," negligence,' 2 and
deliberate action calculated to make performance impossible ;13 it may con-
sist of an affirmative act' 4 or a failure to fulfill a condition, express or im-
plied ;15 it may utterly preclude the possibility of performance 6 or it may
simply hinder by rendering the performance more difficult or expensive. 17
Although promises to refrain from hinderance or prevention will usually
be inferred in every contract,' 8 they should be resorted to only where the
implication is necessary in order to give a reasonable construction and opera-
tion to the language which the parties have seen fit to employ.19 In the
extremely rare situation where the risk of such prevention or hinderance as
occurs has been assumed by the other party,2 0 or the hinderance or preven-
tion is due to some action of the promisor which under the terms of the
contract or customs of the business he was permitted to take, 2' it cannot be
said that the implied obligation was breached. Similarly, where the act is
done in the furtherance of a paramount public interest, it does not consti-
tute unlawful hinderance or prevention.22
A private corporation engaged in furnishing a water-supply to a com-
93 WILIsTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson 1937) § 882; 5 id. § 1315.
105 id. §§ 1315, 1318.
nSellers v. Catron, 5 Ind. Terr. 263, 82 S. W. 742 (1904). But see Thompson v.
Brown, 106 Ia. 367, 76 N. W. 819 (1898); Cole v, Alexander, 113 Ga. 1154, 39 S. E.
477 (1901) (held that insulting language and threats of personal violence did not make
performance impossible).
12 The Valsesia, [19271 P. 115.
'
8 Crawford v. Pioneer Box & Lumber Co., 105 Cal. App. 760, 288 Pac. 694 (1930);
Auto-Lec Stores v. B. & B. System, 162 So. 231 (La. App. 1935) ; Dilworth v. Brown,
128 Pa. Super. 124, 193 Ati. 125 (1937).
14 Crawford v. Pioneer Box & Lumber Co., supra note 13; Auto-Lec Stores v. B. & B.
System, supra note 13; Moore v. Whitty, 299 Pa. 58, 149 Atl. 93 (1930) ; Dilworth v.
Brown, supra note 13.
15Borough of Nanty-Glo v. American Surety Co., 316 Pa. 468, 175 At. 536 (1934).
See also cases cited supra note 8; 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and
Thompson 1937) §§ 677, 875 et seq.; RESTATEMENT, CONTACTs (1932) § 295.
16See cases cited supra notes 13 and 14.
17 American Bridge Co. v. State, 245 App. Div. 535, 283 N. Y. Supp. 577 (3d Dep't
1935) ; Moore v. Whitty, supra note 14.
'
8 Eaton v. Eaton, 233 Mass. 351, 124 N. E. 37 (1919).
:
9 Camp v. Wilson, 97 Va. 265, 33 S. E. 591 (1899). See also Corbin, Conditions in
the Law of Contracts, mpra note 2.
2 0RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 315 (b); accord, Peabody v. Star Sand Co.,
186 Wash. 91, 56 P. (2d) 1018 (1936). See also 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed.
Williston and Thompson 1937) § 677, p. 1956 n. : "Even total prevention by the promisor
might be contemplated as a contingency of which the promisee takes the chance, but
such a case will be very rare."
215 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson 1937) § 1293A, p. 3688,
quoted from the first edition with approval in Iron Trades Products Co. v. Wilkoff,
272 Pa. 172, 116 Atl. 150 (1922).2 2Blakeslee v. Board of Water Commissioners, 106 Conn. 642, 139 AtI. 106 (1927).
For prevention of performance by law, see 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston
and Thompson 1937) H8 1938, 1939.
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munity owes the public service duty of providing an adequate supply of
wholesome water at all times.2 3 Growth in population and in industrial
activity, with consequent increasing use of water, must be anticipated and
provided for.24  One who contracts with a public utility corporation dis-
tributing a natural resource such as water or natural gas and having the
consequent public duty to increase and protect its sources of supply, should
certainly be charged with knowledge of such duty. That the plaintiffs were
in fact aware of the duty is indicated by their complete acquiescence in de-
fendant's well-drilling activities, first on their own land and then on the
adjacent property. It would seem, therefore, that we have here an example
of that rare situation in which plaintiffs have assumed the risk of any inter-
ference brought about by defendant's activities pursuant to its public duty,
so long as such activities were neither of a tortious nature nor were inten-
tionally designed to interfere with their contract rights.
Normally the existence and the fact of breach are in no way dependent
upon the intention of the party in default or upon the amount of care and
faith which he employs. 25  But where the alleged breach is occasioned by
hinderance or prevention of performance, rather than by the promisor's de-
fault, it would seem that there must be a direct intent so to hinder or prevent
in order to effect an actionable breach of the implied obligation as dis-
inguished from mere excuse for non-performance. Leading authorities speak
in terms of "the wilful and wrongful putting an end to a contract, and pre-
venting the other party from carrying it out ' 26 or to "intentionally and
purposely do anything to prevent the other party from carrying out the
agreement on his part."27 Although defendant in the instant case may readily
be termed an "intentional diverter" in a property sense,28 the conclusion is
equally apparent that defendant's conduct was, not motivated by any desire
to cut off and appropriate the supply of water furnished by the plaintiffs.
Defendant never refused to buy the water so long as plaintiffs had some to
sell. On the contrary, it made every effort to increase the supply obtained
from plaintiffs' land, and only when this remained insufficient did it endeavor
to drill wells of its own, all with plaintiffs' apparent knowledge and approval.
Under these facts, therefore, it is difficult to see how defendant's impelling
motive was other than the faithful performance of the public service duty
imposed by its public utility status.
Since defendant's prevention appears from the record to have been neither
23Indianapolis Water Co. v. McCart, 302 U. S. 469, 58 Sup. Ct. 324 (1938) inod'g and
aff'g 89 F. (2d) 522 (C. C. A. 7th 1937); Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public
Service Commission, 292 U. S. 290, 54 Sup. Ct. 647 (1934) ; Luakrawka v. Spring Valley
Water Co., 169 Cal. 318, 146 Pac., 640, Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 277; New Haven Water Co.
v. Russell, 86 Conn. 361, 85 Atl. 636 (1912); East Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities
Commission, 133 Ohio St. 212, 12 N. E. (2d) 765 (1938); 4 MCQUILLIN, MUNIciPAL
CORPORATIONS (Supp. 1939) §§ 1821, 1903.24See note 23 sunpra.25Sliosberg v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 244 N. Y. 482, 498, 155 N. E. 749 (1927) ; Chesa-
peake & Ohio Ry. v. Board, 100 W. Va. 222; 225, 130 S. E. 524 (1925); 1 WILLISTON,
CONTRACrS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson 1936) § 32A.26United States v. Behan, 110 U. S. 338, 4 Sup. Ct. 81 (1883).27Patterson v. Meyerhofer, supra note 7.2sSee (1940) 26 CORNELL L. Q. 154.
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intentional nor tortious, and- since plaintiffs have assumed the risk of non-
intentional interference by the defendant in complying with its public ser-
vice duty, there remains no satisfactory basis on which the court could have
held that the contract had been breached. It would seem, therefore, that
the court erred in affirming the judgment for the plaintiffs.
Frederick L. Raker
Corporations: ,Accountability of directors for profits on sale of control
and liability to corporation for damage done by purchasers.-Corporate
property is owned by the shareholders collectively, although it is sometimes
said that the corporation as a distinct legal entity, and not the shareholders,
owns it. All are agreed, however, that shares in a corporation are the property
of the individual owner. The rights of ownership of any property are not
absolute, but such only as are defined and sanctioned by law. The varying
interests must be balanced to ascertain the extent of rights in lawful exer-
cise of the power of dominion. The fact that shares represent participation
in a joint business venture establishes a relation between all the -shareholders
and points to interests which should be balanced in determining the legal
rights of ownership of that type of property.
One of the most valuable of a shareholder's rights is his right to vote.1
By the same token the right of ownership must include the right to sell that
which he owns. But upon both of these rights there have been placed certain
legal limitations, especially when share ownership is coupled with control of
corporate 'action.
It has been stated that at a shareholders' meeting each shareholder has a
legal right to vote upon a measure even though he has a personal interest
therein, separate from the other shareholders. In such a meeting the share-
holder is said to represent himself solely and he in no, sense acts as
trustee or representative of the others.2 But this general statement is sub-ject to limitation when the shareholder is one of the majority group. The
majority are legally bound not to vote for their own selfish interests in such
a way that the interests of the minority are adversely affected.3 Contracts
which are voted on must be fair to all the shareholders collectively.4 The
majority may not perpetrate a fraud upon the minority or act in bad faith,
and courts of equity will protect against such oppression.5
1
"The righ4 of a stockholder to vote upon his holdings of stock is a property right-
one of the essential rights of ownership." Lord v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 47Misc. 187, 198, 94 N. Y. Supp. 65 (Sup. Ct. 1905), aff'd, 109 App. Div. 252, 96 N. Y.
Supp. 252 (2d Dep't 1905).2Gamble v. Queens County Water Co., 123 N. Y. 91, 25 N. E. 201, 9 L. R. A. 527,
532 (1890).
SKroener v. Pancoast, 47 R. I. 470; 134 At., 6 (1926) ; 18 C. J. S. § 496.4Johnson v. Hotel Lawrence Corp., 337 Ill. 345, 169 N. E. 240 (1929); Putnum v.Juvenile Shoe Corp., 307 Mo. 74, 269 S. W. 593 (1924), 40 A. L. R. 1412, 1415 (1925) ;Meyerhoff v. Banker's Securities, 105 N. J. Eq. 76, 174 Atl. 105 (1929), noted (1929)
28 MicH. L. REv. 202, 14 MINN. L. Rv. 58.5 Gamble v. Queens County Water Co., 123 N. Y. 91, 25 N. E. 201, 9 L. R. A. 527,532 (1890) (leading case on fraud) ; Sautter -v. Fulmer, 258 N. Y. 107, 179 N. E. 310
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Every shareholder may sell his shares for what they will bring-this is an
inherent right. But the limitation imposed by law upon this right is shown
in part in the recent case of Inmtranshares v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F.
Supp. 22 (E. D. Pa. 1940). Insuranshares was an incorporated investment
trust with over 200,000 shares of stock outstanding of which a minority
block was owned by the three defendants. Because of dispersion of owner-
ship and the lack of interest displayed by the majority, these defendants,
acting in concert, were able to control the corporation, were elected directors,
and were principal officers. The defendants desired to dispose of their stock,
but believing they could get a price higher than market because of their pos-
session of control, solicited and consummated a sale to strangers at a pre-
mium. The defendants made no attempt to investigate the purchasers' finan-
cial stability or business integrity, or to ascertain the source of the purchase
money. Complying with the terms of the contract of sale, defendants promptly
resigned as directors and re-elected the purchasers in their stead. The pur-
chasers immediately put into execution a predetermined plan and proceeded
to loot the, corporation's investment portfolio of all its securities, to their
own benefit. Bereft, thereby, of most of its assets, the corporation brought
suit against the defendants on a negligence count and the court awarded
damages generally as prayed. In its well-written opinion the court reiterated
the fiduciary duties owed by a director or controlling shareholder to the cor-
poration and held that defendants had violated those duties. The sale of the
controlling shares, for their own selfish interests, without investigation of
the purchasers under circumstances which would put a reasonable man on
his guard, was an act far below the legat standard of fiduciary duty. It was
held to be not a mere sale of shares, as defendants alleged, but a sale of con-
trol at a premium without regard for the interests of the corporation.6
In holding defendants liable for losses suffered by the corporation after
they had ceased to be shareholders and directors, the court took a position
in accord with the limited authority on the point. A New York case7 re-
quired directors, who sold out control for a bonus, to account for the bonus
and also for losses which the corporation subsequently suffered through mis-
management; but the ,decision was rested more upon conspiracy to defraud
than upon negligence. A Pennsylvania case,8 likewise, held directors liable
(1932) ; Flynn ,v. Brooklyn City Ry., 158 N. Y. 493, 55 N. E. 25(0 (1899) ; Kroger v.
Jaburg, 231 App. Div. 641, 248 N. Y. Supp. 387 (1st Dep't 1931); 13 FLETCHER, CYcLo-
PEDIA OF CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1932) §§ 5810, 5829. However, the minority cannot
interfere with discretionary acts of management unless it clearly appears that their
rights are being abused or there is bad faith. In Hyams v. Calumet & H. Min. Co.,
221 Fed. 529 (C. C. A. 6th 1915), the court said: "Control of the majority of the
stock of a corporation . . . makes a fiduciary relation to the minority and are charged
with the duty of exercising good faith, care and diligence for the protection of such
minority interests, and every act to the interest of the majority to the detriment of
the minority is a breaclh of duty and of trust, so as to warrant plenary relief from a
court of equity in behalf of the minority stockholders."6Voting agreements to keep a certain officer or group in control of management are
unenforceable. Wilbur v. Stoepel, 82 Mich. 344, 46 N. W. 724 (1890) ; Harris v. Scott,
67 N. H. 437, 32 Atl. 770 (1893).
7Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N. Y. 157, 61 N. E. 163, 55 L. R. A. 951, 957 (1901) (where
directors sold shares at a premium and also received a bonus of $18,000).
8Keystone Guard v. Beaman, 264 Pa. 397, 107 Atl. 835 (1919) (where directors
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for resulting losses, but the theory on, which the court based its decision is
not altogether clear.
It is a general rule that even a majority shareholder may sell out his con-
trolling interest for a higher price than market, provided he acts in good
faith toward the corporation and the minority shareholders. 9 But it is a
breach of duty owed to the corporation for the majority to sell their controll-
ing shareg to another for the express purpose of transferring control into the
hands of a rival.10 Since a corporation's charter is given to it by the state
in order that it may carry on a business enterprise, it has been held that
the charter can be revoked if the shareholders, acting in concert, transfer
their shares to: a trustee whereby the corporation is made functionless." If
a majority shareholder, or a director, makes a contract whereby he agrees
to sell a portion of his shares and in return promises to have the purchaser
elected director or corporate officer, such a contract is unenforceable in
equity.' 2  But the mere fact that a stockholder is also a director of the cor-
poration does not affect his right to make a bona fide transfer of his shares.13
Moreover, a director may benefit from the advantage he may reap due to
his holding of an exceptionally large block.14 However, a director may not
be oblivious to the interests of the corporation and the other shareholders,
as his control is only for the legitimate business policy of the corporation
within lawful limits.'0 A director may not use his official position as a sub-
received a bribe of $5,000 each to resign in favor of persod who later stole all cor-
porate assets).9Hellenborg v. Cobre Grand Copper Co., 200 U. S. 239, 28 Sup. Ct. 236 (1906);
Barnes v. Brown, 80 N. Y. 527 (1880); Smith v. Gray, 50 Nev. 56, 250 Pac. 369
(1926) (where a sale of controlling shares by majority was held to be for good of the
corporation) ; Sautter v. Fulmer, 258 N. Y. 107, 179 N. E. 310 (1932) (where majority
sold control at a premium and held liable to minority); 13 FLEH ER, op. cit. supra
note 5, § 5805; 18 C. J. S. § 496.
'
0Penn. R. R. v. Commonwealth, 3 Sad. (Pa.) 100, 7 Atl. 368 (1886).
lNew York v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 131 N. Y. 582, 24 N. E. 834 (1890).12Guernsey v. Cook, 120 Mass. 501 (1876); Wilbur v. Stoepel, 82 Mich. 344, 46
N. W. 724 (1890); Van Slyke v. Andrews, 146 Minn. 216, 178 N. W. 959 (1920), 12
A. L. R. 1070, 1073 (1921); Fabre v. O'Donohue, 185 App. Div. 779, 173 N. Y. Supp.
745 (2d Dep't 1918); Snow v. Church, 13 App. Div. 108, 42 N. Y. Supp, 1072 (2d
Dep't 1897) ; Fremont v. Stone, 42 Barb. (N. Y.) 169 (1864).
13Johnson v. Laflin, 103 U. S. 800, 26 L. ed. 532 (1880) ; Donaldson v. Andresen, 300
Pa. 312, 150 Atl. 616 (1930) ; 12 FLrETCHEr, op. cit. supra note 5, § 5459.
14The leading case in New York is Stanton v. Schenck, 140 Misc. 621, 251 N. Y.
Supp. 221 (Sup. Ct. 1931), noted (1931) 45 HAav. L. REv. 1390, where it was held
'that directors and controlling shareholders who sold all their holdings to a rival cor-
poration at a premium were not accountable to the corporation for this profit as there
was no showing of bad faith. In Keeley v. Black, 91 N. 3. Eq. 520, 111 Atl. 22 (1920)
the Bell Telephone Co. paid the president and director a bonus of $21,000 for getting
control of the majority of shares of his small corporation and selling them to Bell at
par. The court said the president was not liable for this bonus to the corporation as
he was selling his own, stock and owed no duty to anyone. Cf., Porter v. Healey, 244
Pa. 427, 91 Atl. 428 (1914) ; Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa.
410, 76 Atl. 77 (1910); Ins. Agency Co. v. Blossom, 231 S. W. 636 (Mo. 1921);
SPELLMAN, CoRoRarE Drtcroas (1931) 590, 591; 19 C. J. S. 793. This is now quali-
fied by 48 STAT. 896 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. § 78 p (b) (Supp. 1940), known as Securities
Exchange Act, which makes it illegal for an officer or director to resell shares of his
own corporation within six months after purchase.
'
5Fennessy v. Ross, 5 App. Div. 342, 39 N. Y. Supp. 323 (1st'Dep't 1896).
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ject of bargain and sale; and should he sell his stock, anc.in addition receive
a gratuity for relinquishing his office, the corporation may ;hold him to
account ;16 or if he receives a bonus for selling his control which is separable
from what he receives for his stock, he will be held to account for that bonus.
If he receives a gain which can reasonably be traced.to an ,abuse of his con-
trolling position, all the money thus belongs either to the corporation or to
its stockholders in common.1 Thus, there are three grounds of liability
which can be imposed upon a director-shareholder for an improper sale of
his stock: (1) if in addition to the sale price of his shares he receives a
bonus for relinquishing either his control or his office, he must account for
his bonus ;18 (2) if he conspires fraudulently by sale of his shares at a pre-
mium to turn control over to purchasers who mismanage the corporation, he
will be held to account for the bonus plus corporate losses ;19 (3) if he negli-
gently turns control over to purchasers who pay him a bonus for the sale of
his shares and then the purchasers proceed to loot the corporate assets, he
will be held liable for all losses to the corporation which were a proximate
result of his negligence. Situation (3) is exemplified by the principal case.
In that case, the defendants could have been held liable on two grounds: to
account as corporate directors for breach of fiduciary duty, and .secondly for
negligence as controlling shareholders in selling out control without reasonable
investigation as to the purchasers.20
Donald R. Harter
Labor Law: Application of Sherman Anti-trust Act to "labor disputes"
within the meaning of Norris-LaGuardia Act.-Very recently this sub-
ject has become of added interest and importance. Significant in this field
is the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Milk
Drivers' Union, Local No. 752 et al. v. Lake Valley Farm Products,
Inc. et al., 61 Sup. Ct. 122, 85 L. ed. 91 (1940). In this case, members of
'
6Moulton v. Field, 179 Fed. 673' (C. C. A. 7th 1910); Field v. Western Life In-
demnity Co., 166 Fed. 607 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1908); Heinemau..v. Marshall, 117 Mo.
App. 546 (1905) ; McLure v. Law, 161 N. Y. 78, 76 Am. St. 282 (1899).
17Oil Shares v. Kahn, 94 F. (2d) 751 (C. C. A. 3d 1938) ; Bosworth v. Allen, 168
N. Y. 157, 61 N. E. 163, 55 L. R. A. 951, 957 (1901) ; cf., Stanton v. Schenck, 140 Misc.
621, 251 N. Y. Supp. 221 (Sup. Ct 1931) ; Keystone Guard v. Beaman, 264 Pa. 397,
107 Atl. 835 (1919) ; Porter v. Healey, 244 Pa. 427, 91 AtI. 428 (1914); Common-
wealth Title Insurance Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa. 410, 76 Atl. 77 (1910) ; but cf., Keeley
v. Black, 91 N. J. Eq. 520, 111 Atl. 22 (1920).
3sCases cited supra notes 16, 17.19Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N. Y. 157, 61 N. E. 163, 55 L. R. A. 951, 957 (1901) ; Key-
stone Guard v. Beaman, 264 Pa. 397, 107 Atl. 835 (1919).20Since the court in the principal case awarded damages to the corporation for all
losses sustained those damages would become corporate assets when defendants paid.
The court did not discuss whether or not the persons who purchased defendants' stock
would be entitled to share in the recovery which was awarded the corporation. In
Keeley v. Black, supra note 17, which was cited with approval on the point in Stanton
v. Schenck, supra note 17, the court refused to award damages on the basis of such
an anomolous result. However, it has been held that the decree can be so framed as
to allow only innocent shareholders to participate in the recovery. STEVENS, CoRPoRA-
TIONS (1936) 662.
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defendant union, composed of milk wagon drivers, were picketing retail
stores selling plaintiff's milk. Plaintiff petitioned for an injunction upon
the allegation that defendants were engaged in a conspiracy in restraint of
trade in violation of the Sherman Anti-trust Act.' The question was whether
there was a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,2
which states: "No court of the United States ... shall have jurisdiction to
issue any restraining order or... injunction in a case involving or growing
out of a labor dispute, except in strict conformity with the provisions of
this Act .... A case shall be held to involve or grow out of a labor dispute
when the case involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade,
craft, or occupation. . . ." Plaintiff dairies sold their milk to "vendors"-
supposedly independent contractors-who in turn sold to cut-rate retail
stores. Defendants protested that the vendor system and resulting price
reduction depressed labor standards. Plaintiff's "vendors" had organized
into a C.I.O. union, but this did not settle the controversy. The District
Court dismissed plaintiff's bill for want of jurisdiction, finding that the
jurisdictional prerequisites of the Norris-LaGuardia Act had not been com-
plied with, and holding that a "labor dispute" existed.4 The Supreme Court
reinstated this decree, reversing the Circuit Court of Appeals.5
Section 20 of the Clayton Act forbade federal judges to grant an injunc-
tion "in any case between an employer and employees . . . involving or
growing out of a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment.. ." ;6
the Supreme Court in Duplex Printing Press Company v. Deering7 limited
its application to those cases where the dispute was between an employer
and his immediate employees. So was labor restrained in its efforts until
1932, when the Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed." This act, inter alia,
deprived federal courts of jurisdiction, in cases involving labor disputes, to
enjoin the commission of certain acts (enumerated in Section 4) or to issue
126 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 1-7 (1927).
247 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 101-115 (Supp. 1940).
347 STAT. 70, 73 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 101, 113 (a) (Supp. 1940). In general,
see Notes (1938) 23 CORNELL L. Q. 339, 11 So. CALIF. L. REv. 484.4The decree of the District Court is not reported.
1108 F. (2d) 436 (C. C. A. 7th 1940). The companion case, Meadowmoor Dairies,
Inc. v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, Local No. 753 et al., 21 N. E. (2d) 308 (Ill. 1939),
reached an opposite result from the Supreme Court, based on the Illinois anti-injunction
statute [ILL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 48, § 2-a], which is patterned after
the Clayton Act instead of containing the broader definition of "labor dispute" found in
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. For comment on the state case, see (1939) 25 CORNELL
L. Q. 132. The case has been affirmed by the Supreme Court. 9 U. S. L. WEEI 4185
(U. S. Feb. 10, 1941).
638 STAT. 738 (1914), 29 tU. S. C. A. § 52 (1937). For shorti expositions of the
Act, see JAEGER, CASES AND STATUTES ON LABOR LAW (1939) 549; WITTE, THE GOvERN-
MENT IN LABOR DisPums (1932) 66.
7254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172 (1920). For a typical comment on the Clayton Act,
as interpreted by the Supreme Court, see Ralston, Government by Injunctio (1920)
5 CORNELL L. Q. 424. For a history of the events leading up to the Clayton Act and
an analysis of the Supreme Court's interpretation of it in the Duplex and subsequent
cases, see FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNcTioN (1930) 158-176.
847 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 101-115 (Supp. 1940). For general considera-
tion of the Act, see Monkemeyer, Five Years of the Norris-LaCuardia Act (1937)" 2
Mo. L. REv. 1; Witte, The Federal Anti-iunchtion Act (1932) 16 MmN. L. Rxv. 638;
Frankfurter and Greene, Congressional Power over Labor Injunctions (1931) 31 C L.
L. REv. 385.
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any injunctions whatsoever, until after compliance with certain conditions
(enumerated in Section 7). At first, it seemed that the federal courts would
attenuate this labor statute also, by holding that jurisdictional disputes, not
involving the employer, did not satisfy the statutory definition of the term
"labor dispute" ;9 but the Supreme Court rejected such a narrow construction
of the Act in Lauf et al. v. E. G. Skinner,'° and the Milk Drivers' case.'1
Many states have statutes similar either to the Norris-LaGuardia Act or
to the Clayton Act.12 In the beginning, the Supreme Court held such state
acts unconstitutional, 13 but in Senn, v. Tile Layers Protective Union, Local
No. 5 et al.'4 a Wisconsin anti-injunction statute, patterned after the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, was held constitutional, despite the liberal interpretation
given to the phrase "labor dispute" by the state court. New York's anti-
injunction statute is modeled along the lines of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 15
and the New York Court of Appeals has applied the state act to labor con-
troversies with the same understanding and sympathy that the Supreme
Court has shown in applying the federal anti-injunction statute.' 6
9 See Scavenger Service Corp. v. Courtney, 85 F. (2d) 825 (C. C. A. 7th 1936);
United Electric Coal Co. v. Rice, 80 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 7th 1935). See Note (1936)
21 CORNELL L. Q. 640. Cf., In re Cleveland & Sandusky Brewing Co., 11 F. Supp. 198
(N. D. Ohio 1935), noted (1935) 21 CORNELL L. Q. 137.
10303 U. S. 323, 58 Sup. Ct. 578 (1938), noted (1938) 36 MIcH. L. Rav. 1146. This
case reversed the decision of the Seventh Circuit, 82 F. (2d) 68 (1936). In Blankenship
et al. v. Kurfman, 96 F. (2d) 450 (C. C. A. 7th 1938), the court recognized the interpre-
tation given by the Supreme Court in the Lauf case. See also, New Negro Alliance
v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552, 58 Sup. Ct. 703 (1938), noted on opinion below
in (1937) 23 CORNELL L. Q. 206; cf. Anora Amusement Corp. v. Doe et al., 171 Misc.
279, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 400 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
"lAnother question, which may be of considerable future importance, arises from the
use of the term "employees" in the statutory definition of a labor dispute. In the
Milk Drivers' case, the Supreme Court considered the "vendors" to be in reality
"employees," but the Circuit Court of Appeals regarded them as independent con-
tractors. And in Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton et al., 34 F. Supp. 870
(D. Ore. 1939, case reported with additional notes, September 20, 1940), fishermen and
plaintiff were held to occupy the relation of independent contractors, and the activities
of the fishermen, directed through defendant union, were found to constitute a restraint
of trade in violation of the Sherman Act.
'
2For list of such statutes, see Note (1938) 23 CORNELL L. Q. 339, 342, note 20; for
summary of state statutes, see Fraenkel, Recent Statutes Affecting Labor Iniunctions
and Yellow Dog Cotracts (1936) 30 ILL. L. Rv. 854.
'
5 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct. 184 (1922), noted (1922) 7 CORNELL
L. Q. 251.
14301 U. S. 468, 57 Sup. Ct. 857 (1937). For notes discussing the constitutionality of
such acts, see (1932) 17 CORNELL L. Q. 666, (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1064.
15N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §§ 876-a, 882-a. The statute considers as labor disputes em-
ployment relations, "or any other controversy arising out" of the respective interests of
employer and employee"; to this extent the New York statute is more inclusive than
the federal act. A full treatment of the New York anti-injunction act is given in
Comment (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 537.-
1 6 May's Furs and Ready to Wear, Inc. et al. v. Bauer, 282 N. Y. 331, 26 N. E. (2d)
279 (1940) ; Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employees Union, 281 N. Y. 150, 22
N. E. (2d) 320 (1939), noted (1939) 25 CORNELL L. Q. 128 (the decision in the Busch case
must be read in the subsequent light of the May case, and consideration given to the
particular facts existing in that case) ; Stillwell Theatre, Inc. v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405,
182 N. E. 63 (1932) (decision before state anti-injunction act was passed). The family
business has received detailed consideration in the New York courts. Boro Park Sani-
tary Live Poultry Market, Inc. v. Heller, 280 N. Y. 481, 21 N. E. (2d) 687 (1939),
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Prominent in any discussion of a labor dispute "in the same industry" 17
is the term "secondary boycott." As applied by the courts it connotes activity
directed toward a third party, who is not connected with the original dispute,
but is usually a custorer or supplier of one of the disputants.'5 The courts
have experienced much difficulty in determining when businesses aligned
vertically (e.g. farmer, dairy, retail store) are within the "same industry."
New York has adopted the test of "unity of interest."19 Under this test it
is clear that those businesses or groups which so directly affect and influence
each other that together they constitute a unit are within the "same industry,"
especially if effectual control and financial interest exist between the third
party and the disputant.
The Supreme Court has not yet confronted this issue. Just how far it
will go in allowing labor to exert pressure through third parties can not be
predicted; we do know that in theprincipal case picketing was allowed against
a retail store which sold the employer's milk, which suggests that the "unity
of interest" test will be rejected.. Rejection of the "unity of interest" test
looks primarily to the interests of the disputants, rather than the "innocent
bystander," usually a small business man, whom the New York courts are
trying to protect.
So far we have dealt only with the procedural part of the problem, con-
sidering when equitable relief can be obtained; now we must introduce the
substantive law into the setting. Looking back, it seems proper to say that
Congress intended the Sherman Act to apply to combinations of labor.
20
At least, the Supreme Court held in the celebrated Danbury Hatters case, 21
and reasserted in Duplex Company v. Deering22 and the Bedford Cut Stone
case,23 that "secondary" combinations of labor were within the ambit of the
Sherman Act. Also, the second Coronado case2O 4 made it clear,that certain
noted (1939) 25 CORNELL L. Q. 132; Thompson v. Boekhout, 273 N. Y. 390, 7 N. E.
(2d) 674 (1937) ; Anastasiu et al. v. Supran et al., 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 541 (Sup. Ct.
1940); Swartz v. Fish Workers Union, 170 Misc. 566, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 283 (Spp.
Ct. 1939).
17Phrase taken from definition of "labor dispute," found in 47 STAT. 73 (1932), 29
U. S. C. A. § 13 (a) and § 113 (b) (Supp. 1940).
18See HARPER, TORTS (1933) § 233; Barnard and Graham, Labor and the Secondary
Boycott (1940) 15 WASH. L. REv. 137; Feinberg, Analysis of New York Law of Sec-
ondary Boycott (1936) 6 BROOKLYN L. REv. 209; Hellerstein, Secondary Boycotts in
Labor Disputes (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 341.
'
9 The principle can be traced back to the dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis, in the
Duplex case, 254 U. S. 443, 479, 41 Sup. Ct. 172 (1930). The New York Court of
Appeals adopted this criterion in Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d)
910 (1937), noted (1938) 23 CORNELL L. Q. 473. Whether the basis of the criterion
is "fairness" to the third party involved, or "effectiveness" of the activity against the
employer is not clear. For recent decisions in the lower courts applying this test, see
People pf the State of New York v. Borden, 175 Misc. 54 (Sup. Ct. 1940) ; Back v.
Kaufman, 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 449 (Sup. Ct. 1940).2 O0Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 487, 60 Sup. Ct. 982 (1940); see
Landis, The Apex Case, appearing elsewhere in this issue.
2 Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 301 (1908) ; Lawlor v. Loewe, 235
U. S. 522, 35 Sup. Ct. 170 (1915).
22254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172 (1920) ; see supra note 8.
23Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Store Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U. S. 37, 47 Sup.
Ct. 522 (1927).2 4Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295, 45 Sup. Ct. 551 (1925).
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primary combinations designed to be in direct interference with interstate
commerce were prohibited by the Sherman Act. In Apex Hosiery Company
v. Leader2 5 it was declared that other primary combinations were without
the scope of the Actthat such labor activities to fall within its ban mut
have a substantial effect on competitive conditions in the industry generally.
And in the recent case of United States v. Gold,26 the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals extended the doctrine of the Apex case to "secondary" combina-
tions as well.
Whether the alleged combination is "primary" or "secondary," however,
certain "jurisdictional requirements" must be met, if a "labor dispute" is
involved, before injunctive relief can be obtained in a private suit. Section 7
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits issuance of injunctions "except after
findings of fact by the court, to the effect . . . (a) that unlawful acts have
been threatened and will be committed unless restrained .... -2" The Milk
Drivers' case defines "unlawful acts" as acts in violation of state or local
law, e.g., fraud or violence. To the extent that these elements do not exist,
Section 16 of the Clayton Act,28 entitling any person to an injunction "against
threatened loss or damage by a violation of the Anti-trust laws," is emas-
culated.
The Milk Drivers' case determined only that procedurally the federal courts
lacked jurisdiction to issue an injunction in such a "labor dispute" as the one
before it; the question whether substantively such conduct as was there
involved violated the Sherman Act has been answered in the negative by the
Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Hutcheson.29 There, the court
declared that picketing and boycotting in the course of a jurisdictional dispute
between unions are sanctioned by Section 20 of the Clayton Act, and thus are
not in violation of the Sherman Act.30 Since the non-criminal remedies for
violation of the Sherman Act all depend upon a criminal offense having been
2-310 U. S. 469, 60 Sup. Ct. 982 (1940), noted (1940) 26 VA. L. REV. 518. For
comment on the case, with historical analysis of the entire problem, see Landis, The
Apex Case, appearing elsewhere in this issue. Also, see Schulman, Labor and the Ai.ti-
trust Laws (1940) 34 ILL. L. REv. 769; Comment, Labor and the Sherman Act
(1940) 49 YALE L. J. 518. For a case following the Apex case in a similar situation,
see Consolidated Terminal Corp. v. Drivers, etc., Union, 33 F. Supp. 645 (D. C. 1940).
26115 F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. 2d 1940).
2747 STAT. 71 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § 107 (Supp. 1940).
2838 STAT. 737 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 26 (1927).
299 U. S. L. WEEx 4151 (U. S. Feb. 3, 1941), aff'g 32 F. Supp. 600 (E. D. Mo.
1940). See N. Y. Times, December 11, 1940, p. 28, col. 1, for argument of counsel
before the Supreme Court.
sOCompare such cases as Local 167 v. United States, 291 U. S. 293, 54 Sup. Ct. 396
(1934) and United States v. Brims, 272 U. S. 549, 47 Sup. Ct. 169 (1926). The "labor
dispute" between Local 167 and the poultry dealers was conducted by that union by
violent means, so that the convictions which were sustained in that case might well be
sustained today, so far as the Hutcheson case is concerned. On the other hand, it seems
difficult to reconcile the decision' in the Brims case with United States v. Hutcheson:
the means there employed were peaceful, there was a genuine labor dispute between
the Carpenters' Union and the out-of-state manufacturers, and the union's objectives
were genuine labor objectives. The fact that, in seeking to accomplish their objectives,
the union enlisted the aid of the local manufacturers, whose interests were identical
with theirs, should, it would seem today, protect the manufacturers rather than outlaw
the union. The endeavor of the Department of Justice to prosecute "illegitimate use
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committed under the Act,31 this decision a fortiori applies to private suits
under the Act. Thus, at present, it may be said that in cases involving a
"labor dispute," if only methods of "peaceful persuasion" are employed, the
Sherman Anti-trust Act has no application.32
Frederick L. Turner
Landlord and Tenant: Monthly tenancies and tenancies from month to
month: Notice required in New Yorklto terminate tenancies in absence
of provision in lease.-New York law of landlord and tenant has long
been in an unsatisfactory state due to the unsuccessful attempts of the courts
to distinguish between monthly tenancies and tenancies from month to month.
A tenancy from month to month is usually held to have been created (1)
where the tenant enters under a void lease and pays rent on a monthly basis ;'
(2) where the tenant enters under a demise specifically stated to be from
month to month ;2 (3) where there is an oral hiring for an indefinite period
with rent reserved and/or paid on a monthly basis, 3 and where the case does
not fall within the statute which provides that leases in New York City that
do not particularly specify the duration, shall be deemed to continue to the
first day of October next.4
of organized [labor] power" has thus been dealt a severe blow. (For the Department's
position in the prosecution of labor conspiracies in restraint of trade, see ARNOLD, TnE
BOTTLENECKS OF BUSINESS (1940) 249 et seq.). United States v. Gold, commented on
herein, illustrates the effect of the Apex case upon these criminal prosecutions.
3126 STAT. 210 (1890), 15 U. S. C. A. § 15 (1927); 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S.
C. A. § 15 (1927).3 2 1t should also be noted that under recent decisions of the Supreme Court, especially
Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 9 U. S. L. WEEK 4185 (U. S.
Feb. 10, 1941) and A. F. of L. v. Swing, 9 U. S. L. WEEK 4192 (Feb. 10, 1941),
such an interpretation of the Sherman Act seems to be required by the Fifth Amendment.
'Geiger v. Braun, 6 Daly 506 (N. Y. 1876); People ex tel. Botsford v. Darling,
47 N. Y. 666 (1872); Prindle v. Anderson, 19 Wend. 391 (N. Y. 1838) (oral leases
for period greater than one year). See also Israelson v. Wallenberg, 63 Misc. 293, 116
N. Y. Supp. 626 (Sup. Ct. 1909) (lease altered by tenant and landlord refused to sign
in altered form); O'Brien v. Clement, 160 N. Y. Supp. 975 (Sup. Ct. 1916) (lessor
was undisclosed principal on a sealed instrument) ; Bent v. Renken, 86 N. Y. Supp. 110
(Sup. Ct. 1904) (tenant failed in promise to get a surety).2Hoffman v. Van Allen, 3 Misc. 99, 22 N. Y. Supp. 369 (Comm. Pleas N. Y. 1893).
SWitherbee v. Wykes, 159 App. Div. 24, 143 N. Y. Supp. 1067 (3d Dep't 1913),
inod'g and aff'g 81 Misc. 474, 143 N. Y. Supp. 95 (1913); Hungerford v. Wagoner, 5
App. Div. 590, 39 N. Y. Supp. 369 (3d Dep't 1896); Hand v. Knaul, 116 Misc. 714,
191 N. Y. Supp. 667 (Co. Ct., Onondaga Co., 1921); Klingenstein v Goldwasser, 27
Misc. 536, 58 N. Y. Supp. 342 (Sup. Ct. 1899) (lease for "so long as you pay the
rent") ; Legis. (1938) 24 CORNELL L. Q. 145, 149.
4 REAL PROPERTY LAW § 232 (Consolidated from Laws 1920, c. 130). There is an
apparent reluctance on the part of the courts to force the provisions of this statute upon
the parties and so they have endeavoured wherever possible to read a definite duration
into the agreement for occupation and in some cases have not even relied on this to
circumvent the statute, openly declaring that a month to month tenancy was created.
In Wilson v. Taylor, 8 Daly 253 (N. Y. 1879), the statute was held inapplicable
where the tenant entered without any agreement as to duration and paid rent monthly.
The court said that a tenancy from month to -month was created but emphasized the
element of prepaid rent to lend definiteness to the duration. Compare Olson v. Schev-
lowitz, 91 App. Div. 405, 86 N. Y. Supp. 834 (2d Dep't 1904) (leasing expressly -by
the month) and Vernon v. Gilbert, 30 Misc. 112, 61 N. Y. Supp. 896 (Sup. Ct. 1899)
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On the other hand, a monthly tenancy is normally held to have been
created where there is an agreement for an occupation of one month only
and it is intended that the tenancy expire at the end of that month. 5 The
same name is applied to the tenancy resulting when the tenant for one month
holds over after the expiration of his term.6
Unfortunately, both courts and texts have occasionally applied the term
"monthly tenancy" to interests which are generally referred to as tenancies
from month to month and the term "tenancy from month to month" to in-
terests which under prevailing usage are thought of as monthly tenancies.
Thus, in speaking of a situation which involved a hiring for an indefinite
term, several authorities have referred to it as a monthly tenancy rather
than a tenancy from month to month,7 not through a mistaken notion of the
true nature of the tenancy under consideration, but merely because of an
error in terminology. On the other hand, in the case of Gibbons v. Dayton,8
where there was a letting for the term of one month with an, express pro-
vision that the tenancy would expire at the end of that month, instead of
properly classifying the tenancy as monthly the court declared that a tenancy
from month to month had been created. Even in the recent case of T.I.B.
Corporation v. Repetto, 174 Misc. 501, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 744 (Sup. Ct. 1940),
the court called the letting a tenancy from month to month and then said
that cases where the letting was for no fixed period or other indefinite hirings
had no application to the case under consideration. If there actually was
a tenancy from month to month,9 then in accordance with definitions and
the general trend of decisions, it would necessarily be for an indefinite
period. Thus, the court is apparently dealing with a monthly tenancy and
giving it the misnomer of a tenancy from month to month.
It is evident, of course, that the courts are faced with two questions: first,
which type of tenancy did the parties intend to create, or which type did
the law create for them (i.e., are they definite or indefinite as to term);
second, what names shall be given to the two types? The first question is
often difficult to answer, since it is not easy to decide whether a tenant's
occupation is a holding over after the expiration of a definite one-month
(written memorandum for "monthly" lease held to create a tenancy by the month) with
Spies v. Voss, 30 N. Y. St. Rep. 548, 9 N. Y. Supp. 533 (Comm. Pleas N. Y. 1890)
and Bernstein v. Lightstone, 36 Misc. 193, 73 N. Y. Supp. 151 (Sup. Ct. 1901). In
another situation, as represented by Gilfoyle v. Cahill, 18 Misc. 68, 41 N. Y. Supp. 29
(Sup. Ct. 1896), where the entry was under a lease voided by the Statute of Frauds
and rent was reserved on a monthly basis, the court held that the statute was in-
applicable and a tenancy from month to month was created (see infra note 19) ; accord,
Bent v. Renken, 86 N. Y. Supp. 110 (Sup. Ct. 1904). Contra: Galewski v. Appelbaum,
32 Misc. 203, 65 N. Y. Supp. 694 (Sup. Ct. 1900).5Hand v. Knaul, 116 Misc. 714, 191 N. Y. Supp. 667 (Co. Ct., Onondaga Co., 1921);
1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1910) § 14; Legis. (1938) 24 CORNELL L. Q. 145,
149.6See supra note 5.7Olson v. Schevlowitz, 91 App. Div. 405, 86 N. Y. Supp. 834 (Zd Dep't 1904). 1
McADAM ON LANDLORD AND TENANT (5th Ed. 1934) 137 says: "Where the tenant enters
without any specified term and pays rent monthly, he presumptively becomes a monthly
tenant." [citing Hungerford v. Wagoner, 5 App. Div. 590, 39 N. Y. Supp. 369 (3d Dep't
1896) which definitely held that a tenancy from month to month was created].
84 Hun 451 (1st Dep't 1875).
9The facts are so briefly stated as to make it difficult to decide this from the report.
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term or is a holding for several months under an indefinite hiring, since both
arrangements can be entered into orally and can be accompanied by monthly
payments of rent. The second question could be easily disposed of, were
the courts willing to adhere to a uniform system of nomenclature.
While this pr9blem of nomenclature is, in many instances, of little impor-
tance, it becomes pressing when the question arises as to the notice required
to terminate, because the court, in answering this question, often reasons
from the name it applies to the tenancy rather than from the facts out of
which it arose. Thus, if the court calls the tenancy monthly, it will feel
constrained by the common law to require no notice by either party to
terminate,' 0 just as is true of all tenancies definite as to duration." At
the end of any month the tenant can quit the premises or the landlord can
demand his immediate removal. On the other hand, if the court labels a
tenancy as one from month to month, it will be impelled to adopt the re-
quirement of 30-days' or a month's notice, given at the end of the month,
before the tenancy can be terminated.' 2 If the tenancies, have been correctly
named, all is well; or if the names have been misapplied, occasionally the
court's ruling as to notice is correct in view of the true nature of the
tenancy.'3 But in some cases the court's decision as to notice is as erroneous
as the name applied.
The situation is further complicated in New York by illogical incon-
sistencies between the treatment accorded by the courts to tenancies in which
the basic unit is a year and those in which the basic unit is a month. Thus,
New York holds that where there is a mere holdover after the expiration
of a definite term, the tenancy resulting from the holdover expires without
notice at the end of the period of time corresponding to that of the original
tenancy, irrespective of whether the primary unit is a year or a month (but
the tenant is not held for more than a year in those cases where the original
term was more than a year). It is also true that where a periodic tenancy
arises by express demise or by entry for an indefinite term with the reserva-
tion of a periodic rental, there is a requirement of an appropriate notice be-
fore the tenancy can be terminated. But where the tenancy is under a void
lease for longer than a year, the holding in Adams v. The City of Cchoes'4
that a yearly tenancy'5 is created by the payment of yearly rent and that no
notice is required to terminate, is clearly inconsistent with the holding that
1 1OHand v. Knaul, 116 Misc. 714, 191 N. Y. Supp. 667 (Co. Ct., Onondaga Co., 1921) ;
Ludington v. Garlock, 55 Hun 612, 9 N. Y. Supp. 24 (4th Dep't 1890). The latter case
imposed a requirement of no notice at all or, at most, reasonable notice. The tenancy was
called monthly on the basis that rent was prepaid for each month and therefore the court
felt that the landlord had sufficient protection. Cf. Thomson v. Chick, 92 Hun 510, 37
N. Y. Supp. 59 (Sup. Ct. 1895) which approves of the result of this case, but in which
there was no provision for the prepayment of rent.
12 TITFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1910) § 196; Allen v. Jaquish, 21 Wend. 628
(N. Y. 1839) ; Rorbach v. Crossett, 64 Hun 637, 19 N. Y. Supp. 450 (1892).12See all cases cited infra notes 20 and 21. The notice will be 30 days rather than a
month if the court feels that Section 228 of the Real Property Law is applicable.
13Gibbons v. Dayton, 4 Hun 451 (1st Dep't 1875).
14 127 N. Y. 175, 28 N. E. 25 (1891).
15The court actually called it a tenancy from year to year, but it can be inferred that they
meant that it was a yearly tenancy since no notice was required to terminate. This is
another example of loose terminology.
1941]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
a month's notice is necessary to terminate a tenancy from month to month
created by the same sort of entry but with rent paid on a monthly basis.
At the time of entry under these void leases, the holding is merely a tenancy
at will, 16 and at common law could be terminated without notice.17 However,
when there is a reservation of a periodic rent, the courts are inclined to hold
that a periodic tenancy is created, on the theory of a new contract implied
from the conduct of the parties. Therefore, if rent is paid on a monthly
basis, it is a tenancy from month to month; if on a yearly basis (even though
in monthly installments) it is a tenancy from year to year.', Thus, the
situation is in both cases practically identical and yet, despite the decision
in the Adams case, New York courts are almost unanimous in holding that
a month's notice is required to terminate tenancies created in this way and
with a monthly rental.' 9 It is, of course, a departure from the common law
rule to hold that no notice is required to terminate a tenancy arising from
entry under a void lease. However, since New York had abandoned the
common law rule requiring notice to terminate a tenancy arising by a hold-
over, it properly adhered to its own special rule in the analogous situation
(on the theory that occupancy under the void lease for a year created a
tenancy for a year and that continued holding thereafter created successive
one-year tenancies), but, as already pointed out, only in cases where the
basic unit was a year. Where the entry is under a void lease with a month
as the basic unit, New York adheres to the common law and requires advance
notice to terminate.
The reason for the alternative preserved by the phrase, "notice of one
month or 30 days," employed hereinbefore when speaking of the notice
required to terminate a month to month tenancy, is that on this point, too,
there is inconsistency in the decisions. One line of cases holds that a month's
notice is required for termination,20 and the other line requires a notice of
30 days. 2 ' The requirement of notice to terminate a tenancy from month to
month is by many cases said to be based on an analogy to tenancies at will
and by sufferance which are also for an indefinite term and by statute require
'
6Talamo v. Spitzmiller, 120 N. Y. 37, 23 N. E. 980 (1890).
17 NEw YORK LAw OF LANDLORD AND TENANT (1937) § 156, p. 285, citing Lamed v.
Hudson, 60 N. Y. 102, 105 (1875), and Jackson v. Sample, 1 Johns. 231 (N. Y. 1800).
181 TiFFANy, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1910) § 14 (2) (a), p. 126.
19Geiger v. Braun, 6 Daly 506 (N. Y. 1876) ; People ex rel. Botsford v. Darling, 47 N. Y.
666 (1872) ; Prindle v. Anderson, 19 Wend. 391 (N. Y. 1838) ; O'Brien v. Clement, 160
N. Y. Supp. 975 (1916) (citing the Adams case as authority for the requirement of
notice) ; Bent v. Renken, 86 N. Y. Supp. 110 (1904). Contra: Gilfoyle v. Cahill, 18 Misc.
68, 41 N. Y. Supp. 29 (1896). This case adopts the reasoning of the Adams case and
holds that where a month to month tenancy is created in this way, it terminates at the end of-
each month and is renewed by a holding over for successive one month periods, no
notice being required to terminate at the end of any month.
20Hungerford v. Wagoner, 5 App. Div. 590, 39 N. Y. Supp. 369 (3d Dep't 1896);
O'Brien v. Clement, 160 N. Y. Supp. 975 (Sup. Ct. 1916) ; tlingenstein v. Goldwasser,
27 Misc. 536, 58 N. Y. Supp. 342 (Sup. Ct. 1899) (a New York City case but prior to the
inclusion of month to month tenancies into what is now Real Property Law § 232-a);
Hoffman v. Van Allen, 3 Misc. 99, 22 N. Y. Supp. 369 (Comm. Pleas N. Y. 1893).2
'Witherbee v. Wykes, 159 App. Div. 24, 143 N. Y. Supp. 1067 (3d Dep't 1913) ; Hand
v. Knaul, 116 Misc. 714, 191 N. Y. Supp. 1067 (Co. Ct., Onondaga Co., 1921); Mandel
v. Koerner, 90 Misc. 9, 152 N. Y. Supp. 847 (Sup. Ct. 1915). It should be noted that these
cases did not directly pass on this point, but it is expressly stated by way of dictum.
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30 days' notice for termination.22 If all decisions were based on this analogy,
there seems to be no reason why the cases would not universally hold that
the notice required to terminate month to month tenancies is 30 days. Since
periodic tenancies are in substance "streamlined" tenancies at will, the courts
which take this position are on tenable ground. However, a complicating
factor is inserted by a few cases which hold that the requirement may be
based on an analogy to the common law tenancy from month to month which
required a month's notice.2s Inasmuch as the statute referred to above does
not specifically apply to periodic tenancies, this position is also plausible.24 The
difficulty is intensified, moreover, by the tendency of the courts to use "30-
days'" and "month's" interchangeably. 25 Except for the 30-day months, the
question is of real importance. For example, if there is a month to month
tenancy beginning on the first day of the month, a notice given on February
1st will be effective to terminate the tenancy on March 1st under the cases
requiring a month's notice. However, if there' is a requirement of 30-days'
notice, to terminate the tenancy on March 1st the party would have to give
notice on January 30th. Or if it is desired to terminate a tenancy on April 1st,
a notice given on March 2d would be effective under the 30-day rule, but
would have to be given on March 1st under the other rule. Uniformity of
decision or final determination by legislation is obviously desirable here.
26
2 2REAL PROPERTY LAW § 228, which reads: "A tenancy at will or by sufferance, however
created, may be terminated by a written notice of not less than thirty days given in behalf
of the landlord, to the tenant, requiring him to remove from the premises .... " This
section is applicable to entries under void leases where the holding has not been long
enough or payments do not warrant the inference of a periodic lease. Talamo v.
Spitzmiller, 120 N. Y. 37, 23 N. E. 980 (1890). It also applies where there is an
express grant at will [Reckhow v. Schanck, 43 N. Y. 448 (1871)], where there
is an indefinite leasing of the premises without any reservation of rent [Lamed v.
Hudson, 60 N. Y. 102 (1875)], or where the tenant holds over after the expiration of
his term and the lessor has not elected to treat him as a trespasser or hold him for another
term [Smith v. Littlefield, 51 N. Y. 539 (1873)1. The section does not apply to tenancies
at sufferance in the true common law sense of the term. Therefore, a mere holding over
by the tenant after the expiration of a definite term does not entitle him to the statutory
notice to terminate. When the statute refers to a tenancy by sufferance, it contemplates a
situation where the hold-over is so long that the courts will imply the consent of the
lessor, very much the same as in a tenancy at will.2 3Anderson v. Prindle, 23 Wend. 616 (N. Y. 1840) ; Jacob v. Jacob, 125 Misc. 649, 212
N. Y. Supp. 62 (Co. Ct., Madison Co., 1925) ; Hand v. Knaul, 116 Misc. 714, 191 N. Y.
Supp. 667 (Co. Ct., Onondaga Co., 1921). In these latter two cases the courts say
either theory may be used but do not go into a discussion of the inconsistency of result.
Real Property Law § 228 is derived from Rev. St. 1820, pt. 2, c. 1, tit. 4, §§ 7-9, and
until 1896 this imposed a requirement of a month's rather than 30-days' notice. It is
possible that the requirement to terminate month to month tenancies is based entirely on
analogy to this statute but that some courts applied it before 1896 and others applied it
after 1896. If such were the case, it would readily account for the inconsistency.
24REAL PROPERTY LAW § 228.
2 5 11and v. Knaul, 116 Misc. 714 at 719, 191 N. Y. Supp. 667 (Co. Ct., Onondaga Co.,
1921) refers to Klingenstein v. Goldwasser, 27 Misc. 536, 58 N. Y. Supp. 342 (Sup. Ct.
1899), saying that a month to month tenancy was created there and that 30-days' notice
was required to terminate, whereas the case actually imposed a requirement of one month's
notice. Again, at page 298 of 1 NEW YORK LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT, the writer
states that at common law, if the tenancy was from month to month, 30-days' notice was
required, citing Geiger v. Braun, 6 Daly 506 (N. Y. .1876) which held that a month's
notice was required to terminate.2 GIt should be noted that even though the period of notice may be the same for tenancies
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Although Section 228 of the Real Property Law, requiring notice by the
landlord, is silent as to notice by the tenant, and although many New York
cases are, as pointed out above, based on this statute, the obligation to give
notice to terminate tenancies from month to month (aside from a statute27
applicable only to New York City which will be considered presently) is held
to be reciprocal and to rest on the tenant as well as the landlord.28
New York City has by statute been differentiated from the rest of the
state by reason of a provision requiring a notice of at least 30 days given
by the landlord in order to terminate either a monthly tenancy or a tenancy
from month to month.2 9 The statute has been in effect since 1882, but not
until 1920 was it amended so as to include month to month tenancies. Cases
are practically unanimous in holding that the statute is solely for the benefit
of the tenant and that the 30-days' notice requirement is not reciprocal 0
The effect of this statute is to favor tenants in New York City in two ways:
First, it favors the monthly tenant in this city as contrasted with the rest
of the state by requiring the landlord to give him 30-days' notice before
termination (no notice necessary where common law prevails); second, it
takes away the right of the New York City landlord to be notified 30 days
in advance before the tenant can terminate a tenancy from month to month
(a right which still prevails in the rest of the state).
In 1938, the New York State Law Revision Commission recommended
a repeal of this statute, but the recommendation was not adopted by the legis-
lature.81 Instead, in 1939, the statute was, without any change, embodied into
the Consolidated Laws.
It is true that because of its density of population New York City is unique
in certain respects. However, if it is possible to devise a blanket rule
at will and tenancies from month to month, there is a practical difference in application.
The 30-days' notice effective to terminate a tenancy at will may be given at any time and
takes effect 30 days from date, whereas notice to terminate a tenancy from month to month
must be given at the end of the month. If it is given before, the period of notice doesn't
start to run until the end of a month reckoned from the beginning of the tenancy.
27REAL PROPERTY LAW § 232-a.2 SGeiger v. Braun, 6 Daly 506 (N. Y. 1876) ; Boyar v. Wallenberg, 132 Misc. 116, 228
N. Y. Supp. 358 (City Ct. 1928) ; O'Brien v. Clement, 160 N. Y. Supp. 975 (Sup. Ct.
1916); Mandel v. Koerner, 90 Misc. 9, 152 N. Y, Supp. 847 (Sup. Ct. 1915). This
result may also be based on analogy to Real Property Law § 228 which, by its wording,
imposes the duty on the landlord only, but which has been construed to make the require-
ment reciprocal. Boyar v. Wallenberg, supra.2 9 REAL PROPERTY LAW § 232-a. This statute is not new, being derived from Laws 1882,
c. 309 (the "McAdam Act"). After intermediate amendments, by Laws 1920, c. 309, it
was finally amended to read as in its present form.
30 T. I. B. Corporation v. Repetto, 174 Misc. 501, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 744 (Sup. Ct. 1940);
Ertischek v. Blanco, 173 Misc. 153, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 719 (Mun. Ct. 1940); Rogan v.
Weiss, 115 Misc. 193, 187 N. Y. Supp. 443 (Sup. Ct. 1921). But cf. 1239 Madison Ave.
Corporation v. Neuberger, 119 Misc. 662, 197 N. Y. Supp. 225 (Sup. Ct. 1922), rev'd on
other grounds, 200 N. Y. Supp. 174 (1923). In this case, it was held that an occupation
under the Emergency Rent Laws was a tenancy from month to month (reversal up to this
point) and therefore required 30-days' notice by the tenant to terminate.
SIN. Y. LEG. Doc. (1938) No. 65 (o). The bill introduced to carry out this recommenda-
tion was (1938) Senate Introd. No. 70, Pr. No. 70; Assembly Introd. No. 97, Pr. No. 97.
The Assembly bill passed the Assembly on February 22, 1938 and went to the Senate
Judiciary Committee. Neither the Senate nor the Assembly bill was reported out of
committee in the Senate.
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that will protect both parties in the entire state, it cannot be denied that this
would be more satisfactory. The recommendation, for that reason, took this
form:
"A tenancy from month to month or a monthly tenancy may be termi-
nated at any time by written notice of not less than thirty days given by
the party terminating the tenancy; provided, however, that if the original
entry on the property was for one month only, no such notice shall be
required in order to terminate the tenancy at the end of that month."3 2
In light of the problems that have presented themselves, it might be well
to extend the recommendation and say that any tenancy not prescribing a
definite term and where the parties have no express agreement as to a notice
sufficient to terminate, may be terminated by 30-days' notice given by the
party desiring to terminate.33
As the problem has long been regarded as urgent and as even courts have
spoken of the need for corrective legislation,3 4 it is to be hoped that a remedial
statute substantially like the one herein proposed will soon be enacted.
.eronw S. Affron
Real Property: Fixtures: Effect of mistake of fact on intention.-
In Szilagy v. Taylor, 63 Ohio App. 105, 25 N. E. (2d) 360 (1939), an owner
of two adjoining lots constructed a building. Me intended to locate the
building entirely on one lot, but by mistake, part encroached on his adjoin-
ing lot. Thereafter, still ignorant of the encroachment, he sold the latter
lot to the plaintiff. Later the defendant became the owner of the lot on
which most of the building rested. The plaintiff discovered the mistake and
claimed ownership of the small part of the building that encroached on his
premises. Thereupon, before suit, the defendant went on the plaintiff's land,
and removed that portion of the building from the plaintiff's premises. Plain-
tiff sued, and, among his demands, asked that the defendant be compelled to
3 2See supra note 31.
33Bills that would have substantially the same effect were introduced in both the Senate
and Assembly in January, 1940, but were defeated in each house. (1940) Senate Introd.
No. 8, Pr. No. 8, 1106; Assembly Introd. No. 123, Pr. No. 123). Each bill was intended
to repeal Real Property Law § 232-a and amend § 232. The bills said, in substance, that
any agreement for the use of real property wherever situated which did not specify the
duration thereof or date of expiration, should be deemed a tenancy from month to month
and should continue until terminated by notice (30 days in the Senate bill and 20 days in
the Assembly bill) given by the party desiring to terminate. The requirement is not
applicable where the parties have agreed on a method of termination or where the tenancy
was for one month only and one of the parties wishes to terminate at the end of that
month. However, where there is a holdover by the tenant for one month with the
acquiescence of the landlord, the notice requirement applies.Quaere: inasmuch as the bills read "An agreement . . . which shall 11ot particularly
sp.cify the date of expiration," would it be construed as applicable to entries under a void
lease where periodic rent is paid? (Italics supplied.)34Senn, J., inHand v. Knaul, 116 Misc. 714, 191 N. Y. Supp. 667 (Co. Ct., Onondaga
Co., 1921), says, at 672: "It is strange, indeed, that on so important a subject there
has been no legislation applicable to the state at large to define the rights of landlord and
tenant under indefinite parol leases."
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replace upon plaintiff's premises that part of the building formerly thereon
The court held that the portion of the building which encroached did not
pass as an incident to the realty because it was not a fixture, and the plaintiff,
having no title to it, had no right to have it restored.
The term "fixture" has no precise meaning. It is, however, most commonly
used in the decisions to denote an article which was a chattel, but which by
being physically annexed to the realty, has become part of it.' The court
properly stated the three recognized characteristics of a fixture: (1) actual
annexation to the realty; (2) appropriation to the use or purpose of that
part of the realty to which it is annexed; (3) annexation: with the intention
that the article b~e permanently affixed to the freehold. 2 The court granted
that the part of the building which encroached was attached to the freehold,
but held that it was not annexed with the intention to make it permanent, and
that it was not adapted to use as a part of the realty. We have found no
case precisely in point. Let us test the conclusions of the court by an applica-
tion of the rules of fixtures.
The defendant, who owned the land on which the building was intended
to be erected, is acknowledged to have title to that part of the building located
on his land. Since he received the realty according to metes and bounds,
the basis of his ownership of that part of the building must be that it was a
fixture; fixtures pass with the land.3 Yet the court holds that the part which
encroached was annexed with a different intention. The distinction is not
founded on the facts. Since the annexor believed the entire building was
located on one lot, there is no basis for saying that he had a different intention
as to the permanence of ny part.
Similarly, since he owned all the land on which the building stood, and on
the facts given found the building as serviceable as if it were located entirely
on one lot, as intended, it cannot be said that the part which encroached
was not adapted to the use of the land. In a Massachusetts case a purchaser
of land by metes and bounds thought that a barn stood wholly on his land.4
In fact, part was on the land of the grantor. The court held that each owned
that part of the building which rested on his land. The case is distinguishable
from the principal case on the issue of intention for the facts do not disclose
whether the annexor intended the barn to be wholly located on one lot.
However, it does demonstrate that a part of a building may be regarded as
adaptable to use with the land. A Canadian case strikingly illustrates this
rule.5 An owner of several adjoining lots built a building on one of them,
the foundation of which extended underground within the limits of another
lot. He sold this other lot to a purchaser without reference to the founda-
tion, and the purchaser was ignorant of the encroachment. Whether it was
'Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Sawyer, 26 Ala. App. 520, 163 So. 657 (1935) ; Whiting
v. Lubec, 121 Me. 131, 115 Atl. 896 (1922) ; Carlin v. Ritter, 68 Md. 478, 13 At. 370
(1888) ; Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511, 59 Am. Dec. 634 (1853) ; Gasaway v. Thomas,
56 Wash. 37, 105 Pac. 168 (1909) ; ADKIN AND BOWEN, FIxTre S (1924) 1; 1 THoMPsoN
ON R.EAL PROPERTY (1939) § 160; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1940) § 606.
21 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY (1939) § 16Z; 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. s1pra note 1, § 607.
3Bank of America Nat. Ass'n v. La Reine Hotel Corp., 108 N. J. Eq. 561, 156 Atl. 28
(1931) ; 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 1, § 606.4Adams v. Marshall, 138 Mass. 228, 52 Am. Rep. 271 (1888).5National Trust Co. v. Western Trust Co., 4 D. L. R. 455 (Sask. 1912).
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intended that the foundation extend beyond the limits of the one lot is not
clear. The purchaser sued to have the encroachment in his land removed.
The court held that it was part of the land, and passed to him with the
conveyance of the lot. If he wished to have the foundation removed he was
free to do so at his own cost.
Thus it is submitted that the application of established rules as to intention
and adaptability seems to invalidate the conclusion of the court. Yet the
court's conclusion is obviously just. The plaintiff received all he expected
under his contract, and the defendant is not deprived of property both
parties assumed he owned. It would seem desirable to find some theory to
uphold this result. There are instances where the. law has recognized that
qualifications have to be attached to the rule which holds that an article
suited to the purposes of the land which is annexed with an intention that
the accession be permanent becomes part of the land. For example, the in-
tention of a trespasser, however clearly expressed, that the article which he
annexes shall not become part of the land, does not preclude it from being
a fixture, to which the owner of the land has title. The intention is here
regarded as immaterial. 6 Similarly, where purchasers of adjoining plots are
mistaken as to the true boundary line, and one, with the knowledge of and
without objection from the other, builds a fence or a house which, a survey
later reveals, encroaches on the land of the other, the law grants to the
annexor a license to move the structure entirely onto his own land.
7
Thus, it appears that the courts have not infrequently demonstrated a willing-
ness to adjust the general rules to the equities of the particular case. It is sub-
mitted that that could reasonably be done here. Two alternatives are open to
the courts. The notion of intention can be given a new construction by holding
that the original intention that a structure be permanent may be vitiated by a
mistake of fact. Or the courts may decline any attempt to square the con-
clusion with the rules on fixtures, and hold that the intention is here im-
material, and regardless of whether or not this is a fixture, the mistake may
be rectified, and the grantor be given a license to remove.
The reports indicate that some courts would try to decide this case by
the doctrine of implied easements. The rule as generally stated is that where
the owner of an entire estate has so arranged it that one portion of the estate
derives a benefit from the other portion of a permanent, open, visible, and
reasonably necessary character, a purchaser of part will take the part con-
veyed with all the benefits and burdens which, appear at the time to belong
to it.8 The easements are created on the basis of the presumed intent of the
6 Miles v. McNaughton, 111 Mich. 350, 69 N. W. 481 (1896); Treadway v. Sharon,
7 Nev. 37 (1871) ; Henderson v. Ownby, 56 Tex. 647, 42 Am. Rep. 691 (1882) semble;
Huebschmann v. McHenry, 29 Wis. 655 (1872). Contra: Curtis v. Leasia, 78 Mich. 480,
44 N. W. 500 (1889). See 2 TrSANY, op. cit. supra note 1, § 608, note 51. Similarly, a
purchaser of land may remove fixtures he erected where the contract vendor unjustifiably
violates a material term of the contract. 1 THo~isoN ON REAL PROPERTY (1939) § 226,
note 83.7 Lowenberg v. Bernd, 47 Mo. 297 (1871) ; Matson v. Calhoun, 44 Mo. 368 (1869) ; 1
TrFFANY, op. cit. supra note 1, § 171, note 81.8 U. S. v. Appleton, Fed. Cas. 14463 (1883) ; Vargos v. Maderos, 191 Cal. 1, 214 Pac.
849 (1923) ; Cihak v. Kleke, 117 Ill. 693, 7 N. E. 111 (1886) ; 'Mattes v. Frankel, 157
N. Y. 603, 53 N. E. 585 (1899) ; Lampman v. Milks, 21 N. Y. 505 (1860) ; 1 REvxs ON
REAL PROPERTY (1909) 167; 1 THOmPSoN ON REAL PROPERTY (1939) § 407.
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parties to obviate the hardship which a rigid construction of a written instru-
ment would produce.9 Thus the courts fill in something which the parties
forgot or for some reason failed to mention in writing. The doctrine is a
distinct exception to the general rule that written conveyances shall speak
for themselves.
The crucial issue as applied to these facts is whether or not the small part
of the building on plaintiff's land was obviously over the line. If so, it should
be held that he had no title to that part of the building and took his land
burdened with the duty of support. An easement would have been retained
by the grantor, whose rights have passed to the defendant with the convey-
ance of the land on which the larger part of the building rested. The whole
doctrine of implied easements is, however, based on the consciousness of the
grantee that his property is burdened or benefited.' 0 Here on the facts both
parties to the conveyance were ignorant that the building encroached. So it
seems that the encroachment could not be said to be visible and apparent on
an ordinary and usual inspection."
Some cases, however, hold,'1 and others indicate,13 that it is sufficient if
the encroachment is obvious upon a survey. This view has been generally
disregarded, and is opposed to ordinary business practice and the whole
theory of implied easements.
Even if plaintiff's claim to ownership of the part of the building which
was on his land is upheld, his demand for a mandatory injunction to secure
specific restoration of buildings tortiously damaged or removed is issued with
extreme caution, and is restricted to cases where adequate redress at law
is not afforded.14 The rule that land and its accessions are to be treated as
unique is applied only where the suit is to enforce specifically an agreement
for the sale or letting of realty.15 Particularly in this case should equity em-
ploy its discretion, and deny its extraordinary relief. Plaintiff has his remedy
at law in an action for trover, since the severance of the building from the
land has made it personalty again.16 He will be enriched by the value of
the part of the building, an increment unanticipated at the time of the con-
veyance. That is sufficient relief for one whose right to any remedy is based
on hard law.
Bernard R. Rapoport
9State ex rel. McNutt v. Orcutt, 199 N. E. 595 (Ind. 1936) ; Dean v. Colt, 181 Ore. 331,
49 P. (2d) 362 (1935).
'
0Reiners v. Young, 109 N. Y. 648, 15 N. Y. St. 277 (1888). Only the latter citation
gives the opinion, in which the majority concurs in the conclusion but not the reasoning.
Sloat v. McDougall, 80 Misc. 912, 9 N. Y. Supp. 631 (City Ct. B'klyn 1890).
IlReiners v. Young, supra note 10.
'
2Grotenstein v. Kaplan, 90 Misc. 403, 153 N. Y. Supp. 614 (App. Term 1915) ; WEED,
NEW YORK REAL PROPERTY (1938) 636 says, "This decision is erroneous. While Judge
Siclen correctly states the law he fails to apply it correctly. A slight encroachment by a
building is not visible and apparent,--it takes a survey to determine it."
13Katz v. Kaiser, 154 N. Y. 294, 48 N. E. 532 (1897) ; Bihss v. Sabolis, 322 Ill. 350,
1 53 N. E. 684 (1926).
14Baltimore & P. S. Co. v. Ministers, etc., Starr M. P. Church, 149 Md. 163, 130 Atl.
46 (1925); Fortescue v. Bowler, 55 N. J. Eq. 741, 38 Atl. 445 (1897); EWELL ON
FIXTURES (2d ed. 1905) 605.
15PomERoy's EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 221.
16ADKIN AND BOWEN, FIXTURES (1924) 244.
[Vol. 26
1941] NOTES AND COMMENTS
S. E. C.: Commission broadens rules for exemption of small issues:-
On December 9, 1940 the Securities and Exchange Commission made effec-
tive1 an important revision of its rules in connection with the granting of
exemptions of security issues not exceeding $100,000 under the Securities
Act of 1933.2 The revision has been hailed as an effective aid to small
issuers, who, have long protested that the rules and regulations up to the
present time have been so stringent that they seriously impaired the ability
of small corporations to raise new capital. The present step appears to be
one of a series planned by the S. E. C., and the Commission is now said to
be contemplating new rules designed to simplify registration requirements
for issues up to $1,000,000. 3
Section 3 (a) of the Act4 sets forth the exemptions applicable to all security
issues. The problems arising under this section are many and varied, and
a discussion of them is beyond the scope of this note.5  Section 3(b) 6 pro-
vides for additional exemptions for issues not exceeding $100,000, and under
the authority of this section the Commission has heretofore given a total
exemption to issues up to $30,000, 7 and to others up to $100,000 on varying
conditions and terms. 8 The revision, made under the authority of Sections
IThe revision was announced for release in the morning newspapers of Tuesday,
December 3, 1940. See Securities Act Release No. 2410; Wall Street Journal, December
3, 1940, p. 1, col. 5; N. Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1940, p. 42, col. 1.
248 STAT. 74-95 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. ch. 2A, §§ 77a-77bbbb (Supp. 1940) ; 1 Prentice-
Hall (1937) Sec. Reg. Serv. fff1 1121-1199.
3Wall Street Journal, loc. cit. supra note 1.
448 STAT. 75 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77c(a) (Supp. 1940) ; 1 Prentice-Hall (1937) Sec.
Reg. Serv. fff1 1135-1146. In brief these exemptions apply to: (1) old offerings, (2)
government and bank obligations, (3) short term paper, (4) securities of eleemosynary
institutions, (5) building and loan associations, (6) securities of common carriers, (7)
receivers' and trustees' certificates, (8) securities exchanged with existing security
holders, (9) securities exchanged under court supervision, (10) securities sold intrastate.5See Throop and Lane, Some Problems of Exemption under the Securities Act of
1933 (1937) 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 89.
048 STAT. 76 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77c(b) (Supp. 1940) ; 1 Prentice-Hall (1937) Sec.
Reg. Serv. 1f 1147. The section reads: "The Commission may from time to time by its rules
and regulations, and subject to such terms and conditions as may be prescribed therein,
add any class of securities to the securities exempted as provided in this section, if it
finds that the enforcement of this subchapter with respect to such securities is not
necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors by reason of the
small amount involved or the limited character of the public offering; but no issue of
securities shall be exempted under this section where the aggregate amount at which
such issue is offered to the public exceeds $100,000."7Regulation A, Rule 200. 1 Prentice-Hall (1937) Sec. Reg. Serv. 1111 2031-2032.
8Regulation A, Rules 201-210. 1 Prentice-Hall (1937) Sec. Reg. Serv. 111 2033-2043.
These rules put exemptions for issues from $30,000 to $100,000 on such conditions as
compliance with laws of the states where securities were sold, and the use of a pros-
pectus containing certain specified information. They set certain conditions for: (201)
securities sold for cash, (202) stock in a corporation or similar interests in a trust
or unincorporated association, (203) first mortgage notes and bonds, (204) certificates
of deposit, (205) securities exchanged for outstanding securities, (206) voting trust
certificates, (207) certain mineral rights, (208) certain securities issued in connection
with reorganization of banks, (209) certain mortgages and trust agreements, (210)
securities sold for cash in compliance with state law. Regulation A deals with all small
issues not relating to oil and gas interests. Regulation B deals with fractional undivided
interests in oil and gas rights. Regulation B-T deals with interests in oil royalty
trusts or unincorporated associations.
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3(b) and 19(a),9 rescinded Rules 200 to 210 inclusive under Regulation
A, 10 and substituted five new rules, 220 to 224 inclusive.
The emphasis of. the new rules is upon expedition and simplification of
procedure. Prospectuses are not required in any case, and a domestic issuer
need only notify the nearest Regional Office of its intention to sell. The
letter of notification must contain only such information as the names and
addresses of issuer, directors and officers, the person or persons for whose
benefit the offering is to be made, the purposes for which the net proceeds
are to be used, and the principal underwriters.-' The Commission supplies
a form letter of notification,' 2 but notification at the issuer's option may be
by informal letter containing the required information.'3
Rule 220(d) embodies a change in the Commission's position as to future
sales of the securities by the same issuer. The exemption is available "...
even though it is contemplated that after the termination of the offering an
offering of additional securities will be made." The only restriction is the
limitation upon Section 3(b), that the offering price of the securities does
not exceed $100,000. The section has not. been further interpreted, and it
is impossible to predict at this time to what extent large corporations may
remain exempt from registration through successive offerings not exceeding
$100,000. Before the revision the exemption was not available if an offering
was part of a larger financial program, involving the future sale of additional
securities of the same class.
In addition to this relaxation, both an issuer' 4 and its controlling stock-
948 STAT. 85 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77s (Supp. 1940). This section confers general
power upon the commission to make rules and regulations necessary to administration
of the Act.
10Supra notes 7 and 8. The rescission is effective January 1, 1941, except as to issues
of securities bona fide offered to the public on or before such date under any exemption
contained in any of such rules.
"1Rule 222(a), (1) and (5). (4) requires a list of jurisdictions in which sales are
to be made. 1 Prentice-Hall (1940) Sec. Reg. Serv. ff 2047.
12S. E. C. Form S-3b-1.
13Rule 222(b). 1 Prentice-Hall (1940) Sec. Reg. Serv. ff 2047.
14Ruld 220(a). 1 Prentice-Hall (1940) Sec. Reg. Serv. 1 2045. Section 2(4) of the
Act [48 STAT. 905 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77b (4) (Supp. 1940)], defines issuer as: " ...
every person who issues or proposes to issue any security; except that with respect
to certificates of deposit, voting-trust certificates, or collateral-trust certificates, or with
respect to certificates of interest or shares m an unincorporated investment trust not
having a board of directors (or persons performing similar functions) or of the fixed,
restricted management, or unit type, the term 'issuer' means the person or persons per-
forming the acts and assuming the duties of depositor or manager pursuant to the pro-
visions of the trust or other agreement or instrument under which such securities are
issued; except that in the case of an unincorporated association which provides by its
articles for limited liability of any or all of its members, or in the case of a trust, com-
mittee, or other legal entity, the trustees or members thereof shall not be individually
liable as issuers of any security issued by the association, trust, committee or other
legal entity; except that with respect to equipment-trust certificates or like securities,
the term 'issuer' means the person by whom the equipment or property is or is to be
used; and except that with respect to fractional undivided interests in oil, gas, or other
mineral rights, the term 'issuer' means the owner of any such right or of any interest
in such right (whether whole or fractional) who creates fractional interests therein
for the purpose of public offering." Promoters and stockholders who completely dom-
inated a corporation were "issuers" of its securities within the Act, prohibiting use of
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holders15 may now claim an exemption for issues under $100,000, although
each may wish to make such offering within a single year.' 6 "Heretofore,
in such instances, a registration statement has been necessary." 17
These are the important provisions of the new rules. It is to be noted
that Rule 220 is subject to the provisions of Rule 221, which excludes abso-
lutely eight classes of securities from exemption.' 8 Rules 223 and 22419 set
forth regulations for written communications, written or oral representations,
advertisements, and radio broadcasts in connection with offerings under the
provisions of Regulation A.
With these revisions the Commission at long last seems to be embarking
upon a program of relaxation of its rigid rules. The program of the S. E. C.
was put into operation at a time when "big business" was thought to be the
source of all the country's ills. No one doubts that federal security regula-
tion is here to stay, but the method of regulation is still open to successive
revision and amendment. To the cries that have been raised since 1933 are
now added the pressures of expansion for national defense production. There
are indications that the recent changes are only the beginning of a compre-
hensive series of revisions, and that stringent regulation will be gradually
lifted from small issues of a type which cannot be effectively controlled by
the federal government, thus encouraging that expansion of small business
which the present administration has long recognized as essential to the
national welfare.
Harry Scott, Jr.
Taxation: Constitutional Law: Conflict of Laws: Jurisdiction of state
to tax beneficial interest of resident beneficiary of .oreign spendthrift
trust.-E. H. Gary set up a trust in New York by will, the income fo
be paid to his grandson, Sutcliffe, for his life, subject to forfeiture of
that interest if Sutcliffe assigned, mortgaged or charged his interest. The
intangibles constituting the entire trust fund were retained in New York
under the complete control and management of the desiguated New York
trustee, but Sutcliffe removed to and became a resident of Kentucky. Al-
the mails to sell securities without registration statement being in effect, notwithstand-
ing provision that members of trust, committee, or other legal entity should not beindividually liable as issuers. Landay v. United States, et al., 108 F. (2d) 698 (C. C. A.
6th 1939), cert. denied, 309 U. S. 681, 60 Sup. Ct. 721 (1940).
15Rule 220(b). 1 Prentice-Hall (1940) Sec. Reg. Serv. 2045. This rule exempts
securities ". . . offered . . . by, on behalf of, or for the benefit of any person or
persons controlling, controlled by, or under common control with an issuer....
10 (a) and (b) of Rule 220 are in no way made dependent upon each other. Future
offerings under Rule 220(d) are also exempt "[ilf the aggregate offering price of the
securities enumerated in either paragraph (a) or (b) above does not exceed $100,000."(Italics supplied.) See mtpra note 14.
17Securities Act Release No. 2410, p. 2.
18Excluded securities include those of investment trusts or companies; voting trust
certificates; certain oil, gas and mineral rights; certain certificates of interest; securities
of a foreign issuer-; and certain other securities the status of whose issuer depends upon
state regulations, or past conduct before the Commission or courts of competent juris-
diction.
191 Prentice-Hall (1940) Sec. Reg. Serv. ill 2048, 2049.
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though Sutcliffe paid a Kentucky income tax on the proceeds received from
the trust, that state levied an ad valoremn personal property tax on his equit-
able life estate in the trust, computing its value upon the basis of the market
value of the trust fund and Sutcliffe's life expectancy. The state appeals from
a judgment dismissing its proceedings to collect the tax. Held, on the au-
thority of Curry v. McCanless' and Graves v. Elliott,2 reversing two lower
courts, that the tax is valid. Commonwealth v. Sutcliffe, 140 S. W. (2d)
1028 (Ky. 1940).3
The power of a state to tax is limited by the state's jurisdiction over the
subject of and the object of the tax.4 The sine qua non of jurisdiction over
the object seems to be situs. When the object is corporeal and all the ele-
ments of ownership are in one taxpayer, the finding of the magic situs is
relatively simple. The taxable situs of realty is wherethe realty is located, 5
and the jurisdiction of that state to tax is exclusive. 6 Taxation of tangible
personalty was long governed by the maxim nobilia sequuntur personam
(movables follow the person), 7 but the present rule seems to be the same
as that governing realty-that tangible personalty may be taxed only where
actually found.8 Apparently a division of ownership by a declaration of
trust of realty or of tangible personalty would not change the applicable rules
as to jurisdiction to tax, unless the decision of the Kentucky court should
be affirmed by the Supreme Court and the reasoning there employed ex-
tended to all trusts whatever the nature of the corpus. 9
Although intangible personalty by its nature can have no actual situs, the
determination of power to tax this type of property has been guided by
the same magic touchstone. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the
domicile of the owner seemed to have been chosen as the fictional taxing
situs.lO Before this rule became settled, however, the exceptions to it became
1307 U. S. 357, 59 Sup. Ct. 900 (1939), noted (1940) 53 HAv. L. REv. 1013 (1940),
34 ILL. L. REV. 359, (1939) 38 MIcH. L. Rv. 81.2307 U. S. 383, 59 Sup. Ct. 913 (1939), noted (1939) 88 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 120.
3A petition for rehearing and extension of opinion is pending (Oct. 29, 1940).
4 Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S, 194, 26 Sup. Ct. 36 (1905);
State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300, 21 L. ed. 179 (U. S. 1873) ; McCulloch
v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 429, 431, 4 L. ed. 579 (U. S. 1819); MAGILL AND
MAGuIRnE CASES ON TAXATION (1940) 313 et seq.; 1 COOLEY ON TAXATION (4th ed.
1924) § 92, for exhaustive citation of cases. Contra: Pearson v. McGraw, 60 Sup. Ct.
211, 213 (1939).5Witherspoon v. Duncan, 4 Wall. 210, 18 L. ed. 339 (U. S. 1866); 2 COOLEY ON
TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 447; 3 id. § 1066.
62 COOLEY ON TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 447; MAGILL AND MAGUIE, o c. cit. slfpra
note 4.7Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 206, 26 Sup. Ct. 36 (1905).
8 Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 603, 42 A. L. R. 316, 327 (1925) ;
Beale, Jurisdiction to Tax (1919) 32 HARv. L. REv. 587, 597, note 48; 2 COOLEY ON
TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 451, note 95.9 Senior v. Braden, 295 U. S. 422, 55 Sup. Ct. 800 (1934), noted (1935) 21 CORNELL
L Q. 151, held that trust certificates, where trust was of realty, were taxable only at
the situs of the realty. See Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 59 Sup. Ct. 900 (1939).
But compare note 51 infra.
10 Buck v. Beach, 206 U. S. 392, 408, 27 Sup. Ct. 712 (1907) ; Kirtland v. 1Hotchkiss,
100 U. S. 491, 25 L. ed. 558 (1879); State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300,
21 L, ed.. 179 (U. S. 1873) ; see Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U, S. 194, 206, 26
Sup. Ct. 36 (1905).
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so numerous that the rule itself became of little value." The result was
that until 1929 intangibles were susceptible to multi-state taxation on several
logical but contradictory theories.' 2
Trust relationships, with the resultant division of the property interests
between trustee and beneficiary, inject further complications into the field of
taxation of intangibles. It is generally held that the taxable sit s of intangibles
held in trust is the state of the trustee's domicile,13 or the state in which the
trust is administered,' 4 regardless of the domicile of the beneficiary.' 5 Juris-
diction to tax a resident beneficiary on the income from a foreign trust
was established early,' 6 survived a period of anti-double taxation decisions
11Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U. S. 193, 56 Sup. Ct. 773 (1936) ; Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 205 U. S. 395, 27 Sup. Ct. 499. (1907) ; Union Refriger-
ator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct. 36 (1905) ; Assessors v. Comp-
toir National, 191 U. S. 388, 24 Sup. Ct. 109 (1905); Bristol v. Washington County,
177 U. S. 133, 20 Sup. Ct. 585 (1900) ; New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309, 20
Sup. Ct. 110 (1899).
12A chose in action was taxable at the domicile of the creditor [Cream of Wheat v.
Grand Forks County, 253 U. S. 325, 40 Sup. Ct. 558 (1920) (corporate access) ; Hawley
v. Malden, 232 U. S. 1, 34 Sup. Ct. 201 (1913) (shares in foreign corporation) ; Kirt-
land v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491, 25 L. ed. 558 (1879) (debt secured by mortgage on
foreign land); State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds,,15 Wall. 300, 21 L. ed. 179 (U. S.
1872) (railroad bonds)] or at domicile of debtor [Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v.
Louisville, 245 U. S. 54, 38 Sup. Ct. 40 (1917) semble (bank deposit) ; Globe Ins. Co.
v. Board of Assessors for Parish of Orleans, 221 U. S. 346, 31 Sup. Ct. 550 (1910)
(insurance premiums) ; Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277 (1902)
(inheritance tax on non-resident's bank deposit)], and if an instrument were necessary to
effectively control the right-as negotiable documents-the state where the document
was kept could tax il as a chattel [People ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 184 N. Y. 431, 77
N. E. 970, 8 L. R. A. (x. s.) 314 (1906) (shares of stock)) and state of incorporation
could tax shares of domestic corporation [Covey v. Baltimore, 196 U. S. 466, 25 Sup.
Ct. 297 (1904)].
Dix, Must We Carry Our Stocks and Bonds in Our Pockets? (1940) 15 IND. L. J.
373, 393, cites a hypothetical case in which five states could levy both property and trans-
fer taxes on a share of stock. See 2 BOGERT, TRuSTS AND TRUSTEEs (1935) § 262, p. 837;
Pomerance, Situs of Stock (1932) 17 CORNELL L. Q. 43; Stimson, Jurisdiction to Tax
Intangibles (1937) 23 CORNELL L. Q. 143.
132 COOLEY ox TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 469, note 3. Exceptions to the general
rule are noted at notes 7 et seq. See Note (1939) 24 CORNELL L. Q. 590.
142 BOGERT, TRuSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 262, note 25.15Price v. Hunter, 34 Fed. 355 (E. D. Pa. 1888); McClennan v. Bd. of Review, 200
Ili. 116, 65 N. E. 711 (1902); Higgins v. Commonwealth, 126 Ky. 211, 103 S. W. 306
(1907) ; Hemenway v. Inhabitants of Milton, 217 Mass. 230, 104 N. E. 362, L. R. A.
1915C 949 (1914) ; Davis v. Macy, 124 Mass. 193, 32 L. R. A. 439 (1878); Detroit
v. Lewis, 109 Mich. 155, 66 N. W. 958 (1896) ; People ex rel. Western R. Corp. v.
Albany, 40 N. Y. 154 (1869) ; Tafel v. Lewis, 75 Ohio St. 182, 78 N. E. 1003 (1906) ;
Guthrie v. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. Ry., 158 Pa. 433, 27 Atl. 1052 (1893); Ailman,
Petitioner, 17 R. I. 362, 22 Atl. 279 (1891) ; Town of Gallatin v. Alexander, 10 Lea
(Tenn.) 475 (1882) ; Clark v. Powell, 62 Vt. 442, 20 Atl. 597 (1890).
'6Maguire v. Trefrey, 253 U. S. 12, 40 Sup. Ct. 417 (1920) ; see Cook v. Tait, 265
U. S. 47, 44 Sup. Ct. 444 (1924) (sustaining federal income tax on resident beneficiary's
income in foreign,trust) ; Rottschaefer, State Jurisdiction of Inome for Tax Purposes
(1930) 44 HAuv. L. REv. 1075.
The 14th Amendment may limit the power of states to impose income taxes in cases
where double income taxation is the result, although no such limitation is placed on the
federal government. See Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U. S. 378, 53 Sup. Ct. 457, 86 A. L. R.
747, 760 (1933), noted (1933) 47 HAav. L. REv. 307.
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of the Supreme Court,17 and is recognized today even when the trustee has
paid an income tax on the same income in the state of the'trust situs.'1 Legis-
lation conferring the right to tax a resident beneficiary upon his equitable
interest' 9 in a foreign trust has been recognized in the state courts, 20 although
the existence of that right was sometimes denied in the absence of a statute
which specifically included that class of interests in the category of taxable
property.21
Virginia pioneered in the field of taxation of the resident beneficiary's in-
terest in foreign trusts,22 being halted by the Supreme Court in the case of
17Brooke v. Norfolk, 277 U. S. 27, 48 Sup. Ct. 422 (1928) (property tax); Safe
Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 50 Sup. Ct. 59, 67 A. L. k. 386, 393
(1929) (property tax) ; Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 50
Sup. Ct. 98 (1929) (transfer tax). Compare Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50
Sup. Ct. 436 (1930), (transfer tax) with Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1, 48 Sup.
Ct. 410 (1928) (transfer tax) ; Beidler v. South Carolina, 282 U. S. 1, 51 Sup. Ct. 54
(1930) (transfer tax) ; Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 52 Sup. Ct. 174 (1931) (transfer
tax) ; City Farmer's Bank & T. Co. v. Schnader, 293 U. S. 112, 55 Sup. Ct. 29 (1934)
(transfer tax); Senior v. Braden, 295 U. S. 422, 55 Sup. Ct. 880 (1935) (property
tax).
'sStimson, .urisdiction to Tax Income (1937) 22 CORNELL L. Q. 487; Nash, Maguire
v. Trefrey Reclaimed (1939) 27 GEo. L. J. 281; New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 271
N. Y. 353, 3 N. E. (2d) 508 (1936), aff'd, 300 U. S. 308, 57 Sup. Ct. 466 (1937), noted
(1936) 2Z CORNELL L. Q. 93. See also Guarantee Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U. S. 19, 59
Sup. Ct. 1 (1938), noted (1939) 37 MicH. L. REv. 1159; New York ex rel. Whitney v.
Graves, 299 U. S. 366, 57 Sup. Ct. 237 (1937), noted (1937) 15 TEx. L. Rxv. 392, 25
GRo. L. J. 763, 23 VA. L. REv. 465; Lawrence v. State Tax Comm. of Mississippi, 286
U. S. 276, 52 Sup. Ct. 556 (1932), noted (1932) 32 COL. L. Rzv. 1078, 42 YALE L. J. 283;
Harvard Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 284 Mass. 225, 187 N. E. 596 (1933).
19 Brown v. Fletcher, 235 U. S. 589, 599, 35 Sup. Ct. 154 (1915) has been widely
cited as authority for the proposition that the equitable interest of a beneficiary in the
trust is a property right in the fund-though that case does not deal with taxation.
To find an interest sufficient to support a property tax courts have also relied on Maguire
v. Trefrey, 253 U. S. 12, 40 Sup. Ct. 417 (1920), although that case involved ari income
tax, see infra. Whether the interest of the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust is a property
interest, see note 35 infra.2 0Surrall's Committee v. Commonwealth, 102 Ky. 658, 172 S. W. 708 (1915) ; Mc-
Ceney v. County Commissioners, 153 Md. 25, 137 Atl. 291 (1927) ; Humbird v. State
Tax Commission, 141 Md. 405, 119 Atl. 157 (1922) ; Hunt v. Perry, 165 Mass. 287, 43
N. E. 103 (1896); Williston Seminary v. County Commissioners, 147 Mass. 427, 18
N. E. 210 (1886); Ellett v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 136, 110 S. E. 358 (1922) ; Wise
v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 698, 95 S. E. 632 (1918), cert. denied, 248 U. S. 582, 39 Sup.
Ct. 287 (1918); Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Booker, 122 Va. 680, 95 S. E. 664 .(1918);
Seldon v. Brooke, 104 Va. 832, 52 S. E. 632 (1906) ; see Brooke v. Norfolk, 277 U. S.
27, 48 Sup. Ct. 422 (1928) ; Westinghouse Electric Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 188 Cal.
491, 175 Pac. 1076 (1918) ; cf. Maguire v. Trefrey, supra note 16 (income tax) ; but cf.
Augusta v. Kimball, infra note 21; Anthony v. Caswell, infra note 21. Contra: Safe
Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S.'83, 50 Sup. Ct. 59 (1929).2 lLowry v. Los Angeles, 38 Cal. App. 158, 175 Pac. 702 (1918) ; Augusta v. Kimball,
91 Me. 605, 40 Atl. 666 (1898); Dorr v. Boston, 6 Gray 131 (Mass. 1856) ; Berry v.
Windham, 59 N. H. 288 (1879); Anthony v. Caswell, 15 R. I. 159, 1 Atl. 290 (1885).
Contra: St. Albans v. Avery, 95 Vt. 249, 114 AtI. 31 (1921), cert. denied sub norn.
Fonda v. St. Albans, 257 U. S. 640, 42 Sup. Ct. 51, writ of error dismissed, 257 U. S.
666, 42 Sup. Ct. 54 (1921); First Trust and Savings Bank .v. Los Angeles, 206 Cal.
240, 273, Pac. 1066 (1929).22Ellett v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 136, 110 S. E. 358 (1922); Taylor v. Common-
wealth, 122 Va. 693, 95 S. E. 632 (1918) ; Seldon v. Brooke, 104 Va. 832, 52 S. E. 632
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Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia.23  That case, decided in 1929, in a
vigorous attack on double taxation, held that Virginia could not levy an
ad valorem property tax against the value of the entire corpus of a Mary-
land trust merely on the ground that the beneficiaries were Virginia residents,
situs being found in Maryland.24 The Court expressly reserved the question
whether, in the language of Mr. Justice Stone's opinion, ". . . the Fourteenth
Amendment forbids a tax on the beneficiaries. . . where they are domiciled,
measured by their equitable interests. '25  Ohio26 and Pennsylvania 27 pre-
ceded the Kentucky court in seizing upon this dictum in the Safe Deposit
case to support decisions sustaining such taxes, but Maryland 28 and Virginia2 9
arrived at the conclusion that a tax on the beneficiary's interest as defined
by their statutes was in effect a tax on the corpus of a foreign trust and
therefore invalid in view of the decision of the Supreme Court.
Although the Supreme Court bad not reversed its holding in the Safe
Dep'osit Co. case, nor further considered taxation of trust property in such
manner, the Kentucky court, in the case here noted, concluded, as did also
the Pennsylvania court,3 0 that the Supreme Court in the McCanless and
Elliott cases had departed from its insistence upon singleness of taxable
situs and had provided sufficient authority to sustain a tax by the state
of domicile of the beneficiary upon the value of his interest in a foreign trust.31
(1906); Commonwealth v. Williams, 102 Va. 778, 47 S. E. 867 (1904). See Brooklyn
Trust Co. v. Brooker, 122 Va. 680, 95 S. E. 664 (1918).
23280 U. S. 83, 50 Sup. Ct. 59 (1929).
24The beneficiaries here had no present interest in the irrevocable trust created; their
interests would become present upon their attaining the age of twenty-five, at which
time they would become entitled to the principal and accrued income.2 5Mr. Justice McReynolds said, "The power of Virginia to lay a tax upon the fair
value of any interest in the securities actually owned by one of her resident citizens
is not now prescribed for consideration. See Maguire v. Trefrey, srupra." 280 U. S.
83, 92. (Italics added.) The case referred to is the leading case establishing the
validity of the imposition of an income tax on a resident beneficiary's income from a
foreign trust.
Professor Nash interprets this paragraph as holding that an income tax might be
laid on such interest, and points to the subsequent holding in Guarantee Trust Co. v.
Virginia, supra note 18, as bearing him out. See Nash, Maguire v. Trefrey Reclaimed
(1939) 27 GEo. L. J. 281.
Mr. Justice Stone in concurring opinion seems to refer specifically to property taxa-
tion, comparing the situation to similar taxation of a debt secured by mortgage on
foreign realty, which realty is taxed at its situs.25Rowe v. Braden, 126 Ohio St. 533, 186 N. E. 392 (1933).27Commonwealth v. Stewart, 12 A. (2d) 444 (Pa. 1940).2SMayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Gibbs, 166 Md. 364, 171 Atl. 37 (1934),
cert. denied, 293 U. S. 559, 55 Sup. Ct. 71 (1934).29Commonwealth v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 155 Va. 452, 155 S. E. 895 (1930),
noted (1931) 37 W. VA. L. Q. 319.
30Commonwealth v. Stewart, 12 A. (2d) 444, 450 (Pa. 1940), "Any remaining doubt
as to whether the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits two states from both taxing owner-
ship inierests of their respective residents in the same intangibles has been dispelled by
the recent cases of Curry v. McCanless . .. and Graves v. Elliott."
3'The Kentucky court quoted from Ctrry v. McCanless the equivocal statement that
"there are many circumstances in which more than one state may have jurisdiction
to impose a tax and measure it by some or all of the taxpayer's intangibles" to find itsjurisdiction to tax. 140 S. W. (2d) 1028, 1030 (Ky. 1940).
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In those cases, the doctrine of single state death transfer taxation was defi-
nitely abandoned where the settlor of trusts reserved to himself the power of
disposal by devise or appointment.
In the present case there is nio power over the res vested in the beneficiary.
The "property right" being taxed by Kentucky is the bare right to receive
income for life, and the beneficiary has no power to transfer or assign that
right.32 If property taxation is justified as a quid pro quo for protection
afforded by the, taxing state to the property taxed,33 or because its laws
contribute to the continued existence of such a right,34 it would seem clear
that Kentucky cannot tax whatever interest Sutcliffe has, for it affords that
interest no protection except that a transitory action might be brought in
its courts against the New York trustee-if he were found within the court's
jurisdiction. Except for that contingency, the validity and protection of Sut-
cliffe's right depends entirely on the New York courts and the law of that
state. Whether the equitable interest conferred on Sutcliffe by the New
York will, by whatever law it is protected, gives rise to any property right
sufficient to support a property tax might be questioned. 35
Moreover, it is submitted that whatever interest does in fact exist in Ken-
tucky has already been taxed by that state's income tax upon the beneficiary,
and that the levy of an additional "property tax" results in double taxation. 6
In the leading case of Maguire v. Trefrey,37 sustaining the imposition of an
income tax assessed against a resident beneficiary on the income from a
foreign trust, the Supreme Court of the United States approved a finding
that this tax was "founded upon the protection afforded the recipient in his
person, in his right to receive the income, and in his enjoyment of the income
when in his possession, '5 8 and went on to say that the "beneficiary has an
equitable right, title and interest distinct from its [trustee's] legal owner-
3 2 1n the McCanless and Elliott cases emphasis is placed on the power of transfer,
the Court, in the Elliott case saying, ". . . the power of disposition of property is the
equivalent of ownership." 307 U. S. 383, 386, 59 Sup. Ct. 913 (1939). Note that in
the Sutcliffe case there is an entire absence of the power, the beneficiary not being
allowed to transfer his future interest or to change it in any manner. But see GRIS-
wOLD, SPENDTHRFT TRuSTS (1936) §§ 304, 383, 384.33Beale, Jurisdiction to Tax (1919) 32 HARV. L. Rxv. 587; Beale, Progress of the
Law: Taxation (1925) 38 HARv. L. REv. 281.34Mr. Justice Holmes seemed at times to be following this theory. See his dissent
in Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 216, 50 Sup. Ct. 98 (1930).35In Commonwealth v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 155 Va. 452, 456, 155 S. E. 895 (1930),
the following pertinent language was used: "If we denominate her [beneficiary's] in-
terest a life estate [as was done it Sutcliffe case], it is only a life estate in the income
from the estate and not in the corpus. . . . The only interest possessed [by the bene-
ficiary] in her father's estate is an inchoate interest in possible income derived from
a successful investment on the part of the trustee."3 6Such double taxation of the same interest to the same taxpayer is undoubtedly a
constitutional levy, but it seems obvious that the legislative intent was not that this
result should obtain. Where the tax on the beneficiary's interest was laid under a
general property tax law and it was shown that the property has, been taxed in another
state as property and that the beneficiary had paid income taxes in the state of her
residence, the second tax was disallowed in Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v.
Gibbs, infra note 43.
37253 U. S. 12, 40 Sup. Ct. 417 (1920).
881d. at 14.
[Vol. 26
NOTES AND COMMENTS
ship.... It is this property right belonging to the beneficiary, realized in
the shape of income, which is the subject matter of the tax. ... 39 Tlhe
Kentucky court reasoned that the tax in the Maguire case was a property
tax, and, ignoring the fact that an income tax had already been levied by
Kentucky, sustained a further "property tax" against the "right to receive
income from intangibles." 4a Althpugh this double levy upon the income is
not unconstitutional, some indication that the Supreme Court might take this
aspect of the case into consideration may be found in the case of Brooke v.
Norfolk,41 where Mr. Justice Holmes, a proponent of multi-state taxation,
invalidated a property levy on the foreign corpus where the beneficiary had
already paid an income tax.42
The possibility that this type of taxation might be found to be a levy against
the whole corpus, and, so invalid under the Safe Deposit Co. case also exists.
The Maryland court so held, saying, "No legal distinction can be drawn,
we think, between taxing the whole corpus because of the benefit received
by the resident [beneficiary] from it, and taxing so much of it as represents
her share in it upon a capitalization of her income. . . . Either, income or
principal must be the subject of the tax. There is no third or middle ground
for taxation between the two."43
Whether, in the light of recent reversals of Supreme Court opinion upon
multi-state taxation, the McCanless doctrine would be applied in a case of
property taxation of intangibles has been the subject of much current contro-
versy.44 If we assume that it would apply to ad valorem taxation, there still
39M. at 16.
40140 S. W. (2d) 1028, 1032 (Ky. 1940).
41277 U. S. 27, 48 Sup. Ct. 422 (1928).42The precise ground upon which this case was decided is not clear, Mr. Justice
Holmes saying, "The petitioner has paid . . . a tax on the income received by her.
But the doctrine contended for now is that the petitioner is chargeable as if she owned
the whole. .. .Here the property is not within the state, does not belong to the peti-
tioner and is not within her possession or control. The assessment is a bare proposi-
tion to make petitioner pay upon an interest to which she is a stranger. This cannot
be done." 277 U. S. 27, 28, 48 Sup. Ct. 422 (1928). Compare this language to Holmes'
dissent in Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, supra note 17, at 96, where a tax was
levied apparently under the same statute but no income tax was collected. There
Holmes is equally emphatic that the beneficiaries can be taxed on their interest.
See also Mr. Justice Stone's language in New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300
U. S. 308, 313, 57 Sup. Ct. 466 (1937) : "It [a state] may tax net income from bonds
held in trust and administered in another state, Maguire v. Trefrey . .. , although
taxpayer's equitable interest may not be subjected to the tax, Safe Deposit & Trust
Co. v. Vir.qinia. ...4 3 Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Gibbs, 166 Md. 364, 371, 171 Atl. 37 (1934),
cert. denied, 293 U. S. 559, 55 Sup. Ct. 71 (1934).
44 That it would, see Rawlins, State Jurisdiction to Tax Intangibles-Some Modern
Aspects (1937) 15 TEx. L. Rav. 296; Brown, Taxation of Trust Property (1935) 23
Ky. L. J. 403, 419; Traynor, State Taxation and the Supreme Court, 1938 Term (1940)
28 CALIP. L. REV. 1. That it would not, see Dix, Must We Carry Our Stocks and
Bonds in Our Pocketsf (1940) 15 IND. L. J. 373, 376 (criticizing the McCanless rule).
Although its authority is probably extinct in light of subsequent decisions upon the
subject, the case of Lowry v. Los Angeles, 38 Cal. App. 158, 175 Pac. 702 (1918), should
be noted. In that case the court allowed a transfer tax against the estate of the settlor
of a foreign trust who reserved a power to appoint, but held that a property tax could
not be imposed on the same property, which consisted of intangibles, because the securi-
ties had never been within the jurisdiction of. the state.
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remains an important distinction between the McCanless case and the type of
case here noted. The taxpayer in the McCanless case was the settlor, who vol-
untarily extended "his activities with respect to his intangibles, so as to avail
himself of the protection and benefits of the laws of another state,"'45 and re-
tained a measure of control over the property. It may well be that where such a
situation obtains there is justification for a rule that allows taxation by two
states. A very different problem is presented where, as in the case noted,
the tax is levied against a domiciled beneficiary who had no hand in setting
up the foreign trust fund, has no control over the trust management, and no
power over the disposal of the trust property.46 Under these circumstances,
it seems unjust and unwarranted to allow a property tax to be levied by
the two states. Such property is effectively localized at the "seat of the
trust"47 to take on the attributes of tangible personalty. The law requiring
the listing of trust assets precludes danger of such property escaping proper
taxation.48 If the added protection of the trust device gives added reason
to tax, surely the imposition of double income taxes adequately repays the
states for this privilege.49 Unless public policy requires that trusts be con-
fined to and operate within a single state, it would seem that they should
be protected from predatory taxation.50 An affirmance of the Sutcliffe case
by the Supreme Court would, in effect, open wide the door to multiple taxa-
tion of trust property of all description 51
45307 U. S. 357, 367, 59 Sup. Ct. 900 (1939).46The power of the beneficiary to alienate the property in the trust fund seems to
have been the major basis for taxing his interest in the leading case of St. Albans v.
Avery, 95 Vt. 249, 255, 144 Atl. 31 (1921), the court pointing out that "the beneficiaries
are the substantial owners of the trust fund. They have the powe" to control, abso-
lutely, the character of the securities comprising the fund, and to terminate the trust at
will.... To say that they have no 'property' is absurd." The power which the court
emphasizes here is entirely absent in the case noted, which, it is submitted, should lead
to a different result.
4 7
HARDING, DOUBLE TAXATION OF PROPERTY AND INcOME (1933) 106; Beale, The
Progress of the Law, 1919-1920 (1921) 31 HARv. L. REv. 50, 52.48See MASS. ANN. LAWs (Lawyer's Co-op., 1933) c. 254, § 24; Ky. STAT. (Carroll,
1936) c. 108, art. XX, § 4281b-29(2); N. Y. TAX LAw, art. 16, § 365(2), (making it
the legal duty of the trustee to give such information to the tax authorities) ; OHiO
GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, Supp. 1935) § 5372-4 (for clerks of court so doing).49See note 18 supra.50See Phillips, Social Control Through Taxation of Estates and Trusts (1938)
23 CORNELL L. Q. 113.
The Supreme Court has often condemned multi-state taxation. See cases cited
note 17 supra. The states have also recognized the inequity of' the practice and at
least three-quarters of the states had enacted reciprocal exemption statutes prior to
1930. The Supreme Court decisions finding a constitutional prohibition on the
imposition of double taxation rendered these acts nugatory. Would an affirmance of
the Sutcliffe case revive this legislation?
New York went further than most states on this road to self-denial, incorporating
the tax exemption statute into the state constitution. N. Y. CosT." Art. 16,
§ 3, reads in part: ". . . Intangible personal property ... shall be deemed to be located
at the domicile of the owner for the purposes of taxation, and if held in trust; shall not
be deemed to be located in this state for purposes of taxation because the trustee is
domiciled in this state, provided that if no other state has jurisdiction to subject such
property held in trust to death taxation, it may be deemed property having a taxable
situs within the state for purposes of death taxation. .. ."
5lIf the Supreme Court adopts Mr. Justice Stone's analysis of the nature of the right
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Since this note was prepared for the printer, Stewart v. Commonwealth,
12 A. (2d) 444 (Pa. 1940),52 was affirmed by the Supreme Court by memo-
randum decision without opinion, Hughes, C. J., McReynolds and Roberts,
J. J., noting dissents to the Court's action, also without opinion.53
The distinguishing feature of the Sutcliffe case lies in the fact that Kentucky
levied both income and ad valorem property taxes on the beneficiary. In the
Stewart case only a property tax was laid. This being so, and the state of the
domicile of the trustee imposing only an income tax, no double taxation in fact
resulted in the Stewart case. 54 Further, in the Stewart trust there was no
spendthrift provision, which might distinguish the quantum of the taxpayers'
interests in the two cases. 5
The Stewart case affirmance admittedly seems to have the effect of over-
ruling Safe Deposit & Trust Ca. v. Virginia, and to point to a holding that at
least when the state tax statutes expressly list the equitable interest of a
resident beneficiary in a foreign trust of intangibles for the purpose of ad
valorem taxation, that state may levy and collect such a tax.56
It seems unfortunate that the Stewart case should have been affirmed at
this time, when the trend of tax statutes is distinctly away from ad valorem
taxation of intangibles, thus obviating the problem of double taxation in this
field. 57 With that decision in mind, draftsmen of trust instruments will be
well advised to insert a provision that the administration of the trust and the
trust res may be transferred to any state in which the beneficiary subsequently
becomes domiciled, for apparently the only way to avoid double taxation of
trust property seems to lie in keeping the res, the trustee, and the beneficiary
within the bounds of a single state.
Stanley M. Brown
of a cestui que trust [Stone, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust (1917)
17 COL. L. REv. 4671, i.e., that it is a chose in action, it would seem to follow that by
the theory of equitable conversion the beneficiary might be taxed on foreign land
held in trust, or foreign trusts of tangible personalty. The result would be that, in-
asmuch as the state of situs would also tax, trust property would he taxed where the
same property not in trust is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pennsylvania
[In re Arbuckle's Estate, 252 Pa. 161, 97 Atl. 186 (1916) ; In re Vanuxeum's Estate,
212 Pa. 315, 61 Atl. 876 (1905)1, Iowa [In re Sanford, 188 Iowa 833, 175 N. W. 506
(1919)], and South Carolina [Land Title and Trust Co. v. Tax Comm., 131 S. C.
192, 126 S. E. 189 (1925)] once followed this reasoning, but were deterred by the
decision in Frick v. Pennsylvania, supra note 8. For thei reversal, see Ii re Robinson's
Estate, 285 Pa. 308, 132 At. 127 (1926), noted (1926) 25 MICH. L. Rav. 84; In re
Paul's Estate, 303 Pa. 330, 154 Atl. 503, 78 A. L. R. 779, 793 (1931), noted (1931)
41 YALE L. J. 140. New York had always rejected the theory. In re Estate of Swift,
137 N. Y. 77, 32 N. E. 1096 (1893).5 2This case was almost identical on its, facts with the case herein noted. The only
real distinctions on the facts are pointed out above. The tax was levied under Act of
June 22i 1935 § 3, P. L. 414, as amended by Act of July 17, 1936, 1st Ex. Sess., P. L.
51 EPA. STAT. (Purdon, Supp. 1940) tit. 72, § 3244].
539 U. S. L. WEEK 3182 (Jan. 14, 1941).5 4New York does not levy a property tax on intangibles, N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 470,
§ 20, but does tax the income to the trustee, or in certain circumstances to the bene-
ficiary. N. Y. TAX LAw Art. 16, § 365 (1) f. See notes 41-43 supra.
5 5See note 32 supra for discussion.5 5 See notes 19-21 supra and text therewith.57See GREEN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MODERN TAXATION (2d ed. 1938) 327-336.
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Trade Regulation: The position of cooperatives under the Robinson-
Patman and fair trade acts.-The Quality Bakers of America are an
association of wholesale bakers. A corporation of the same name was or-
ganized, the sole stockholders being the members of the association. The
corporation rendered certain services to the members of the association and
also acted as purchasing agent for them. This petition was to review an
order of the Federal Trade Commission which required the corporation to
cease and desist from practices constituting a violation of Section 2(c) of
the Robinson-Patman Act.1 The practices complained of were that the
corporation accepted for the benefit of its members certain prohibited brok-
erage fees and allowances from various sellers of merchandise, including
several flour milling companies. The petitioners contended that they consti-
tute a cooperative association and thus were exempted from the provisions
of Section 2(c) by Section 4 of the Robinson-Patman Act.2 The Circuit
Court held that Section 4 does not authorize cooperative associations to en-
gage in practices forbidden by Section 2(c) of the Act. Quality Bakers of
America et al. v. Federal Trade Commission et al., 114 F. (2d) 393 (C. C.
A. 1st 1940).
In holding that Section 4 of the Robinson-Patman Act does not exempt
cooperatives from the provisions relating to price discrimination the court
was adopting the logical position. The language of the section could not be
interpreted as licensing cooperatives to accept otherwise illegal brokerage
fees, rebates, or discounts. The only purpose in including this provision
would be to remove any doubt as to the ability of a cooperative to return to
its members the profits derived from its legitimate trading activities. It
was never intended that such associations should be allowed to indulge in
practices forbidden to other forms of business enterprise by the Robinson-
Patman Act.3
1Section 2 (c) as found in 49 STAT. 1527 (1936) is embodied in 15 U. S. C. A.
§ 13 (c) (Supp. 1940) and reads as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any person en-
gaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or
accept, anything of value as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any
allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except for services rendered in connection with
the sale or purchases of goods, wares, or merchandise, either to the other party to such
transaction or to an agent, representative, or other intermediary therein where such
intermediary is acting in fact for or in behalf, or is subject to the direct or indirect
control, of any party to such transaction other than the person by whom such com-
pensation is so granted or paid."2 Section 4 as found in 49 STAT. 1528 (1936) is embodied in 15 U. S. C. A. § 13b
(Supp. 1940) and reads as follows: "Nothing in this Act shall prevent a cooperative
association from returning to its members, producers, or consumers the whole, or any
part of, the net earnings or surplus resulting from its trading operations, in proportion
to their purchases from, to, or through the association."
SCongressman Utterback in reporting the bill from the Committee on the Judiciary
said: "Section (f) [now Section 4] affirms the right of cooperatives to distribute their
net earnings resulting from their trading operations among their members on a patron-
age basis in proportion to their purchases or sales from, to, or through such cooperative
association. While the bill contains elsewhere no such provision either express or
implied to the contrary, this section is added as a precautionary reservation in a spirit
of encouragement to the cooperative movement." H. R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1936) 6. A quotation to the same effect is found in the statement of the Man-
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What are the legitimate trading activities in which the cooperative is al-
lowed to engage? There is unquestionably still some benefit in codperation.
The Act does not prohibit, but expressly allows, quantity discounts which
bear a relation to a decrease in'the seller's costs.4 If a retailer's cooperative
actually performs a service to the seller-producer by consolidating orders,
substituting its credit for that of its individual members, and participating
in distribution of the product, there certainly is no reason why it should not
be entitled to such a quantity discount.5 The fact that the cooperative per-
forms services for the producer does not entitle it to brokerage fees from
the latter, as these services are merely incidental to the principal services
performed for the members of the cooperative.6
Functional discounts, on a scale more favorable to wholesalers than to re-
tailers, are given by some producers.7 If such a discount is given, the ques-
tion arises whether a retailers' cooperative is entitled to the wholesale dis-
count. Under the Mennen case,8 decided before the Patman Act, a retailers'
cooperative was said to be classifiable as a retailer rather than as a whole-
saler for the purpose of the functional discount. Under the Robinson-Patman
Act, technical terminology seems of little importance. The determining fac-
tor would appear to be whether or not the cooperative actually performs the
wholesaling function, and if it does relieve the producer of this burden, it is
entitled to the wholesaler's discount.' It might be argued that a retailers'
agers on the part of the House in reporting from the joint conference. H. R. REP.
No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 9.
Again quoting Mr. Utterback: "There is nothing in the last section of the bill [Sec-
tion 4] that distinguishes cooperatives, either favorably or unfavorably, from other
agencies in the streams of production and trade, so far as concerns their dealings with
others." 80 CONG. REc. 9419 (1936).
415 U. S. C. A. § 13 (a) (Supp. 1940). Cf. 15 U. S. C. A. § 13a (Supp. 1940)
which allows quantity discounts but says nothing about service to the producer.5Cf. In the Matter of Simmons Company, 29 F. T. C. 727 (1939). In this case the
"syndicate heads" performed no service for the producer and existed for the mere pur-
pose of pooling purchases so that the syndicate could get the quantity discount and pass
it on to the individual members. There was a finding that the salesmen of the Simmons
Company contacted, solicited and took orders from, and the company delivered its mer-
chandise to, billed, extended credit to and collected from each of the individual members
in exactly the same manner as it did to individual non-member customers.
Even before the Robinson-Patman Act, the courts allowed a producer to refuse
quantity discounts to a pool of purchasers who performed no added service, even though
quantity discounts were allowed to a chain which did render services to the producer.
National Biscuit Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 299 Fed. 733 (C. C. A. Zd 1924),
cert. denied, 266 U. S. 613, 45 Sup. Ct. 95 (1924).OBiddle Purchasing Co. et al. v. Federal Trade Commission, 96 F. (2d) 687 (C. C. A.
2d 1938), cert. denied, 305 U. S. 634, 59 Sup. Ct. 101 (1938).7Congressman Patman says: "There is nothing in the Act which prevents a seller
from establishing a functional discount either for the wholesale function or the retail
function. . . . The various functions may be performed exclusively by separate parties,
or all may be performed by one party, as in the factory-direct-to-consumer system."
PATMAN, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT (1938) 174.
8Mennen Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 288 Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 2d 1923), cert.
denied, 262 U. S. 759, 43 Sup. Ct. 705 (1923).
9PATmAx, op. cit. supra note 7, at 173; Lazo, Commercial Cooperatives Uider the
Patman Law in WERNF- BusINEss AND THE ROBINSON-PATMAN LAW (1938) 145. The
same would be true in treating consumers' cooperatives as retailers for the purpose of
the retailer's discount.
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cooperative is in competition with the independent wholesaler and to grant
a wholesaler's discount to one and not to the other, if both perform the same
function for the producer, would be discrimination under the Act.10
Section 1 of the Act" prevents discrimination where its effect may be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. Quantity
discounts within limits are expressly excepted from this prohibition. It is
arguable that functional discounts, if they are allowed under Section 3, might
be invalid under Section 1 if they diminish competition or promote monopoly.
When a retailer's cooperative accepts a functional discount, it is able to sell
to its members at a lower price as it passes this saving on to them. This
gives a competitive advantage over the independent retailer and the latter
might contend that a monopoly is being gained by the retail members of a
cooperative. However, the advantage to the retailers resulting from the
giving of a functional discount to the cooperative appears to be indirect.
The benefit comes not from the giving of the discount in the first place but
from the practice of the cooperative in selling to its members at the lowest
possible price and minimizing its own profit.12 Whether the courts will out-
law functional discounts to cooperatives will depend, in part, upon the view
taken as to the wisdom of the cooperative movement.13
Another difficult problem is faced in attempting to determine the position
of cooperatives under the various fair trade acts.' 4 It appears from reading
these statutes that cooperatives are bound by resale price maintenance con-
30Cf. In the Matter of Bird & Son, Inc., et al., 25 F. T.'. C. 548 (1937). In this case
the Commission found that there was no discrimination in sales at the same price to
jobbers and to mail order houses. This finding is criticized by Patman on the ground
that the wholesale buyer performs services to the seller in distribution to smaller re-
tailers, and thus is entitled to a functional discount in order to maintain competitive
equality. PATMIAN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 165. See also id. at 54.
115 U. S. C. A. § 13 (a) (Supp. 1940).
1 2it is impossible to state or to speculate upon the result under the various forms
which the cooperative might take. A cooperative which itself actually does purchase
goods, and resells to its members appears above reproach. Differing results might obtain
if the cooperative merely pools orders and does not.supply its own credit, or if goods
are received on consignment or under a trust arrangement. In these situations the re-
lation between the functional discount and the lower price to the retailer is more direct
and more likely to be interpreted as creating a competitive advantage within the pro-
hibition of Section 1.
'
3Lazo, supra note 9, at 149.
14AII states except Delaware, Missouri, Texas and Vermont now have fair trade
acts. 106 C. C. H. 1938 Trade Reg. Serv. W 2800. The Federal government has the
Miller-Tydings Act to implement these. 15 U. S. C. A. § 1 (Supp. 1940), as amended
Aug. 17, 1937, c. 6909, Title VIII, 50 STAT. 693. For the purpose of this discussion all
the state acts are sufficiently similar to be treated alike. They uniformly contain pro-
visions validating resale price maintenance contracts requiring minimum prices on resale
of trade-marked goods both by wholesalers and retailers. A typical provision is found
in the Feld-Crawford Act of New York, N. Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 369-a. The operation
of the Feld-Crawford Act is discussed in (1940) 25 CORNELL L. Q. 414.
The Michigan Act specifically provides that the payment of patronage dividends by
farmers' cooperative associations on the basis of sales of commodities sold under the
provisions of the Act is not to be construed as a violation of the provisions of the Act.
MIcH. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, Supp. -1940) § 19.323. Does this provision imply that
other types of cooperatives are prohibited from returning patronage dividends on pro-
fits from sales of trade-marked goods?
The Wisconsin Act contains a provision that the section should hot apply to any
cooperative society or association not organized for profit. Wis. STAT. (1939) § 133.25
(8). This provision was declared unconstitutional. Weco Products Company v. Reed
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tracts in the same manner as any other vendor of trade-marked goods.15
A decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, invalidating as unconstitutional
a provision of the Wisconsin Fair Trade Act which exempts cooperatives,' 6
supports the position that these associations are bound to abide by the prices
fixed by the producer.17  The court said that the purpose of the Fair Trade
Act was to protect the good will of the! producer,' 8 and that to allow a co-
operative selling in competition with other retailers to cut prices would thwart
this purpose.
It would seem that this prohibition applies only to discounts given at the
time of the sale thereby leading directly to a lower price. A cooperative at
the end of any fiscal period is not barred from returning to its members on
a patronage basis the profits derived from its trading activities.19 This is
true even though some of the profits come from the sale of goods under
resale price maintenance contracts, and though it results indirectly in a
lowered price on these goods to the members of the cooperative.2 0 Any
other result would militate against the purpose and policy behind the co-
operative movement by requiring the profits made on price-fixed goods to be
accumulated and never distributed.21
Section 4 of the Robinson-Patman Act 22 serves only a limited purpose;
it prevents harassment of cooperatives based upon their return of dividends.
A similar provision should be included in the various fair trade acts to remove
doubt as to the ability of a cooperative to return in patronage dividends the
profits made on sales of goods under resale price maintenance agreements.
Richard J. Bookhout
Drug Company, 225 Wis. 474, 274 N. W. 426 (1937). The decision might well have
been different had the exemptions been confined so as to allow cooperatives to return
only patronage dividends of profits.
Pennsylvania by decision has exempted a retailers' cooperative from the provisions
allowing resale price maintenance as to wholesalers. Such an association was held not
to be a wholesaler, and there was no violation of the price agreement as the individual
members maintained the established retail prices. The Welch Grape Juice Co. v. Frank-
ford Grocery Co., 36 Pa. D. & C. 653 (1939).
'
5 Only those cooperatives whose members are consumers are affected by any fair
trade act, and these insofar only as they handle trade-marked or standard brands which
are covered by resale price maintenance agreements. A cooperative which engages solely
in marketing the goods of its producer-members is not touched by such legislation.
'
0 Wis. ST.AT. (1939) § 133.25 (8).
17Weco Products Company v. Reed Drug Company, 225 Wis. 474, 274 N. W. 426
(1937).
18See also Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U. S.
183, 195, 57 Sup. Ct. 139 (1936).
lOThis principle applies to all cooperatives engaged in selling, whether wholesalers',
retailers', or consumers' associations.20,The distinction between the return of profits and the giving of a direct discount is
a question of interpretation to be determined from the facts of the arrangement em-
ployed in the particular case. The extremes are the declaring of dividends of profits
at the end of the fiscal year, and the giving of an immediate lower price or even a cash
refund. The shading, of the middle ground from legality to illegality is evident; where
the line is to be drawn must of necessity be left to the interpretation of the courts.21An analogy can be drawn to the case of a merchandising corporation which might
happen to sell a trade-marked article to a shareholder. It would be anomalous to hold
that the shareholder was not entitled to a dividend which would include part of the
profits made on the sale to him of the article subject to a resale price maintenance
agreement.2 2Sitpra note 2.
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